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l)CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DURING MARKET TRANSITION
HETEROGENEOUS RESPONSES TO INSTITUTIONAL TENSIONS IN CHINA
Corporate governance in transition economies does not fit in the dominant normative
models. China embodies institutional tensions between an inherited system of political
governance and new laws transplanted from Western countries that empower external
shareholders on capital markets. 
The two empirical studies in this dissertation apply set theoretic methods on large
samples of Chinese listed firms to uncover the causal complexity involved in corporate
governance problems, focusing on the complementarities, functional equivalence and
causal asymmetry. The first study analyses the configurations that facilitate and deter the
most salient governance problem: the diversion of cash flow from the firm by controlling
shareholders through tunneling. The second study analyses the diversity of governance
forms in successful firms, including politically embedded firms, those that rely on outsider
control systems resembling the Anglo-American model, as well as creative hybrid forms. 
The dissertation shows that, even in transition economies, property rights matter for
allocating decision making rights between large and minority shareholders. Also, political
connections matter, but not as much as is commonly assumed since many private firms
operate profitably without any political ties. In addition, the observed domestic hetero -
geneity of forms compels to drop the conception of “transition” as a linear process
towards market institutions in favor of a finer understanding that accommodates a
diversified landscape including resilient features of political governance. Finally, the thesis
commands caution regarding the role of independent directors, who not only fail to
provide effective monitoring on insiders, but often facilitate collusion easing tunneling
behavior.
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onder -
zoek school) in the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding
participants of ERIM are the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University (RSM),
and the Erasmus School of Econo mics (ESE). ERIM was founded in 1999 and is officially
accre dited by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research
under taken by ERIM is focused on the management of the firm in its environment,
its intra- and interfirm relations, and its busi ness processes in their interdependent
connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage ment, and to offer an
ad vanced doctoral pro gramme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three
hundred senior researchers and PhD candidates are active in the different research pro -
grammes. From a variety of acade mic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM commu nity is
united in striving for excellence and working at the fore front of creating new business
knowledge.
Erasmus Research Institute of Management - 
Rotterdam School of Management (RSM)
Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR)
P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, 
The Netherlands
Tel. +31 10 408 11 82
Fax +31 10 408 96 40
E-mail info@erim.eur.nl
Internet www.erim.eur.nl
Erim - 15 omslag Tremblay (15176).qxp_Erim - 15 omslag Tremblay  20/08/15  11:02  Page 1
1_Erim BW Tremblay_Stand.job
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate Governance during Market Transition: 
Heterogeneous responses to institutional tensions in China 
  
2_Erim BW Tremblay_Stand.job
  
3_Erim BW Tremblay_Stand.job
 
Corporate Governance During Market Transition: 
Heterogeneous responses to institutional tensions in China 
 
Corporate Governance in een veranderende markt: 
Heterogene reacties op institutionele spanningen in China 
 
Thesis 
 
to obtain the degree of Doctor from the  
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
by command of the 
Rector Magnificus 
 
Prof.dr. H.A.P. Pols 
and in accordance with the decision of the Doctorate Board 
The public defense shall be held on 
Friday, 25 September 2015 at 9:30 hrs 
 
by 
 
Pierre-Olivier Legault Tremblay 
born in Montréal, Canada. 
 
  
4_Erim BW Tremblay_Stand.job
Doctoral Committee  
Promoter:   Prof.dr. B. Krug 
 
Other members:  Prof.dr. B. Cambré 
   Prof.dr. P. Reinmoeller 
Prof.dr. F.H. Wijen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Erasmus Research Institute of Management – ERIM 
The joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management (RSM)   
and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at the Erasmus University Rotterdam 
Internet: http://www.erim.eur.nl 
 
ERIM Electronic Series Portal: http://repub.eur.nl/pub 
 
ERIM PhD Series in Research in Management, 362 
ERIM reference number: EPS-2015-362-ORG 
ISBN 978-90-5892-419-3 
© 2015, Pierre-Olivier Legault Tremblay 
 
Design: B&T Ontwerp en advies www.b-en-t.nl   
 
This publication (cover and interior) is printed by haveka.nl on recycled paper, Revive®. 
The ink used is produced from renewable resources and alcohol free fountain solution. 
Certifications for the paper and the printing production process: Recycle, EU Flower, FSC, ISO14001. 
More info: http://www.haveka.nl/greening 
 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means 
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, 
without permission in writing from the author. 
 
 
  
5_Erim BW Tremblay_Stand.job
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my future grandchildren, 
who will probably speak Mandarin… 
  
6_Erim BW Tremblay_Stand.job
  
7_Erim BW Tremblay_Stand.job
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
Writing a doctoral thesis is a great adventure. The synonyms dictionary offers relevant 
alternatives to “great” in this context: fantastic, marvelous, remarkable. But the list also 
contains: enormous, heavy, vast. For me, it was all that. The learning process to become a 
scholar and researcher is an amazing journey of exploration, pursuing answers to challenging 
questions. My doctoral path was sinuous, geographically between Rotterdam, Montreal and 
Shanghai, but also conceptually between streams of literature. Along the path, many people 
provided crucial support, advice, and guidance that proved vital to the progress and 
completion of my research endeavor. 
First and foremost, I am immensely grateful for the unflinching support provided by my 
doctoral supervisor Barbara Krug. Barbara, your depth of knowledge on China, your 
amazing capacity for brainstorming, your creative ideas to bridge concepts and your rigorous 
scrutiny with wording clarity have proved invaluable assets to the development of my 
research. Thank you for giving me enormous flexibility to explore, but also flexibility to 
balance my work and family life, and for engaging fully with my research especially in the 
crucial last steps. I am also grateful to the other members of my doctoral committee: Bart 
Cambré, Patrick Reinmoeller, Frank Wijen, Taco Reus and Jeroen Kuilman. Likewise, I 
heartily thank the people who provided insightful comments on my thesis proposal in the 
early stages of research: Ed Carberry, Will Felps, Hans Hendrischke, Sonja Opper, Élias 
Rizkallah, Wouter Stam and Dean Xu. 
What make doctoral studies so interesting are plentiful informal discussions with colleagues 
to challenge ideas, share views and learn. Much of the strength of RSM lies in its people. I 
wish to thank everyone who gravitated around the China Business Centre: Johannes, Mark, 
Nathan, Ona, Sergey, Ying. Your encouragements, trust, constructive comments and support 
were invaluable. I also enjoyed every spontaneous discussion, seminar and lunch with my 
colleagues in the Organization department. The faculty and staff made this department very 
welcoming: Anne, Babs, Bart, Bas, Daan, Dicea, Dirk, Gabriele, George, Hugo, Irma, Kate, 
Meir, Niels, Pursey, Shira, Slawomir, Steffen, Wendy. And the PhDs, many of which 
became good friends, made the workplace so much more enjoyable, comfortable and fun: 
Burcu, Christian, Colin, Eliza, Giorgio, Inga, Jasmien, Jorien, Julija, Maartje, Maya, Merlijn, 
Suzanne, Victoria, Wendong, Yingjie. You all helped me grow as a researcher, but primarily 
as a person. 
All along my PhD program, I benefited from the support a several institutions, without which 
it would have been impossible. The people at ERIM, especially Patrick, Miho and Marisa, 
have been very supporting and diligent since the beginning. I am really grateful for the 
financial support from ERIM and the Erasmus Trustfonds that facilitated data acquisition, 
8_Erim BW Tremblay_Stand.job
visits to conferences and a research visit to China. The bulk of my funding as a PhD was 
awarded by the Fonds de recherche du Québec sur la Société et la culture (FQRSC). I would 
not have started nor finished my degree without their support, so I wish to thank the fund 
and the committee that awarded me this research grant. I also wish to thank Kalun Tse who 
made possible my research visit at the China Europe International Business School (CEIBS) 
in Shanghai. Special thanks to Professor Mike Thompson and the data team at the library. 
They have been helpful and welcoming. 
Hard work is necessary to produce a thesis, but my best memories from my time at RSM 
will remain the lighter moments I spent with new friends. A coffee break, a too rare night 
out, a diner, a philosophical debate at the pub, a bike ride home, a basketball game, a visit at 
the zoo or at a medieval carnival! It is nearly impossible to name all the people that 
contributed to make those years so fulfilling. Anne, Balazs, Basak, Bernardo, Claude, Diana, 
Els, François, Irina, Lameez, Laura, Laurie-Anne, Marco, Mehdi, Melek, Misagh, Neeltje, 
Nufer, Oguz, Philip, Pooyan, Pourya, Riccardo, Roxana, Silviu, Sophie, Stefanie, Teng, 
Teodor, Thomas, Tim, Yannis. We laughed, shared aspirations, lighted barbecues, dared, 
doubted, danced, fooled around, overcame, celebrated... Life is crazy and beautiful, always 
worth an argument and a smile. I love you all. 
I cannot say how important my family is: la famille Legault Tremblay et la famille Audette-
Chapdelaine. In our lives full of uncertainties, knowing that I lay on a foundation of 
unconditional trust, support and care is an immense source of strength. My parents, Benoit 
and Marie-France, your limitless moral support, your generosity, your patient understanding, 
your loving dedication to make every gathering, discussion and experience so much more 
viable and meaningful for me and my loved ones are worth the world. And my close friends 
at home, Alexis, David, Nic, Alexandre, Lilia, Vicki, thank you for always being there, 
regardless of the distance and time, with your comforting words in hardships, your 
enthusiasm, your engaging companionship with no expectations. The person I am today was 
born out of our friendship. 
Alice, you are my model of curiosity, adaptation, sensemaking and wonderment. Marianne. 
My love. My best friend. My teammate. My best public and my favorite performer. My 
partner in life, in travelling, in parenting. My sober conscience and my foolish accomplice. 
You make it all worth it.
9_Erim BW Tremblay_Stand.job
ix 
 
CONTENTS 
List of Figures xii 
List of Tables xiii 
CHAPTER 1 – GENERAL INTRODUCTION 15 
1 Corporate governance: a rudimentary introduction 15 
2 A “complementarities” perspective on reforms and emerging governance forms 18 
2.1 Complementarity and Incremental Change 18 
2.2 Decoupling in Transition Economies 19 
2.3 Heterogeneity and Shifting Hierarchy in the System 21 
3 Empirical context: China and the listed sector 22 
3.1 Corporate Governance Reforms in China 23 
3.2 The Rise of Chinese Listed Firms and the Resilience of Political Control 26 
4 Approach and method 30 
5 Aims and structure of the dissertation 33 
5.1 Principal-Principal Relationships at the Core of Corporate Governance Problems in 
China: A Set Theoretic Analysis 34 
5.2 Political Embeddedness and Corporate Governance: Heterogeneity and 
Hybridization in China 37 
5.3 Comparison and General Contributions 39 
CHAPTER 2 - PRINCIPAL-PRINCIPAL RELATIONSHIPS AT THE 
CORE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS IN CHINA: A SET 
THEORETIC ANALYSIS 41 
1 INTRODUCTION 41 
2 CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER EXPROPRIATION PROBLEM 47 
2.1 Tunneling: Definition and Prevalence in China 47 
2.2 Determinants of tunneling 50 
2.3 Proposition Building, Complementarities and Substitution Effects 61 
10_Erim BW Tremblay_Stand.job
x 
 
3 EMPIRICAL STUDY: METHODOLOGY 65 
3.1 Data and Sample 65 
3.2 Set Theoretic Method 66 
3.3 Outcome Variable: Inter-Firm Loans as a Measure of Tunneling Behavior 70 
3.4 Causal Conditions 72 
3.5 Descriptive statistics 75 
4 RESULTS 78 
4.1 Outcome Tunneling: Operationalization and Solution Output 78 
4.2 Outcome Tunneling: Findings 80 
4.3 Outcome No Tunneling: Operationalization and Solution Output 85 
4.4 Outcome No Tunneling: Findings 87 
4.5 Limitations 91 
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 92 
CHAPTER 3 – POLITICAL EMBEDDEDNESS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: HETEROGENEITY AND HYBRIDIZATION IN 
CHINA 99 
1 INTRODUCTION 99 
2 Political governance and political embeddedness in china 106 
2.1 Corporate Governance Reforms: An Issue of Depoliticization 106 
2.2 The Resilience of Political Embeddedness in China 108 
2.3 Political Embeddedness and Firm Performance 112 
3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 116 
3.1 Competing Models of Corporate Governance 116 
3.2 Domestic Heterogeneity of Corporate Governance Configurations 120 
3.3 Corporate Governance Models “With Chinese Characteristics” 123 
3.4 Hybridization: Corporate Governance Configurations 127 
4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 130 
4.1 Data and Sample 130 
4.2 Method 131 
4.3 Outcome Measure: Firm Performance 133 
4.4 Explanatory Conditions 134 
4.5 Analysis 138 
11_Erim BW Tremblay_Stand.job
xi 
 
5 RESULTS 141 
5.1 Sample of Private Firms 141 
5.2 Sample of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 148 
5.3 Additional General Findings 154 
6 CONCLUSION 156 
CHAPTER 4 – GENERAL CONCLUSION 163 
1 The dissertation’s aim and motivation 163 
2 Summary of the results 165 
3 Theoretical implications 168 
4 Practical implications 174 
5 Concluding remarks 176 
REFERENCES 177 
Summary (English) 200 
Summary (Dutch) 201 
Summary (French) 202 
Summary (Mandarin) 203 
About the Author 204 
  
12_Erim BW Tremblay_Stand.job
xii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Chapter 1 
Figure 1. Stock market development in China .................................................................... 26 
Figure 2. Ownership in Chinese listed firms ....................................................................... 27 
Figure 3. Listed firms’ compliance with rule on independent directors .............................. 28 
 
  
13_Erim BW Tremblay_Stand.job
xiii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Chapter 2: 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of tunneling variable and causal conditions ........................ 76 
Table 2. Provinces and industry distribution ....................................................................... 77 
Table 3. Frequency and consistency thresholds (outcome: tunneling) ................................ 79 
Table 4. Solutions for tunneling .......................................................................................... 80 
Table 5. Tunneling incentives and mechanism ................................................................... 81 
Table 6. Absence of governance practices .......................................................................... 83 
Table 7. Asymmetry and board independence .................................................................... 84 
Table 8. Frequency and consistency thresholds (outcome: no tunneling) ........................... 86 
Table 9. Solutions for absent tunneling............................................................................... 87 
Table 10. Incentives and mechanisms ................................................................................. 88 
Table 11. Disclosure complementarities ............................................................................. 89 
Table 12. Floating complementarities ................................................................................. 90 
 
Chapter 3: 
Table 13. Descriptive statistics of variables used in the models for private firms and 
SOEs ................................................................................................................................. 138 
Table 14. Configurations leading to performance in private firms ................................... 142 
Table 15. Descriptive statistics: Configurations in sample of private firms ..................... 143 
Table 16. Configurations leading to performance in SOEs ............................................... 149 
Table 17. Descriptive statistics: Configurations in sample of SOEs ................................. 150 
 
 
14_Erim BW Tremblay_Stand.job
  
15_Erim BW Tremblay_Stand.job
15 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 – GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A RUDIMENTARY INTRODUCTION 
How are firms governed? Ever since Berle and Means’ (1932) treatise on The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property, the governance of large corporations is conceived 
through the separation between ownership and control. As opposed to owner managed firms 
in which the owner makes the decisions and claims the profits, stock listed firms involve 
shareholders that bring the capital and claim the residual profits, and managers to whom the 
administration of the firm is delegated. The benefits of the separation largely rest on the 
efficiency gains when the transaction costs involved in hierarchical decision making are 
lower than those of market mechanisms (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1979). The relationship 
between owners and managers has been professionalized over time in formal corporate 
governance structures. Typically, the shareholders gather yearly in the shareholders’ 
meeting to elect (usually on the basis of one share one vote) representatives among 
themselves that, on their behalf, oversee the management during the year. They form the 
board of directors. There has been abundant research on corporate governance, on the 
structure of boards, on the roles of directors and on the rules governing the shareholders’ 
meetings (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010; Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003). This body of 
research has led to prescriptions that have been integrated in corporate laws, stock exchange 
rules, companies’ bylaws and in codes of corporate governance.  
For long, the intellectual tradition of both the scholarship and the practice of corporate 
governance has been rooted in the specific context of and theorized according to the realities 
of American and British listed firms. While there is some domestic variety of ownership 
structures and despite some institutional features such as private contracting and too big to 
fail banks diverge from the theorized model, the dominant model observed in listed firms 
came to be seen as an ideal type at least is the US and the UK. Most large firms in these 
countries are characterized by dispersed ownership, which means that firms listed on the 
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stock exchanges often have a large number of shareholders that share the decision making 
rights. One of the inherent strengths of dispersed ownership rests in the disciplining effect 
of a market for corporate control (Butler, 1989; Easterbrook & Fischel, 1991). If a firm is 
poorly managed, it falls in value and may become the target of a hostile takeover by 
investors, with the aim of restructuring the firm, improve its management and regain value. 
Yet, given the separation between management and the board representing the interests of 
shareholders, the biggest challenge is to mitigate principal-agent problems between a firm’s 
management and its large pool of shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency 
problems arise when managers make decisions that are not in the best interests of 
shareholders. This may include empire building, whereby managers invest in projects that 
are not economically profitable. The solutions prescribed usually include the presence of 
independent directors on the board to avoid that executives control its agenda (Weisbach, 
1988). Also, appointing a different person to the role of board chairman and of CEO helps 
ensuring a proper monitoring of managers. Implementing incentive compensation through 
stock options for managers also helps to align their personal interests with those of 
shareholders, namely maximizing the value for shareholders (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). This 
type of model can be called the outsider-control system (Franks & Mayer, 1997). It is usually 
found in countries with market based systems such as the US and the UK, where capital for 
investment in large firms is primarily drawn from the equity market. 
But not all markets have dispersed ownership. In many countries, such as France, Germany 
and Japan, the law offers less protection to small shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). In this context, most firms remain under the control of a few 
insiders: large investors or often a single family. Then, the insiders are typically more 
involved in the operations as well, thereby reducing principal-agent problems. Firms in these 
systems often set up an additional board, the supervisory board, where key partners are 
invited to sit in order to coordinate their efforts to the benefit of the firm (Aoki, 1984). These 
partners, called stakeholders, may include members from the controlling family, 
representatives of employees, an agent from the bank, professors from a collaborating 
academic research center, etc. While agency problems are mitigated by the ownership 
concentration, a different challenge may arise from principal-principal problems in the form 
of tunneling (Johnson, Boone, Breach, & Friedman, 2000). Indeed, the controlling owner 
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may us e the firm’s assets to maximize its private benefits of control, such as employing 
family members regardless of qualifications or by investing in particular projects that allow 
them to achieve advantages in other ventures they control (Jiang & Peng, 2011). These 
decisions may have large opportunity costs and not offer the highest marginal returns to 
smaller shareholders. Such problems are partly mitigated by anti-self-dealing regulations 
(Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008), and by the supervisory board that 
contributes to the long term orientation of corporate decisions (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). 
This type of model can be called the insider-control system (Franks & Mayer, 1997). It is 
usually found in countries with bank-based systems such as Germany and Japan, where 
capital for investment is mainly channeled through financial institutions (Gilson & Roe, 
1993). 
These ideal-type models, dominant in the literature and practice across the OECD, provide 
normative bases to analyze the development of corporate governance regimes in other parts 
of the world as well. Yet, the starting point in most emerging countries that have embarked 
on lengthy processes of reforms to establish their own system differs substantially. For 
instance, transition economies with strong state sectors such as China, Vietnam and Russia 
face challenges that go far beyond principal-agent problems. Many firms are still ultimately 
controlled by the state, many private firms were born out of privatization of state assets, the 
legal system lacks independence and political elites are particularly influential (Allen & 
Shen, 2012; Opper & Schwaag-Serger, 2008). Nonetheless, some of these countries have 
initiated regulatory reforms that try to implement features and rules of the West in a search 
for solutions to professionalize their corporate governance systems. There is a tension 
between the heavy heritage of government authority and the intention to empower external 
shareholders through legal reforms. The present doctoral dissertation aims to contribute to 
understanding whether and how firms’ responses to this tension shape the emergence of a 
new stable corporate governance regime in a transition economy with a strong state. 
In the remainder of this general introduction, section two reviews theoretical insights 
concerning complementarities, decoupling and heterogeneity that provide additional 
conceptual guidance about the emergence of new forms of corporate governance. Section 
three presents the case of China as a field that embodies the tension between inherited 
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institutions of political governance and recent efforts of professionalization of corporate 
governance. Section four presents the particular approach of configurational analysis, along 
with the methodology used in the operationalization of the empirical studies: fuzzy-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). Section five summarizes the aims and 
contributions of each of the two main substantive chapters of the thesis, including a brief 
account of the findings and a comparison of the two studies. 
 
2 A “COMPLEMENTARITIES” PERSPECTIVE ON REFORMS AND 
EMERGING GOVERNANCE FORMS 
2.1 Complementarity and Incremental Change 
During the last decade, a large part of the debate about corporate governance reforms has 
revolved around the convergence hypothesis. First put forward by Hansmann and Kraakman 
(2001), it predicts that listed firms around the world will ultimately all adopt the Anglo-
American model based on agency theory prescriptions and dispersed ownership. The 
hypothesis has found some empirical support (Markarian, Parbonetti, & Previts, 2007), but 
has also been challenged on both conceptual and empirical grounds. Aoki (2001: 225) 
observes that the “institutional complementarity” in corporate governance is a force that 
sustains the diversity of systems internationally. Tarun Khanna (see Khanna, Kogan, & 
Palepu, 2006; Khanna, Palepu, & Sinha, 2005) also explains that systems of corporate 
governance consist of a number of complementary elements involving firm-level practices 
and contingencies from the institutional environment and the legal framework. Schmidt and 
Spindler (2002: 319) define complementarity as elements that “mutually increase their 
benefits […] or mutually reduce their disadvantages or costs”, while consistency 
characterizes a system of which the constitutive elements fit together and “exploit the 
potential created by complementarity”.  Höpner (2005: 332) further explains that in most 
fields, “complementarity refers to a constellation in which two (or more) elements must be 
combined to produce a particular outcome”. Taken together, these two definitions entail that 
complementarity concerns elements that are parts of a consistent system and that have 
mutually reinforcing causal relationships with an outcome. It has been argued that 
complementarities are a force for path dependency, preventing substantive reforms towards 
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an entirely new system. In this vein, Schmidt and Spindler (2002) propose that consistent 
systems are path dependent because of the costs associated with the risk of system wide 
disruption upon the reform of one element. While complementarities contribute to the 
persistence of a system, they may also represent its weakness. To the extreme, the definite 
disruption of a single element through internal tensions or external shocks can destabilize 
the overall consistency. Therefore, radical but isolated changes can hurt the system’s 
effectiveness. 
From this perspective, Schmidt and Spindler (2002) argue that only marginal improvements 
within a configuration can be implemented to reach a local optimum. This local efficiency 
peak may not be the highest when compared to the full range of possible systems. Only 
radical changes involving reforms of a critical mass of elements may justify the disruption 
costs associated with switching to another consistent system and achieve a new equilibrium. 
In practice however, reforms often concern only one or few marginal elements that can 
provide short term improvements towards the local optimum to satisfy political pressures 
from powerful constituencies and stakeholders (Schmidt & Spindler, 2002). In turn, 
institutional domains often display complementarities that reinforce the resulting 
predominant actors' interests in a virtuous circle (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). According to 
the path dependency perspective, a wave of corporate governance reforms such as that 
witnessed in China in 2006 could either only achieve incremental improvements of the 
system towards a local optimum or trigger, after a system-wide disruption, a more 
fundamental realignment of elements under a new consistent system. Yet, even significant 
reforms in the books may fail translate into actual changes in practice. 
 
2.2 Decoupling in Transition Economies 
The particularity of transition economies such as China, Vietnam or Russia, with their 
imperfect regulatory framework, stems not from the law itself, but mostly from its low usage 
and weak enforcement. In the long run, improving the rule of law in capital markets can help 
reduce transaction costs (Williamson, 1979, 1991) and enhance predictability in dispute 
resolution (Cooter & Rubinfeld, 1989; Posner, 1973a, 1973b). While this may ultimately 
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apply to China, in the short run, Opper and Schwaag-Serger (2008) explain that legal reforms 
of corporate governance in China provide a perfect illustration for the mismatch between 
new laws in the books (de jure) and actual practices in the field (de facto). This has also been 
called decoupling (Fiss & Zajac, 2004, 2006), meaning that mere apparent compliance to 
the corporate law is sufficient and tolerated where enforcement is lacking or unfeasible (Fiss, 
2007). In this context, “meaningful analysis of legal change in transition economies, such as 
China's, [...] requires analysis of institutional frameworks that shape social behavior, which 
in turn explain the effectiveness of changes in the law” (Opper & Schwaag-Serger, 2008: 
245). The changes in social behavior entailed by reforms in corporate governance touch on 
deeply rooted systems of central command and planning that can only slowly evolve into 
more decentralized structures of decision making to accompany the professionalization of 
management and its separation from ownership. 
In addition, many legal prescriptions are not binding, but mere recommendations. They are 
ambiguous, in many cases intentionally. Dobbin and Sutton (1998) argue that specific legal 
compliance requirements are left in large parts for organizations to define, often consuming 
large amounts of resources in the process. So the practical applications of law in business 
activities are often shaped by a continuous negotiation process between actors. In other 
words, “legality1 may originate in the external environment, but its meaning is often 
negotiated” (Edelman & Suchman, 2007: 10). In China, the Company Law textually states 
that the provisions are applicable unless the statutes of the corporation provide for different 
arrangements. In this sense, the implementation is largely left to the economic actors 
themselves. To be useful, the supply of law must follow the demand. “Despite impressive 
achievements in formal legal change, many transition economies have yet to learn how to 
use their new legal order effectively.” (Pistor, Raiser, & Gelfer, 2000: 357) So while it is 
important to implement “legal rules whose meaning can be understood and whose purpose 
is appreciated by domestic law makers, law enforcers, and economic agents, who are the 
final consumers of these rules” (Berkowitz, Pistor, & Richard, 2003: 192), the law only 
provides the backbone for contractual relationships resulting from constant renegotiation. 
                                                          
1 According to Selznick et al. (1969: 11), the expression “legality” is inter-changeable with 
the concept of “rule of law”. 
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2.3 Heterogeneity and Shifting Hierarchy in the System 
Such a dynamic process of implementation of legal changes allows for substantial 
spontaneity and heterogeneity. Ahlering and Deakin (2007: 870) subscribe to the view that 
“complementarities often arise from unexpected contingencies or conjunctions” through an 
evolutionary process that, at the systemic level, cannot be planned. The constant 
renegotiation and adaptation by economic agents can affect the efficiency of specific 
elements of the system. Ahlering and Deakin (2007) consider that this unpredictable process 
is often self-reinforcing towards a contextually efficient system, suggesting that spontaneity 
may be compatible with path dependence. Still, this dynamic process that thrives towards a 
local optimum is expected to exhibit tensions among its elements. While the internal 
consistency among the elements of a system certainly contributes to stability, many scholars 
argue that even stable configurations of complementary elements are not static equilibria. 
Boyer and Saillard (2005) and Crouch and Farrell (2004) explain that complementarity and 
consistency can still carry some incoherency, redundancies and tensions between elements. 
Aguilera and Jackson (2003) propose that it is likely that the conflicting pressures that 
emerge from different domains of the institutional setting result in heterogeneity within a 
national market. Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel and Jackson (2008) observe that, while some 
complementarities can be hypothesized based on past theory, empirical evidence has shown 
substantial heterogeneity of combinations of practices across firms. 
In addition, the constant process of renegotiation is likely to result in an equally constantly 
changing hierarchy among the elements of a system over time, and across cases. Even across 
firms with resembling consistent systems, the relative importance of complementary 
elements, or whether they are core or peripheral causal conditions, can vary. Höpner (2005: 
342) explains that “a given institution shapes the organization of related institutions, but in 
an asymmetric way, with the hierarchy among institutions undergoing permanent change”. 
The relative importance of certain elements of the system evolves in different ways 
depending on the relations between the particular economic agents involved in a transaction. 
Such variations are expected to contribute to the domestic diversity. Aguilera et al. (2008) 
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suggest that the variety of configurations in a given market can be important to provide the 
grounds for future adaptation. This proposition is in line with Stark’s (2001) argument that 
national variety of combinations (or recombination) of practices can provide flexibility. 
While a number of economic agents might achieve a local optimum, there is the possibility 
that other economic agents adopt suboptimal systems that, while less efficient in the short 
run, may prove to be more compatible with forthcoming large scale legal reforms. Domestic 
heterogeneity, it follows, would prevent system wide disruption while the regime could 
accommodate for experimentation with a variety of systems concurrently. 
To sum up, given that firms seek to take advantage of the complementarities offered by 
different elements of the system, given that implementation of reforms is often negotiated 
among the actors, and given that the hierarchy of elements is context-specific, the shape of 
the corporate governance regime in China is influenced by the heterogeneity of governance 
structures adopted by firms in response to the institutional tensions between the inherited 
tradition of political control and recent market oriented reforms. The present doctoral 
dissertation dives into the issue of heterogeneity to analyze the main corporate governance 
forms that have emerged and whether they can allow firms to mitigate corporate governance 
problems and achieve performance in the context of institutional tensions.  
 
3 EMPIRICAL CONTEXT: CHINA AND THE LISTED SECTOR 
The field of corporate governance in China in the past decade, with the rapid evolution of 
the institutional framework, offers a particularly interesting ground for scholarly work on 
the influence of significant legal changes on the effectiveness of corporate governance 
practices. The Chinese government has set the professionalization of corporate governance 
in the listed sector as a high priority. The tension between these reforms and the inherited 
institutions of political governance is particularly salient. This section provides a detailed 
account of the recent wave of corporate governance reforms put forward in China. It then 
presents a description of the population of Chinese listed firms, with an emphasis on the 
ownership structures and a discussion of the resilience of political control at the firm level. 
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3.1 Corporate Governance Reforms in China 
Prior to the reform era, the management system in China made no distinction between 
political governance and corporate governance. As the Chinese state embarked on the road 
of massive economic transformation and liberalization, corporations also slowly started to 
separate the functions between managers and owners and to develop economic performance 
criteria. Allen and Shen's (2012) view is that unlike centuries old stock exchanges in New 
York, London or Amsterdam, China's did not emerge out of transactional routines and 
agreements between merchants and capitalists, but was rather carefully crafted from scratch 
by the state from top-down and effectively launched on a complete pre-existing regulatory 
framework that was not based on norms negotiated in the marketplace. Created in the early 
1990s, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges were planned, designed, controlled. 
They were primarily created to provide the central government with an avenue to achieve 
massive waves of privatizations in the large state sector (Allen & Shen, 2012).  
It took roughly 25 years before the emergence of a real push towards standardization and 
professionalization of corporate governance. The first significant interventions by the state 
in this regard came in the form of a Code of corporate governance for listed firms in 2002 
and the Establishment of Independent Director Systems by Listed Companies Guiding 
Opinion in 2001 mandating the appointment of a proportion of 33% of independent directors 
on the board of directors, both issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC). This prescription was a direct transplant of corporate governance practices 
developed and promoted in Western countries. In the run up to the adoption of the new 
securities and company laws, the state started forcefully advocating for the implementation 
of international best practices. In the 2004 Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the 
Reform, Opening up and Steady Growth of Capital Market, the importance of “safeguarding 
the legitimate rights and interest of investors, especially those of public investors”2 is 
mentioned no less than seven times. 
                                                          
2 Guo Fa [2004] No.3, issued on January 4th, 2004. Section II. Available at: 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/laws/rfdm/AdministrativeLaws/200907/t20090729
_119391.html  
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These principles were formally integrated into the legal framework with the enactment of 
the reformed Company Law and Securities Law. These were new versions of the two most 
important laws regulating large firms in China first enacted in 1993 and 1998 respectively. 
Major reforms to both laws were adopted in 2005 during the tenth National People’s 
Congress and became effective on January 1st 2006, with an aim to level the Chinese system 
closer to international standards. At once, of the 229 provisions of the old Company Law, 
60% were amended, another 20% were deleted and 41 new provisions were created. Of the 
214 provisions of the Securities Laws, 40% were amended, 13% were deleted and 27 new 
provisions were included. This produced a major change in terms of compliance 
requirements for firms and also a powerful signaling effect on the expectations towards 
management and governance improvements in the Chinese corporate market. “The newly 
revised Company Law regulated the governance structure of listed companies, set forth strict 
legal obligations and responsibilities for listed companies and related staff” and the revised 
securities law “increased supervision of securities companies, established the securities 
investor protection fund system, improved the securities regulatory management system, and 
increased legal liabilities imposed on violators in securities market.” (Chen, 2009: 21) The 
law greatly expanded the civil liability of wrongdoers, including executives, directors, 
supervisors, auditors and exchanges. Investors were even allowed to sue directors for 
fraudulent actions that had taken place prior to the law's promulgation. 
These two laws became the bedrock for a wave of additional provisions and regulations to 
consolidate and specify the legal regime under which the securities market is operating. In 
2006, amendments were made to the Criminal Law providing the basis for charges in the 
securities market and the means to judicial authorities to enforce the new measures set 
forward in the securities and company laws. Authorities were given explicit power to punish 
insider trading, partial disclosure, stock manipulation and many other actions that hurt the 
interests of shareholders. Also in 2006, the CSRC established the Administrative Sanctions 
Committee to investigate alleged violations and the Ministry of Finance issued the new 
Chinese Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises and the Auditing Standards for 
Certified Public Accountants. In 2007, the CSRC issued the Regulations on Information 
Disclosure of Listed Companies, followed by the release of specific disclosure rules by both 
the Shanghai and the Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. 
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Consistent with the idea that quality information disclosure must be available to external 
investors in order to generate accurate stock prices, a particular emphasis was put on 
disclosure to support market efficiency. While the CSRC has been actively trying to instill 
more discipline (Allen & Shen, 2012), academics and practitioners do not ascribe much trust 
to data disclosure in China. Indeed, the results of a study conducted by the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange indicate that “disclosure violations represented approximately 78% of all 
violations punished by the CSRC and two stock exchanges for the period of 1996-2007” 
(Allen & Shen, 2012: 169). With the new laws, listed firms are required to disclose truthfully 
and timely any information that may have material consequences for shareholders. Also, 
disclosure of detailed compensation of directors individually was mandated from 2006 
onwards (Conyon & He, 2011). False or omitted information is to be sanctioned. More 
generally, the CSRC launched in 2007 a compulsory corporate governance self-assessment 
process in which firms were required to document and release the details on the extent of 
their compliance with the new rules, justify the gaps and set improvement targets (Lu, 
Zhong, & Kong, 2009). 
These laws were accompanied by a number of initiatives that reinforced the strength of the 
signal sent by the Party leadership to the market about their commitment to improve 
corporate governance in the marketplace. Many of these initiatives took the form of 
collaborations with international institutions on the implementation of better standards. 
Among others, the OECD has supported the production of lengthy self-assessment reports 
on the implementation of the OECD principles of corporate governance. Also, the 
International Financial Corporation (World Bank) has been involved in several large 
Chinese firms to assist with the implementation of firm-level reforms. In 2005, ahead of the 
enactment of the new Company Law and Securities Law, then Chairman of the IFC Javed 
Hamid declared in front of a large political and financial crowd in Shanghai that “well 
governed companies are directed by their boards, have mechanisms for protecting minority 
shareholders, and are transparent” (Hamid, 2005). Finally, the CSRC is member of nearly 
every consultative committee of the International Organization of Securities Commission 
(IOSCO). Along with Brazil and India, China was invited to sit on the IOSCO`s Technical 
Committee responsible for establishing the international securities regulatory standards. As 
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of 2014, the CSRC also holds the Vice-Chairmanship of the IOSCO Committee on 
Investment Management. 
 
3.2 The Rise of Chinese Listed Firms and the Resilience of Political Control 
As it can be seen in figure 1 below, the number of listed companies has increased gradually 
over the years, with a slight acceleration from 2008 onwards. During the two years that 
followed the enactment of the new Securities Law and Company Law, the average Chinese 
listed firm nearly tripled in market capitalization. While the global financial crisis moderated 
this trend, the total market capitalization in the two Chinese stock exchanges kept increasing 
steadily, fuelled by a wave of new initial public offerings (IPOs). The last decade has seen 
Chinese stock exchanges produce very large IPOs. At the time of their listing, the 
Agricultural Bank of China in 2010 and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in 
2006 were the largest IPOs ever recorded in any market with respective values of 22.1 and 
21.9 billion dollars.  
Figure 1. Stock market development in China3 
 
                                                          
3 Own calculations using data from WIND database. See unit in parenthesis to interpret 
each series on the vertical axis. 
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Figure 2 shows the evolution of ownership structures over the period from 1998 to 2010. In 
1999, more than 80% of all listed firms were controlled by the state. The downward trend 
mirrors the rise of private firms (firms of which the ultimate controlling owner is a private 
party), which ultimately surpassed SOEs by the end of the decade. Nevertheless, about 45% 
of listed firms were still controlled by a government agency in 2010. Figure 2 also shows 
the evolution of the average ownership concentration. Top1 represents the average 
proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder. There was a reduction of about 10% 
between 1998 and 2006, but the percentage stabilized since 2006 around 35% of 
shareholding. Top2-10 tracks the average sum of shareholding of the second to tenth largest 
shareholders. The value is remarkably stable across time, with a modest trend upwards 
although remaining substantially below the average proportion held of the largest 
shareholder. 
Figure 2. Ownership in Chinese listed firms4 
 
                                                          
4 Own calculations using data from CCER-PACAP database. The vertical axis indicates the 
average proportion of ownership. 
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In terms of professionalization of corporate governance practices, a majority of firms 
implemented the most basic prescriptions over the decade. For instance, figure 3 presents 
the proportion of firms that complied with the rule enacted in 2002 mandating a minimum 
of 33% of independent directors on their board. Already in 2003, nearly 80% of firms had 
complied. By 2010, only a few exceptions were in breach. Since 2003, about half of the 
firms maintain the exact minimum of 33%, while the other half went beyond the legal 
requirement. The creation of special committees of the board followed a similar trend. Over 
the decade, these committees went from being virtually absent from boardrooms to being 
the norm. The audit committees and the compensation committees were the fastest to 
develop, covering less than 1% of firms in 2000, around 50% in 2005 and more than 99% in 
2010. The committees of strategy and of nominations also developed quickly, covering 
around 75% of firms by 2010. 
Figure 3. Listed firms’ compliance with rule on independent directors5 
 
Yet despite these instances of professionalization and despite the steady decrease in the 
proportion of firms formally controlled by the state, the Communist Party of China (CPC) 
                                                          
5 Own calculations using data from GTA Corporate Governance database. The vertical axis 
indicates the average proportion of independent directors on the board. 
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and the political elite maintain an influence that is felt far beyond these official numbers. 
The Chinese system is rooted in a past of political governance. In the 1980s, even when 
formal decision making did not rest in the hands of political agents, the administrative 
monopoly held by the government which is not unique to China but particularly salient could 
be used to extract rent from entrepreneurs and managers investing in private businesses, 
creating a hold-up problem. Che (2002: 789) observes that the government's power over 
firms was most prominent in the allocation and control of “various inputs, such as land, 
electricity, water, licensing, and financial capital”. Using the emergence of township and 
village enterprises (TVEs) as an example, he finds that local government ownership could 
act as a “second best commitment” to curtail rent-seeking behavior by the local government 
itself and incentivize private business investment. Hsiao, Nugent, Perrigne and Qiu (1998) 
also observe that local governments had substantial power over the allocation of resources, 
especially energy and market access, in TVEs early during the reform era. From 1985 to 
1989, no less than 50% of TVEs' production was sold to SOEs. The role of local state 
agencies in this context, although accompanied by considerable moral hazard and 
discretionary power, was important to provide market clearance and resources that ill-
functioning markets could not deliver. 
In the 1990s, political influence started adapting to the new corporate structures that 
accompanied the rise of the listed sector. Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007) studied 790 
companies from 1993 to 2001 and found that about 27 percent of CEOs were current or 
former government bureaucrats. Li, Meng and Zhang (2006: 560) observe that private 
entrepreneurs in China have a tendency to seek formal political participation to obtain 
resources. By doing so, they “can obtain resources that are not accessible through markets; 
they can circumvent government regulations; they can secure tax deductions and obtain legal 
or nonlegal protection for their businesses”. Li et al. (2006) measure political participation 
by formal membership in the People's Congress and the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference. They find that the likelihood of a private entrepreneurs 
membership in one of those bodies decreases by 8% to 20% with an improvement of one 
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standard deviation in the institutional index6 (see Fan & Wang, 2003), which suggests that 
political participation is an effective surrogate for well-functioning market institutions. 
During the last decade, the empirical evidence continues to show the important role of 
political agents in business. In 2010, among 2139 listed firms, 50% were found to have at 
least one individual in a top position (top executives, directors, supervisors) concurrently 
holding an official political position outside the firm7. Among private firms, 35% displayed 
such political connection. Among those politically connected private firms, 38% had a 
politically connected leadership (Board Chairman or CEO). 
4 APPROACH AND METHOD 
This doctoral dissertation studies a population of listed firms that are embedded in inherited 
institutions of political governance while facing new challenges brought by a wave of legal 
reforms tailored on international best practices and aiming at professionalizing corporate 
governance. The China of the last decade represents a timely and interesting case to study 
how firms respond to such tensions between seemingly conflicting institutions that are 
simultaneously constraining and enabling. In such a dynamic environment, one cannot 
expect a complete and detailed blueprint of institutions. While this is true everywhere in the 
world, the effect of decoupling between regulation and practice as well as the evolving 
complementarities among elements of the system suggest that China may present an acute 
level of heterogeneity of firm-level governance models. Some models may approach the 
ideal-type systems presented earlier, but it is reasonable to expect that the spontaneous and 
creative process of recombination sparked by the institutional tensions has led to novel ways 
to tackle problems and achieve performance. 
The two main substantive chapters of this dissertation are structured around two core 
questions pertaining to corporate governance in China. Chapter 2 studies the most salient 
                                                          
6 Fan and Wang (2003) have designed the “NERI index of marketization of China’s 
provinces”, which incorporates sub-indicators that measure components such as the size 
of government, tax burden on enterprises, non-state share in employment and 
investment, bank loans to private firms, share of lawyers and accountants per population, 
number of patents, etc. 
7 Own calculations and coding using data from GTA Corporate Governance. 
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corporate governance problem, namely the controlling shareholder expropriation problem 
which stems from principal to principal relationships. Chapter 3 documents the 
heterogeneous forms of corporate governance observed in China, including features of 
political embeddedness, and how they relate to firm performance. Taken together, these two 
empirical studies aim at understanding how firms subject to institutional tensions achieve 
performance and resolve problems. 
Following the insights from the literature on complementarities and heterogeneity, these 
issues of corporate governance are studied through a research design using configurational 
analysis. While this approach is suited to the empirical setting presented above, it is also in 
line with recent developments in corporate governance research. Short, Payne and Ketchen 
(2008) argue that approaches studying multiple interactions would help resolving equivocal 
results in the literature. Indeed, corporate governance is increasingly conceived as bundles 
of mutually reinforcing practices (Aguilera et al., 2008; Rediker & Seth, 1995). Firms adopt 
structures that offer synergies with their institutional environment (Aguilera, Kabbach-
Castro, Lee, & You, 2012). Across bundles, distinct practices may act as substitutes, 
effectively offering firms with alternatives between functional equivalents (Demsetz, 1983; 
Misangyi & Acharya, 2014). It may also be the case that a critical mass of elements from 
one bundle, as opposed to the adoption of every practice of the bundle, is sufficient to 
achieve the outcome (Garcia-Castro, Aguilera, & Arino, 2013).  
Such configurational analysis does not completely depart from the classical contingency 
theory first proposed by Chandler (1962) which claims that a firm’s structure is the product 
of its strategy. In this vein, Mintzberg (1979) famously documented five structural 
configurations while emphasizing that organizations are complex and that decision making 
is often unstructured and iterative. Embedded in the proposed multiplicity of configurations 
is the idea that managers and organizations need flexibility because problems are also 
flexible. The configurational perspective addresses a number of critiques voiced in the 
literature on the structure-performance paradigm (see Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1994), calling 
for more inductive studies and for approaches that can account for the often complex 
relationships involving more than one contingency simultaneously, which a bi-variate 
method does not allow.  
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The configurational analysis adopted here enables an inductive approach to the study of 
complex interaction effects involving multiple elements. Short et al. (2008) define two types 
of configurations that are based on organizational features. Archetypes are context specific, 
usually according to industries, and share certain features including “strategy, structure, 
process, size, and culture” (Short et al., 2008: 1056). Organizational forms are more 
generalizable configurations that span several industries. Based on this taxonomy, and since 
the questions studied in this thesis are not driven primarily by industry specific contexts, the 
configurational patterns discussed here could be labeled as corporate governance forms. 
Set theoretic methods have been identified as a promising avenue to study the causal 
complexity and the subtle complementarities in bundles of corporate governance practices 
(Aguilera et al., 2008; Filatotchev & Allcock, 2010). In particular, the fsQCA software 
developed by Ragin, Drass and Davey (see also Ragin, 2000, 2008a; 2006) is increasingly 
used in the literature for empirical studies on corporate governance (Bell, Aguilera, & 
Filatotchev, 2013; Garcia-Castro et al., 2013; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014). Set theory 
conceives the elements of a system as conditions that are either absent or present. The 
intersection between the sets of many conditions and the outcome set allows the 
identification of configurations of conditions that lead to the outcome. Set theory therefore 
integrates the notion that a given outcome may not have a single cause (Greckhamer, 
Misangyi, Elms, & Lacey, 2008). That several causal paths can lead to the outcome is called 
equifinality (Fiss, 2007). This is particularly useful to the study of heterogeneity of 
configurations. It also facilitates the study of multiple interactions within bundles. In 
addition, set theory allows for causal asymmetry, which means that the presence of an 
element may contribute to the success of one configuration while the absence of the same 
element is required for another configuration to work (Fiss, 2011; Ragin, 2008a).  
The subtle treatment of interaction effects in fsQCA offers advantages compared to other 
research designs. In particular, research on the effect of corporate governance often makes 
use of indices, bundling many practices into a single indicator of good governance (Bebchuk, 
Cohen, & Ferrell, 2009; Cheung, Thomas Connelly, Limpaphayom, & Zhou, 2007; 
Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003). Indices can be useful to establish a normative measure 
that is comparable over time, that can be generalized to large populations, and that can 
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aggregate the construct and allow for parsimonious quantitative analysis. However, the 
strengths of indices also represent their weaknesses. For instance, Lu et al. (2009) develop 
an index based on the OECD corporate governance guidelines, but specifically adapted to 
the Chinese market and divided into 6 sub-sections. For them, “the logic behind this 
approach is that corporate governance mechanisms might be substitutes for one another. 
Consequently, one must consider the overall quality of corporate governance when 
examining the impact on a firm’s performance” (Lu et al., 2009: 84–85). While the 
diagnostic that practices can be substitutes fits the conception adopted here, the remedy of 
mixing them effectively leads to losing sight of their distinct effects.  
Another problem appears in studies that incorrectly present their findings in terms of 
configurations. For instance, Lo, Wong and Firth (2010) report that independent directors or 
the separation of board Chair and CEO positions or financial expertise in the audit committee 
can deter the manipulation of transfer prices during related party sales. Their usage of the 
word “or” wrongly suggests that each of these three conditions is a sufficient functional 
equivalent, although their OLS regression method cannot convey such findings. 
Configuration analysis, using Boolean logic and vocabulary, allows a careful analysis of 
interactions that can support findings that include “ANDs” (complementarities) and “ORs” 
(substitutes).  
 
5 AIMS AND STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
The remainder of this doctoral thesis is organized in two substantive chapters and a general 
conclusion, which discusses the general takeaway and offers propositions for future 
research. After summarizing the aim of each of the two main chapters of the thesis, this 
section ends with a comparison of the two studies and a short discussion of the general 
takeaways. It is important to note that the two main chapters are written as stand-alone 
studies that, while offering a consistent whole, maintain full coherence if read separately. 
The population of firms analyzed in the empirical studies of both chapters Chinese firms 
with standard A shares listed on the two main Chinese stock exchanges: the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). The dataset for chapter 2 
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(Principal-principal relationships at the core of corporate governance problems in China: 
A set theoretic analysis) consists of 1337 firms. The data was gathered for the year 2005, 
since it is the last year for which the outcome variable was disclosed and readily available. 
The study covers the entire population at the time (99%), leaving only a few cases because 
of missing or inconsistent data. The dataset for chapter 3 (Political Embeddedness and 
Corporate Governance: Heterogeneity and Hybridization in China) consists of 810 SOEs 
and 942 private firms, studied in two separate groups. All the data concerns the year 2010. 
In order to maintain the comparability of results between SOEs and private firms and to 
facilitate the interpretation, the industries where SOEs were too dominant or not present 
enough were removed. This strengthens the comparative focus between the state sector and 
the private sector which more closely embodies the institutional tensions and reduces the 
potential industry-specific bias induced by sectors that are nearly entirely structured around 
state agencies. The five industries that were removed are timber and furnishing, finance and 
insurance, mining, utilities and transportation. 
 
5.1 Principal-Principal Relationships at the Core of Corporate Governance Problems 
in China: A Set Theoretic Analysis 
While most of the corporate governance literature concerns the mitigation of principal-agent 
problems in markets with dispersed ownership (Daily et al., 2003; Fama & Jensen, 1983), 
the most salient corporate governance problem in Asia and many emerging markets rests in 
the controlling shareholder expropriation problem (Chen, Li, & Shapiro, 2011). The 
presence of a large controlling owner allows the insiders to use corporate assets to reap 
disproportionate private benefits of control to the detriment of the small investors’ wealth 
maximization (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000). Such principal-principal problems are 
not unique to China or other emerging markets, as they are also a concern in continental 
Europe where many firms still have concentrated ownership (Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001). 
Still, these problems in China are distinct because of the particular impact of the state in two 
main ways. The state still directly controls a large proportion of listed firms, and it also has 
an indirect impact on all firms through anemic implementation and enforcement of 
legislation. The enduring role of the state embodies the inherited norm of common property 
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regimes (Ostrom, 1990), which involves constant renegotiation of decision making rights 
among principals (Stark, 2001). In this context, chapter 2 aims to understand the conditions 
under which the controlling shareholder in Chinese firms has the incentive and the ability to 
expropriate cash flow from the firm. 
The most common form of expropriation occurs through tunneling, a diversion of assets 
from the firm to another corporate entity controlled by the same group of insiders (Johnson 
et al., 2000). These dealings are often referred to as related party transactions. In the case of 
China, the most common tunneling transaction takes the form of inter-firm loans (Jiang, Lee, 
& Yue, 2005). The model used in chapter 2 therefore adopts a measure of inter-firm loans 
as the outcome variable. Then, four types of conditions are identified as potential 
contributors to the occurrence of tunneling. 
a. The ownership structure: The proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder 
gives a measure of his income rights and his incentives to expropriate cash flow 
(Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 2002). The presence of large minority investors may enhance monitoring 
on insiders or enable tunneling if there is collusion at the top of the ownership 
structure (Faccio et al., 2001). A low floating ratio (proportion of tradable shares) 
may hinder disciplining market mechanisms and increase the insiders’ incentives 
to engage in tunneling (Chen, Chen, & Wei, 2009). 
b. Control by the state: State control does not intrinsically increase tunneling 
incentives. State ownership may add a layer of external monitoring on insiders (Lo 
et al., 2010), but it may also bring objectives that diverge from the maximization 
of small shareholders’ wealth (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). 
c. Commitment to best practices of corporate governance: Three elements are 
included in the model to assess the effectiveness of corporate governance practices 
to mitigate tunneling behavior, namely whether there is a critical mass of 
independent directors on the board (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997), whether the firm 
has a rigorous internal audit mechanism and whether the firm engages in proactive 
disclosure (Liu, 2006a; Xie, Davidson III, & DaDalt, 2003). 
d. Financial factors: The literature is mixed about the effect of firm size on principal-
principal problems. Large firms may become transaction hubs facilitating tunneling 
36_Erim BW Tremblay_Stand.job
36 
 
(Yeh, Shu, & Su, 2012), but the governance structure of small firms is usually less 
geared towards accountability (Aguilera et al., 2008). High firm indebtedness (high 
leverage) has been identified in the literature as a strong determinant of tunneling 
(Jiang, Lee, & Yue, 2010). 
Following the recent work of Garcia-Castro et al. (2013) and Misangyi and Acharya (2014) 
on the possibility that elements of corporate governance may be simultaneously 
complements and substitutes, a number of guiding propositions are drawn. Chapter 2 adopts 
an inductive approach, although these guiding propositions are used to explicitly relate the 
findings with the predictions from the literature on principal-principal problems and assess 
how they apply to the Chinese case. Generally, the findings suggest that the main incentives 
and mechanisms driving tunneling behavior by insiders involve a three-way interaction 
between a low proportion of shares by the largest shareholder, a small firm size and high 
indebtedness. Any two of these three conditions seems sufficient to provide the incentives 
and mechanisms for insiders to engage in tunneling. This finding is symmetric since these 
conditions are absent in most configurations that do not produce tunneling. If these 
conditions are present, a lack of commitment to best practices of corporate governance acts 
as an enabling factor for tunneling, especially the absence of proactive disclosure. Yet, in 
the absence of tunneling incentives, the implementation or not of best corporate practices 
does not matter. Also, an independent board is found to provide an enabling mechanism for 
collusion towards tunneling in firms with large minority investors and those controlled by 
the state. 
These findings contribute to the literature in several aspects. They provide a finer 
understanding about the contractual relationships and governance structures that can 
effectively align the interests of multiple principals in a transition economy. The results show 
that investors in both private firms and SOEs should be concerned with principal-principal 
problems, but that the conditions enabling tunneling might differ. The empirical literature 
on principal-principal problems in Asia had offered very equivocal results. Using 
configuration analysis allows unraveling the causal complexity and asymmetry of the 
relationship between elements of corporate governance models and tunneling behavior. 
These findings confirm that conditions may at the same time be complements and substitutes 
37_Erim BW Tremblay_Stand.job
37 
 
(i.e. the presence of any two out of three conditions is sufficient in the tree-way interaction). 
This emphasizes the importance of studying corporate governance structures as bundles of 
inter-related elements instead of isolating the effect of individual practices. 
 
5.2 Political Embeddedness and Corporate Governance: Heterogeneity and 
Hybridization in China 
As explained earlier in this chapter, Chinese firms have to deal with a substantial wave of 
recent reforms of corporate governance legislation aimed at professionalizing their practices 
(Qian & Wu, 2003). At the same time, these market based reforms are implemented within 
an institutional context of political governance inherited from a socialist past (Allen & Shen, 
2012). A large proportion of firms are still ultimately controlled by state agencies and, even 
in private firms, the influence of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is felt through 
networks of political connections among top executives and directors. Indeed, through the 
Party Nomenklatura, the state maintains a firm grip on the career path of many top officers 
within the corporate elite (Brødsgaard, 2012). The influence of informal mechanisms is 
strengthened by the decoupling between de jure legislation and de facto practices (Opper & 
Schwaag-Serger, 2008). Interestingly, the literature, which can be synthesized using the 
metaphor of the helping hand and the grabbing hand of the state (Frye & Shleifer, 1997), 
provides very equivocal results about the effect of political connections on firm 
performance. In this context, chapter 3 offers an exploratory study that aims to uncover the 
actual corporate governance configurations employed by both private firms and SOEs to 
achieve firm performance. 
The two ideal-type models proposed by Franks and Mayer (1997) and discussed at the 
beginning of this introduction are used as a starting point for the analysis: the insider-control 
system and the outsider-control system. Three conceptual building blocks are added to 
complement this starting point. Firstly, scholars increasingly recognize that the 
heterogeneity of systems documented at the international level by the comparative corporate 
governance literature (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003, 2010) may also be observed at the 
domestic level across firms (Krug & Hendrischke, 2012; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 
2009; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008; Whitley, 2006). Secondly, the theoretical work of Streeck 
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(2001) on complementarities along with accounts of recombination in China (see Boisot & 
Child, 1996; Nee, 1992) suggest that firms may diverge from ideal-type models and use 
elements of distinct systems to create new hybrid forms. Thirdly, the inherited institutions 
of political embeddedness offer a third archetype model from which firms may borrow 
elements to develop forms of corporate governance “with Chinese characteristics”. 
The empirical model integrates the most crucial elements of each ideal-type system, along 
with measures of political embeddedness. The research design is inductive, using a set 
theoretic method to let emerge the dominant configurations that lead to profitability. To 
allow a comparison between the two institutional settings, private firms and SOEs are 
analyzed in separate samples. The results show four broad categories of configurations of 
well performing private firms: market pressure, outsiders’ voice, insider-control and 
politically embedded. Three broad models emerge in the SOEs sample: external pressure, 
insider-control and national champions. Generally, the findings suggest that there is a large 
diversity of configurations in SOEs that can lead to firm performance, while the sample of 
private firms displays a higher adherence to fewer dominant forms. 
The results offer a number of important findings. Firstly, there is substantial heterogeneity 
of corporate governance forms in China that can equally lead to firm performance. While 
some configurations lean more towards one ideal-type system or the other, most represent 
hybrid forms that integrate elements from different models.  Secondly, the results confirm 
that elements from different models can act as functional equivalents to achieve the same 
objective, such as monitoring managers or mitigating political pressures. Thirdly, successful 
politically embedded configurations are observed in both samples, although they cover 
surprisingly few private firms. Still, this suggests that institutions of political embeddedness 
are able to adapt to the changing and increasingly market-driven environment of listed firms 
in China. It also shows that the Chinese regime can accommodate a large variety of forms, 
leaving substantial flexibility for firms to search for specific bundles of practices that fit their 
needs and constraints. Fourthly, large minority investors and practices of proactive 
disclosure appear in most configurations for each sample. While these two elements are 
quasi-necessary conditions that have symmetric effects across all configurations, most 
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conditions are involved in complex interaction effects. Documenting this causal complexity 
contributes to reconciling some equivocal results found in previous empirical work. 
 
5.3 Comparison and General Contributions 
The two studies display a number of similarities. Firstly, the samples for the empirical 
analysis are based on the same population of firms. Except for the exclusion of a few 
industries in chapter three as explained above, both studies include nearly every firm listed 
with normal A shares on the two mainland China stock exchanges. Secondly, both chapters 
tackle a research question that relates to corporate governance and includes some measures 
of the composition and structure of the Board of directors. Thirdly, both papers use set 
theoretic methods operationalized with fsQCA to outline configurations. Given their many 
similarities, the two chapters offer a cohesive whole that presents the complexity of the 
Chinese corporate governance landscape. 
Still, the two chapters have a number of differences. Firstly, they have a different empirical 
focus. While chapter 2 focuses on the conditions leading to the presence and absence of a 
specific governance problem, chapter 3 looks at the resulting firm performance. Secondly, 
while both studies rely on inductive reasoning, chapter 2 draws propositions from the 
literature that aim to guide the empirical analysis. Chapter 3 is entirely exploratory, letting 
emerge the corporate governance forms observed in China. Thirdly, while the chapters each 
include two separate analyses, the nature of the comparison differs. Chapter 2 looks at the 
symmetry of the results by using the exact same sample twice, but with the reversed outcome 
for the second analysis. Chapter 3 uses the same outcome but divides the population into 
two separate samples (private firms and SOEs) that are then compared. Fourthly, they have 
a different conceptual focus. Chapter 2 focuses on the interactions among conditions, 
emphasizing the occurrence of complementarities and substitutions among the elements of 
the system rather than characterizing each configuration independently. Chapter 3 offers a 
thicker discussion of each configuration observed in the solution sets as a distinct prototype 
for the emerging forms of corporate governance in China. 
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Apart from the findings and contributions explained in detail in every chapter, the thesis as 
a whole supports some general ideas that are worth mentioning. In general terms, when 
making sense of the Chinese experience, the literature imposes a dichotomy between the 
contractual approach and the common pool resources. For instance, Sachs and Woo (2001) 
frame this debate as opposing the experimentalist school to the convergence school. These 
are supposedly on opposite sides of a so-called transition process. Yet, what is observed does 
not fit an ideal-type model. Firms creatively recombine elements from different models to 
create new ones. The case of China shows that firms are able to implement and maintain 
corporate governance structures even in the context of poorly enforced property rights. This 
indicates that the importance of formal property rights in North’s (1990) tradition that 
institutions must precede markets may be over-emphasized, at least according to the Chinese 
experience. Also, the literature often confuses two distinct roles of the state: the state as 
provider of regulatory framework and formal legislation, and the state as an actively 
involved market player through ownership and networks. Yet, at the disaggregated level 
(firm level), the state appears to have enough incentives not to follow its own rule, its own 
“coherent” regulatory framework. This is partly explained by the deliberate institutional 
ambiguity (see Ho, 2001), but also by the simple fact that the state is actually composed of 
various actors with their own roles and agenda at multiple levels of the bureaucracy. There 
is a need to better decompose the role of the state, and such an exercise is necessarily context-
driven. Another dichotomy offered by the literature to reflect on this decomposition is the 
characterization of formal and informal systems. The literature regards a deviation from the 
ex-ante contract (ex: corporate governance) as “informal”. While this dichotomy may be 
useful at the system level, it is scarcely informative when disaggregating at the firm level 
since there is no clear dichotomy. The work contained in this dissertation supports the idea 
that a configurational approach that accounts for the specificities of the recombination 
process observed at the firm level is more effective than dichotomies as a conceptual tool to 
translate the complex reality.  
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CHAPTER 2 - PRINCIPAL-PRINCIPAL 
RELATIONSHIPS AT THE CORE OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS IN 
CHINA: A SET THEORETIC ANALYSIS 
 
Abstract: Corporate governance problems in countries with high ownership 
concentration in listed firms rest in principal to principal rather than on 
principal-agent relationships. A dominant concern in Asia is the use of related 
party transactions by controlling shareholders to expropriate cash flow from 
the firm. In a transition economy like China, the ill-enforced regulatory 
framework and the heavy participation of the state in the economy add 
complexity to the issue. This article is the first to use a set theoretic approach 
(fsQCA) to analyze the interactions among corporate governance conditions 
that lead to high and low tunneling behavior in 1337 Chinese listed firms in 
the form of related party loans. The results show substantial asymmetry in 
terms of complementarities and substitution effects between elements of 
ownership structure, state control, corporate governance practices and other 
key demographic factors including firm size and indebtedness. Firstly, a low 
proportion of shares by the largest shareholder, high indebtedness and small 
firm size combine to set the incentives and mechanisms for tunneling. 
Secondly, provided that incentives are in place, a lack of governance practices 
enables tunneling. In the absence of incentives, governance practices matter 
little. Thirdly, board independence is found to contribute to tunneling in state-
controlled firms and in those that display large minority investors, possibly 
facilitating collusion at the top of the ownership structure. 
Keywords: corporate governance, board of directors, China, principal-
principal problems, tunneling, state-owned enterprises, QCA. 
JEL Classifications: G32, G34, H82, M14, O53, P31 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The field of corporate governance has long had a narrow focus on principal-agent 
relationships between owners and managers (Daily et al., 2003; Rubach & Sebora, 1998; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), mainly paying attention to the alignment of executive incentives 
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through compensation packages, the establishment of internal monitoring by optimizing 
board composition and the nurturing of external control through healthy markets for hostile 
takeovers (Blair, 1995; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Rajan & Zingales, 1998; Walsh & Seward, 
1990). Yet, instead of originating from principal-agent problems, the biggest corporate 
governance concerns in many countries come from principal to principal relationships 
(Faccio et al., 2001; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). In markets 
characterized by high ownership concentration, the disparity of interests between the many 
owners is more salient. In this sense, it cannot be assumed that shareholders form a 
homogenous group. The difference to principal agent relations is a follows. While agents, 
i.e. managers, are controlled by their principals, i.e. owners which have an interest in 
safeguarding effective allocation of resources and investment into productive activities 
which promise high future returns, in principal-principal relations one needs to distinguish 
between insider and outsiders. At the heart of this phenomenon, the collusion of interests 
between at least one principal and the agents may cause problems, enabling the owner to 
reap private benefits of control beyond his legitimate cash flow rights. Indeed, the presence 
of a large controlling shareholder typically involves direct control over high management, 
effectively ensuring the alignment of incentives between the dominant principal and the 
agent, which are together characterized as ‘insiders’. The other principals are mostly small 
investors better characterized as ‘outsiders’ that keep minority shares and expect more 
moderate yet fair and proportionate financial returns, mostly in the form of dividends. The 
interaction between these groups of owners determines the allocation of assets and cash 
flows within the firm. The structure of ownership is therefore paramount to understanding 
the principal-principal relationship. In other words, modeling principals as one homogenous 
group or assuming divergent interests between all principals and agents misses the actual 
decision making and cash flow appropriation. 
Conventionally, the relationship between the multiple principals is organized in contracts set 
to align their interests, including ways to resolve conflicts. The contracts usually cover 
liabilities, transfers of assets, organizational forms that separate management and ownership 
and the allocation of residual benefits. Yet, within the contractual relationship, a 
misalignment remains between the interests of minority investors and the largest 
shareholder. Because of the discrepancy between its decision making rights and income 
43_Erim BW Tremblay_Stand.job
43 
 
rights, the largest shareholder can use his dominant position to appropriate a disproportionate 
share of the firm’s residual returns (Claessens et al., 2000). In other words, the generation 
of private benefits of control becomes more desirable than the redistribution of cash flows 
according to income rights when insiders hold nearly full control of the firm (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). This diversion of cash flow has been referred to as the controlling shareholder 
expropriation problem (Chen et al., 2011). The most common form of such expropriation is 
called tunneling (Friedman, Johnson, & Mitton, 2003), which consists of the transfer of 
assets within a corporate network through loans or sales to other entities controlled by the 
same owner. Because they involve parties that are connected through ownership ties or 
possibly by kin, these dealings are referred to as related party transactions. Tunneling has 
been identified as the greatest corporate governance challenge in Asia generally (Faccio et 
al., 2001; Johnson et al., 2000; OECD, 2009a, 2011a, 2011b) and in China specifically 
(Young et al., 2008). 
The literature on investor-protection (La Porta et al., 2000) suggests that the safeguard of 
shareholders’ interests rests on contracts supported by laws and regulation. Djankov, La 
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer’s (2008) anti-self-dealing index is noteworthy to this 
end. The index assessed for 72 countries as of 2003 the legal framework that underpins 
private enforcement mechanisms before and after a related party transaction. Its components, 
divided into ex-ante and ex-post control indicators, reference requirements for disclosure, 
independent review, derivative lawsuits8 and civil liabilities as well as measures of public 
enforcement, fines and prison terms for contraveners. China appears in the top 10 of 
countries with the best score for anti-self-dealing regulations. Yet, it scores zero in the public 
enforcement index (Djankov et al., 2008). This underscores the idea that a formal approach 
only works in the context of strong legal institutions that enforce binding contracts. 
Such contractual and legal measures may therefore not be effective in markets with ill-
functioning institutions like China, which carries a socialist heritage where there is no 
tradition for protecting individual property rights, entitlements and obligations. In this vein, 
the experimentalist school attributes the Chinese successes to competitive SOEs, collectively 
                                                          
8 Lawsuit brought by a shareholder on behalf of the firm, often against an insider. 
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owned township and village enterprises (TVEs) and ambiguous agricultural land property 
(Sachs & Woo, 2001). From this perspective, the relation to ownership rather resembles a 
system of jointly owned resources or common property regimes (see common-pool 
resources, Elinor Ostrom, 1990), inherited from the past where a clan or a local community 
functioned as collective owner. In this system, resources are owned by the village or county 
collectively and no clear property rights based on contracts are guaranteed by national 
legislation. As has been shown in the literature on the ‘commons’, this may create some 
conflicts of free riding and overgrazing. The over-use of resources by individuals in the short 
run at the expense of long term availability becomes symptomatic and may lead to 
underinvestment. In this “non-contractual” context, decision-making power and usage of 
cash flow is constantly negotiated and recombined among principals (Stark, 2001). In China, 
this view has been especially dominant during the rise of township and village enterprises 
(Krug & Hendrischke, 2012), and is still relevant in the ministries that administer a 
substantial proportion of listed firms and regulate all of them. This heritage has two main 
consequences. Firstly, the contracts are often not binding. Secondly, firm ownership is still 
frequently collectively held in the hands of the state. In other words, principal-principal 
relationships in China are not only about ownership contracts, but also about the involvement 
of the state and a weak legal system. The study of tunneling and expropriation needs to 
account for this, especially in the case of state owned enterprises (SOEs). Besides the 
aforementioned incentives to harvest the private benefits of control, governance in state-
owned enterprises may also be tainted by politically driven constraints and incentives that 
serve the political intentions of the state rather than the commercial interests of the firm. The 
view taken here is that the Chinese case does not fit any ideal type, that it lies somewhere 
between the contractualist approach and the heritage of jointly owned resources. 
The aim of the present article is to shed light on the conditions driving tunneling behavior 
in the context of weak private ownership rights. It is not necessary to further investigate 
whether cash flow is redirected to serve other purposes, such as political aims of cadres or 
private economic interests of shareholders. It is rather the identification of conditions which 
set incentives, offer a suitable mechanism, and possible constraints which clarifies the 
interaction leading to the diversion of cash flow. Specifically, the main research question is 
the following: under which conditions does the controlling shareholder have the incentive 
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and the ability to expropriate cash flow from the firm. The model developed here posits that 
principal-principal problems depend on four types of conditions: ownership structure, state 
control, corporate governance practices, and financial factors including firm size and 
leverage. Embedded in this question, because of the recent heritage of jointly owned 
resources, is the additional objective of assessing whether the conditions producing 
tunneling in SOEs are different from those in private firms. Finally, this study accounts for 
the possibility that tunneling may be an asymmetric problem. In other words the conditions 
that lead to expropriation are not necessarily expected to be the opposite of the conditions 
that deter it. Do owners face disincentives or lack the appropriate tools for tunneling? Can 
corporate governance practices help prevent such attempts? Accordingly, two separate 
analyses are used to assess the conditions under which tunneling behavior is present, and 
those under which it is absent.  
The empirical study uses a set theoretic method (Fiss, 2007, 2011) operationalized in the 
fsQCA software (Ragin et al., 2006). Such a configurational analysis has been identified as 
a particularly well suited method to study the causal complexity of corporate governance 
structures (Filatotchev & Allcock, 2010; Short et al., 2008). Set theory, using Boolean logic, 
is especially useful in the study of equifinality, which involves multiple causal paths to a 
single outcome. It also allows analyzing causal asymmetry when specific governance 
practices are instrumental to both the presence and the absence of an outcome depending on 
the interaction with other conditions, and whether particular conditions act as functional 
equivalents involved in neutral permutations in their causal relation to the expropriation 
problem. The outcome variable that measures the extent of the tunneling problem is based 
on a measure of related party loans, which represents money that the firm transfers to another 
related firm through the use of inter-firm loans. The item “other receivables”, disclosed by 
Chinese listed firms until 2005 in their annual report, contains inter-firm loans and has been 
identified as a valid measure of related party loans and a good proxy for tunneling (Jiang et 
al., 2005, 2010). It has been demonstrated that the larger these other receivables are, the 
larger the share that can be directly traced to a related party or parent company. While using 
inter-firm loans does not represent malpractice in itself, preferential loans freeze cash flow 
that could otherwise be put to productive use. In addition, top executives of 10 firms that 
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had failed to recover such loans to related parties in 2006 were arrested by the authorities 
(Jiang et al., 2010). 
 The dataset contains 1337 listed Chinese firms for the year 2005, representing 99% of the 
population. While the market has evolved since 2005, related party transactions are still 
considered the biggest corporate governance problem in Asia, including in China (OECD, 
2009a). Ironically, the emphasis put on disclosure has also pushed firms to better hide certain 
transactions, making measures of tunneling increasingly blur. 2005 was therefore chosen 
because it is the most recent year for which the “other receivables” were disclosed, and 
because other studies on the same time period and population allow to compare the results 
of the configuration analysis with the existing empirical literature based on statistical 
methods. This offers the opportunity to improve existing conceptual building blocks, 
especially regarding the interactions between the determinants.  
The results offer a number of interesting findings. Firstly, a low proportion of shares by the 
largest shareholder produces a misalignment of interests with those of minority investors 
and provides incentives for tunneling. High firm indebtedness (leverage) is identified as a 
key causal condition in most configurations that lead to tunneling, and thus appears to be 
used as a mechanism to draw monetary resources to be tunneled to related parties. These 
two conditions, along with small firm size, are involved in a three way interaction in which 
the presence of only two out of three conditions is sufficient to create the tunneling 
incentives and mechanisms. These findings are symmetric since a small controlling 
shareholder, a low leverage and a large firm size are identified as important causal conditions 
leading to low tunneling. Secondly, the absence of proactive disclosure is a quasi-necessary 
causal condition to enable tunneling, but it must be complemented by a lack of rigorous audit 
or a lack of board independence. Only in configurations that rely on large minority investors, 
it can also be complemented by a low floating ratio. This finding is not symmetric in that, in 
the absence of tunneling incentives, strong commitment to best corporate governance 
practices matters very little. Thirdly, provided that there are sufficient incentives for 
tunneling, board independence is detrimental if combined with state control or large minority 
shareholders. In such contexts, the results suggest that directorships become a rent 
generating mechanism that plays an enabling role for collusion towards tunneling behavior.  
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This research has two main contributions. Firstly, it offers an analysis of the principal-
principal problem in the context of weak ownership rights and limited enforceable 
contracting. The empirical study is helpful to understand under which types of ownership 
structures, regarding both state ownership and shareholding concentration, a commitment to 
best practices of corporate governance can effectively align the interests of multiple 
principals. This is relevant to understand the contractual relationships and governance 
structures preferred by small investors in any transition economy not only China. Secondly, 
by identifying the specific configurations that enable tunneling behavior and the ones that 
inhibit it, the research furthers our understanding of the causal complexity and asymmetry 
at play in the principal-principal problem. Some equivocal findings from the literature on 
corporate governance, which are detailed further below, are reconciled by showing that the 
complementarities and substitution effects through which conditions contribute to the causal 
relation are not mutually exclusive. This underscores the importance of theorizing corporate 
governance practices as bundles of interdependent conditions. Such subtle interactions 
cannot be easily unearthed with traditional statistical methods that rely on marginal and 
additive effects. 
The remainder of this article is divided as follows. Section two offers a literature review of 
the tunneling problem and the causal conditions and builds propositions used to guide the 
empirical study. Section three presents the set theoretic method employed in the empirical 
study. Section four contains and explains the empirical results. Section five discusses the 
findings and concludes on limitations and implications for future research. 
 
2 CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER EXPROPRIATION PROBLEM 
2.1 Tunneling: Definition and Prevalence in China 
According to the OECD (2009b, 2011a, 2011b), the high level of ownership concentration 
makes Asian markets a fertile ground for tunneling through related party transactions, which 
now represents the biggest corporate governance challenge in the region. This is in line with 
previous studies that identified the proportion of shares of the largest shareholder as one of 
the most important determinant of poor governance in Asia (Claessens et al., 2000; Fan & 
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Wong, 2002). Similarly, many indices used by consultancy firms to appraise good 
governance include a measure of ownership dispersion as a key element (see for instance 
McKinsey & Company, 2002: 16; Standard & Poor’s, 2008: 6). While ownership 
concentration can address the principal-agent problem by reducing the information 
asymmetry and improving internal monitoring, it can also facilitate the appropriation of 
private benefits by the controlling owner (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
The diversion of cash flow by corporate insiders at the expense of external investors has 
been given various labels in the literature, including tunneling (Friedman et al., 2003), 
entrenchment (Claessens et al., 2002), self-dealing (Djankov et al., 2008), principal-
principal conflicts (Jiang & Peng, 2011) and controlling-shareholder expropriation (Chen et 
al., 2011). These terms are used interchangeably in this text. Expropriation can take many 
forms, including the appointment of unqualified relatives, related party transactions (sales, 
loans, etc.), family controlled empire building or pyramid control. This can be achieved 
using direct or indirect means. Tunneling through related party transactions typically 
consists of a direct transfer of assets to another organization where the controlling 
shareholder has more income rights (Bertrand, Mehta, & Mullainathan, 2002; Jiang & Peng, 
2011). Bae, Kang and Kim (2002) provide an example of indirect tunneling in South Korea, 
where a group-affiliated firm that conducts an acquisition often falls in value, while other 
firms in the group, including the parent company, gain value following the transaction. The 
minority shareholders of the acquirer see their cash flow used unproductively, while the 
controlling shareholder – the parent company – gains in value. 
The attention given recently to this problem especially in China suggests that the balancing 
act at present requires the refinement of a conceptual framework to analyze controlling 
shareholder expropriation and the role of the state. China is a fertile ground for large 
shareholders to appropriate the cash flow of minority investors (Chen et al., 2009; 
Huyghebaert & Wang, 2012; Jiang et al., 2010; Wang & Xiao, 2011). Wu, Xu and Phan 
(2011: 108) suggest that the specificity of the institutional environment, with a strong state 
presence, weak financial protections and “the salience of non-economic stakeholder interests 
bonded with the economic interests of controlling shareholders” largely account for the 
prevalence of principal-principal problems in China. Firstly, most firms were privatized and 
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carry residual state ownership and employment relationships with the Party. This weakens 
the voice of external shareholders in the internal monitoring mechanisms (Opper & 
Schwaag-Serger, 2008). Secondly, Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis (2006) argue that the 
unreliability of judicial means to enforce shareholder rights limits the use of shareholder 
activism to protect the legitimate income rights of minority investors. Thirdly, the 
concentration of ownership (the average has been stable at 40% ownership by the top 
shareholder over the last 10 years) and the low floating ratio9 (the average increased from 
42% to 69% between 2005 and 2010) hinder the use of external control mechanisms such as 
hostile takeovers (Cheung et al., 2006). 
To redress the low floating ratio, the state launched in April 2005 the split-share reform that 
sought to convert the non-tradable shares to be freely negotiated on the secondary market 
among investors. Prior to the reform, there was a split-share structure in which around two 
thirds of all shares at issue were non-tradable in the stock exchanges, mostly in the hands of 
state bodies at various levels. Making every state share of listed SOEs tradable was a big 
step in the process of privatization of state assets. While most shares are officially tradable 
since the completion of the reform in 2007, there are still serious limitations on transfers of 
large block holdings given the lack of market thickness and the industrial policy constraints 
in state- and SOE-controlled firms. There is also a three year lockup period post-IPO 
preventing owners from selling their shares. The resulting relatively low proportion of 
tradable shares has important consequences. Apart from limiting the potential disciplining 
effect that usually stems from healthy markets for corporate control, the constraints on share 
transfers dramatically damage the efficiency of the pricing mechanism on the market (Yang, 
Chi, & Young, 2011). Most importantly, owners of non-tradable shares cannot materialize 
the value of their asset by selling their shares on the market and are largely indifferent to 
price fluctuations (Chen et al., 2009). This provides an incentive to appropriate private 
benefits of control. In this context, given the low proportion of tradable shares supplemented 
by the high level of ownership concentration, controlling shareholders have the incentives 
                                                          
9 The floating ratio represents the proportion of a firm’s shares that are tradable on the 
stock exchange. 
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and the capacity to initiate self-benefiting related party transactions, effectively tunneling 
cash flow out of the firm (Cheung et al., 2006). 
The next section presents a detailed literature review about the most important factors 
identified in past theoretical and empirical work that influence the principal-principal 
problems in large listed firms in transition economies. This review is meant to theoretically 
ground the guiding propositions put forward in the following section.   
 
2.2 Determinants of tunneling 
2.2.1 Ownership structure. This section discusses three factors related to the 
ownership structure that have an impact on the incidence of tunneling behavior, namely the 
proportion of equity of the largest shareholder, the presence of large minority shareholders 
and the proportion of tradable shares (floating ratio). As expressed above, ownership 
concentration is seen by most studies as an important determinant of tunneling. It is assumed 
to provide an approximation of the controlling shareholder's incentives to engage in 
expropriation. However, to be informative, the concepts of ownership and concentration 
must both be refined. Firstly, it is necessary to decompose the concept of ownership to 
distinguish the separate effects of decision making rights and income rights. Secondly, it is 
important to differentiate between ownership concentration among the largest shareholders 
or in the hands of the single largest shareholder. 
Decision making rights and income rights have opposite effects. According to Claessens et 
al. (2002) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002), income rights 
decrease the incentives for tunneling, while decision making rights are positively related to 
tunneling. Tunneling would thus be driven by a gap between higher decision making rights 
and lower income rights. They predict that the higher the income rights of the largest 
shareholder are, the more his interests are aligned with those of small investors and the less 
he has incentives to engage in tunneling behavior. Indeed, the cash flow rights of the largest 
shareholder have been found to be positively related to firm value since higher cash flow 
rights reduce the tunneling incentives (Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2002). 
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Regarding decision making rights, for the largest shareholder to be able to reap the private 
benefits of control and have the capacity to engage in tunneling behavior, it is suggested that 
a certain threshold of decision making rights must be held at the top of the ownership 
structure. Claessens et al. (2002) report that many studies assume that a threshold as low as 
10% may be regarded as yielding effective control over a listed firm. In the Asian context, 
this is indeed extremely low. In China, the ownership of the largest shareholder averages 
around 40%. If the 10% ownership threshold is used as a cutoff for effective control, 98% 
of Chinese listed firms in 2010 would qualify as being effectively controlled by the single 
largest shareholder (more than 99% in 2005). Even with a 20% threshold, which has been 
used in past studies on China (Huyghebaert & Wang, 2012), the proportion only falls to 86% 
of firms in 2010 (92% in 2005). This leaves only a very small minority of Chinese listed 
firms that could be regarded as being truly widely held compared to international 
benchmarks. In addition, because it is sometimes the case that a number of large shareholders 
in a firm belong to the same conglomerate, these numbers even underestimate the real 
decision making power of most controlling shareholders.   
For these reasons, even a low proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder by Chinese 
standards still represents a very large controlling stake by international standards. Jiang et 
al. (2010: 11) plainly argue that in the vast majority of Chinese firms, “the largest block 
holder has effective control, even when holding a relatively low percentage of total shares”. 
In other words, except for a very small minority of firms, controlling shareholders in China 
have enough decision making power to implement tunneling mechanisms. The only variable 
effect remaining, out of the two theorized by La Porta et al. (2002) and Claessens et al. 
(2002), is that of the income rights, predicting that the higher the percentage of shares owned 
by the largest shareholder is, the lower is the incentive for tunneling. There is a large gap by 
default between income rights and control rights and the extent of this gap is nearly entirely 
driven by the size of the income rights. Therefore, while ownership concentration is the main 
reason for the prevalence of principal-principal problems, the theory predicts that in the 
Chinese context the proportion of shares of the largest shareholder is inversely related to 
tunneling behavior. 
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Most of the empirical evidence provided in past studies regarding the impact of ownership 
concentration on shareholder expropriation in China supports this prediction. Jiang et al. 
(2010) and Huyghebaert and Wang (2012) indeed show that there is a negative relationship 
between the largest shareholder’s income rights and tunneling. Yeh, Shu and Su (2012) also 
confirm that the alignment of incentives between controlling and minority shareholders 
measured by the income rights of the former has a negative moderating effect on the positive 
relation between free cash flow and expropriation. For similar reasons, Lin, Ma and Su 
(2009) and Qiu and Yao (2009) both find that the largest owner's shareholding has a U-
shaped relationship with firm efficiency and firm value, respectively. The initial downward 
slope might be explained by the few firms that do display ownership dispersion thus limiting 
the effective control of the largest shareholder, but they interpret the subsequent upward 
slope as evidence of incentive alignment. 
Still, some studies that analyze the same population of Chinese listed during roughly the 
same time period offer diverging results. Wang and Xiao (2011) and Wu et al. (2011) find a 
positive relationship between the proportion of shares of the largest shareholder and 
tunneling behavior. In a similar vein, Chen et al. (2011) find that the relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance has an inverted-U shape. Guthrie, Xiao and 
Wang (2008) similarly find that joint ownership concentration has a positive relation with 
profitability. Yet, the “tunneling” interpretation of the link between ownership concentration 
and performance must be taken with caution. Many factors can influence this link (Sánchez-
Ballesta & García-Meca, 2007), such as the type of ownership or the identity of owners 
(Claessens & Djankov, 1999; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000), corporate governance practices 
like board independence (Lefort & Urzúa, 2008) and other factors like investment and 
leverage (Hu & Izumida, 2008). These factors are discussed in separate sections below and 
the empirical configurational framework used in the present study provides an avenue to 
explore their subtle interaction with ownership concentration and the effect on principal-
principal problems. 
Also, part of this departure from the theoretical prediction might be explained by the fact 
that two of those studies use measures of concentration that involve multiple shareholders 
(Chen et al., 2011; Guthrie et al., 2008), which fails to isolate the incentives of the controlling 
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shareholder. Indeed, some authors study the effect of ownership concentration by looking at 
the combined ownership of the largest shareholders, usually the five (Chen et al., 2011) or 
the ten largest (Guthrie et al., 2008). Unless one can provide evidence of collusion, this 
approach obscures the relation between the level of concentration and the resulting extent of 
the controlling shareholder’s effective control and incentives to conduct expropriation, 
confounding the very idea of ownership dispersion and concentration. Indeed, the presence 
of large minority shareholders can have a distinct impact from that of the share ownership 
of the largest shareholder. Consistent with the idea that ownership dispersion reduces the 
tunneling problem, the sum of ownership of the second to tenth largest shareholders has been 
found to increase monitoring on insiders and improve firm performance (Berkman, Cole, & 
Fu, 2009; Qiu & Yao, 2009). It has also been found to be negatively related to expropriation 
in the form of related party transactions (Huyghebaert & Wang, 2012). Still, the presence of 
multiple block holders has produced mixed results in cross-country studies. Faccio et al. 
(2001) find that minority shareholders that control more than 10% of a firm’s stock help to 
reduce expropriation in Europe, while suggesting the presence of collusion in Asia by 
intensifying principal-principal problems. They attribute this finding to the poor governance 
and institutions in Asia’s “crony capitalism” and call for more transparency and 
shareholders’ rights.  
While this underlines the importance of differentiating the controlling shareholder from 
other large investors, evidence from past studies is somewhat inconclusive regarding the 
impact of large minority shareholders. A configurational analysis may help uncovering the 
conditions under which these principals increase the level of monitoring on insiders and 
under which conditions they are compelled to collude with the largest shareholder. As 
mentioned earlier, such an analysis can also allow to assess whether the effect of large 
minority shareholders on tunneling behavior depends on the level of intra-firm monitoring 
and on the governance structure as negotiated between minority and controlling 
shareholders. Still, the main insight about ownership concentration provided by the 
theoretical literature and the existing empirical work is to accept the proposition that a 
relatively low proportion of shares by the largest shareholder provides incentives towards 
tunneling behavior. 
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Finally, apart from the ownership concentration and the presence of large minority 
shareholders, an additional condition related to the ownership structure that is an important 
factor in emerging markets to explain the prevalence of principal-principal problems is the 
floating ratio (the proportion of tradable shares). Indeed, as explained earlier, the owners of 
non-tradable stocks that hold a controlling stake cannot materialize any capital gains by 
trading shares on the market and are therefore incentivized to maximize their private benefits 
of control (Chen et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2011). The low floating ratio in the Chinese context 
also hinders the rise of an effective market for corporate control, which would have a 
disciplining effect on insiders (Cheung et al., 2006). This finds echo in Yuan et al.’s (2009) 
findings that institutional investors such as pension funds prefer investing in firms with a 
high proportion of tradable shares, presumably to maximize asset liquidity in a context that 
is otherwise not characterized by market thickness. Finally, Wang and Xu (2004) use the 
floating ratio itself as an indicator of overall quality of corporate governance in Chinese 
listed firms. The extent literature thus suggests that the floating ratio is negatively correlated 
with tunneling behavior.  
 
2.2.2 State control. Before diving into the specific factors that influence the relation 
between state ownership and tunneling behavior, it should be noted that government 
agencies acting as controlling shareholders are also subject to the same incentives and 
constraints that derive from the size of their stake as discussed in the previous section about 
ownership concentration. Also, Chen et al. (2011) argue that state ownership in itself cannot 
be assumed to inherently produce more tunneling, and that controlling shareholders in both 
private and state owned firms can have incentives to expropriate private benefits at the 
expense of small shareholders. Still, there are a number of incentives that are particular to 
government shareholders. 
Firstly, the decisions of state officials directly involved in corporate governance can be 
informed by many other concerns than delivering financial returns to regular shareholders, 
including the maximization of employment and state revenues (Sappington & Stiglitz, 1987; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). These political priorities and “non-economic stakeholder 
interests” can provide the grounds for state agencies to channel resources outside the firm 
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(Wu et al., 2011: 108) and have been found to negatively affect firm performance (Boardman 
& Vining, 1989). Secondly, as described earlier, constraints on share trading in SOEs 
incentivize the diversion of cash flow since capital gains cannot be easily materialized 
through stock sales (Cheung et al., 2006). Thirdly, the fact that state participation often 
provides preferential access to loans reduces the need to attract equity capital from external 
investors, trimming down the incentives to treat small shareholders well (Allen & Shen, 
2012). 
The inherited collectivistic past of the command economy also enables an undue influence 
by state officials on managers, weakening the power of outsiders (Opper & Schwaag-Serger, 
2008). In this context, even when the state is a minority shareholder, there is the possibility 
of collusion between private controlling shareholders and rent seeking officials (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1994). Many past studies provide empirical evidence supporting the positive effect 
of various levels of state ownership on tunneling. For example, Wu et al. (2011) find indirect 
evidence that tunneling is positively correlated with state participation in firm equity while 
Jian and Wong (2010) further emphasize that state control  has the effect of entrenching 
principal-principal problems. Finally, Huyghebaert and Wang (2012) find that state 
shareholding in state-controlled firms is positively associated with expropriation. 
However, there are also reasons to think that state shareholding can bring benefits. Some 
have argued that state influence can help curb principal agent problems by exercising 
complementary control on managers and even reduce controlling shareholder expropriation 
when the state is not the ultimate owner (Chang & Wong, 2004; Qian, 1995, 1996). From 
this perspective, when the state is a minority shareholder, its financial interests seem to be 
aligned with those of external public shareholders. For example, Allen and Shen (2012) 
observe that the rules on behavior and disclosure by controlling shareholders included in the 
first Code of Corporate Governance in 2001 were meant primarily to protect state holdings 
against mismanagement and diversion of cash flow. The claim that state shareholding helps 
mitigating principal-agent problems is supported by Tian and Estrin (2008), who find a U-
shaped relation between state shareholding and firm performance. The idea of a negative 
relation between state ownership and tunneling is also supported by Lo, Wong and Firth 
(2010) who report that firms in which the government is the largest shareholder use fewer 
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price manipulations during related party transactions. Yet, in a study by Wang and Xiao 
(2011), state control was found to have no significant relation to tunneling. 
To resolve the puzzle posed by these mixed results, some authors have suggested a 
distinction between local and central SOEs. Jiang et al. (2010) find that tunneling is 
positively related to local state control, but negatively related to central state control. 
Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis (2010) had also found higher tunneling in the form of 
manipulated transfer pricing in related party sales in firms controlled by the local state, 
which they attribute to the higher probability of prosecution for cash flow diversion at the 
central level. Similarly, Capalbo, Frino, Mollica and Palumbo (2014) find that larger SOEs 
perform less earnings manipulations, which is consistent with the two preceding findings 
since central SOEs are nearly five times larger than local ones on average (McMillan & 
Evans, 2015). Still, beyond the attempts at characterizing different forms of state ownership, 
many authors observe that much more research is needed to uncover the conditions under 
which state ownership can be beneficial or detrimental to private investors (Huyghebaert & 
Wang, 2012).  
The empirical investigation presented in this chapter will therefore argue that the influence 
of state control should be contextualized and embedded in complementary corporate 
governance practices at the firm level. A subtle analysis of specific configurations of 
corporate governance and of the relations among many principals will help explaining the 
conditions driving the causal asymmetry documented in the literature between state 
ownership and the expropriation problem. 
 
2.2.3 Commitment to best practices of corporate governance When the CSRC 
released the Chinese code of corporate governance in 2001, officials put the explicit 
emphasis on the objective of safeguarding the interests of minority investors in listed firms. 
Most of the provisions of the code and other laws consisting the Chinese corporate 
governance framework were transplants from textbooks of best practices primarily 
implemented in Western countries (Yu, 2007), such as the independent director and 
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fiduciary duty (Clarke, 2006), and more generally the standards promoted by the OECD 
(2004). These prescriptions are generally inspired from the Anglo-American model of 
corporate governance. It relies on disclosure as a complementary function of independent 
auditing (Mangena & Pike, 2005) which, coupled with board independence, a market for 
corporate control and incentive compensation, represent the basis of market-based 
mechanisms for effective monitoring by outsiders (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Franks & 
Mayer, 1997; Rediker & Seth, 1995; Walsh & Seward, 1990).  
In general terms, past studies provide equivocal results about the impact of firm-level 
corporate governance practices on tunneling behavior in China. On the one hand, Chen et 
al. (2011) find that while the expropriation of minority investors’ wealth by controlling 
shareholders in China is salient, it cannot be deterred by board-level governance practices. 
From this perspective, the usual prescriptions of good governance provide very limited, or 
no protection to minority shareholders against controlling parties. Chen et al. (2011) argue 
that agency theory prescriptions are certainly not harmful to small investors in transition 
economies, but because of the particularities of the institutional environment, the integral 
transplant of such prescriptions does not seem sufficient to limit the expropriation of small 
shareholders’ cash flow. On the other hand, in the neighboring Taiwanese market (i.e. one 
with a non-socialist past), good governance practices have generally been found to be 
effective to constrain the use of related party transactions as a tunneling mechanism (Lo et 
al., 2010; Yeh et al., 2012). As explained in the following paragraphs, the literature on 
specific practices also provides equivocal results. The present research surveys three specific 
interrelated practices that have received particular attention in past studies regarding the 
principal-principal problem in China, namely information disclosure and rigorous audit 
which are complementary conditions that enable independent directors to accomplish their 
monitoring role (Aguilera et al., 2008). 
Firstly, board independence is among the most common governance practices prescribed to 
ensure shareholder’s wealth maximization (Daily et al., 2003), since an insider-dominated 
board is less effective to monitor the CEO (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). In the Chinese 
context, the claim that independent directors can effectively increase board vigilance is 
controversial. According to Peng (2004), the appointment of independent directors serves a 
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symbolic purpose and does not play an actual role in the corporate governance of Chinese 
listed firms. Chen et al. (2011) find that board independence has no effect on firm 
performance. Huyghebaert and Wang (Huyghebaert & Wang, 2012) find that board 
independence in China is insignificant with regard to related party sales and purchases. This 
is not entirely at odds with past literature as Kesner, Victor and Lamont (1986) had found 
the level of board independence to be insignificant in relation with the prevalence of illegal 
activities among Fortune 500 companies. Su, Xu and Phan (2008) even suggest that the 
ineffectiveness of independent directors makes them a liability more than an asset. Chinese 
independent directors, they argue, fail in their monitoring role because they are either lacking 
information, colluding with insiders or are appointed on political grounds. Indeed, in firms 
dominated by one shareholder, especially those controlled by the state, board memberships 
are used to reward friends of the regime. In other words, the board is seen as a rent-generating 
tool from which individual members benefit to the detriment of the firm. From this 
perspective, an independent director is a waste of resources. Yet, some studies provide 
counterfactuals to this rationale. Liu and Lu (2007) have observed that board independence 
reduces earnings manipulation surrounding new rights issues. Liu (2006b) also observes that 
firms with a more independent board, as opposed to an insider-dominated board, display 
higher performance and generally make decisions that are more favorable to minority 
investors. These equivocal findings suggest that despite the prescriptions of best corporate 
governance practices, independent directors may allow for rent-seeking behavior rather than 
controlling insiders. Still, when considered within a bundle of complementary practices at 
the firm level, board independence may increase vigilance and deter harmful behavior. 
Secondly, proactive disclosure is not a practice that has been traditionally strong in China. 
Aguilera and Jackson (2003) explain that in countries where the rights of small shareholders 
are ill-protected, the allocation of decision making rights is more tainted by strategic interests 
than by legal requirements and that such a system typically mandates little information 
disclosure. At the firm level, this dynamic has also been observed in family firms that usually 
rely on the owners’ long term commitment and offer much less transparent reporting to 
outsiders (Dhnadirek & Tang, 2003). Similarly, Liu (2006b) observes that the traditional 
model of governance in China involves limited financial disclosure, which facilitates 
decisions that diverge from small shareholder wealth maximization. The fact that related 
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party loans were readily disclosed prior to 2006 (Jiang et al., 2010) highlights the 
ineffectiveness of disclosure alone as a monitoring mechanism in absence of legal means to 
privately enforce the legitimate cash flow rights of shareholders. Still, a survey of investment 
managers revealed that Chinese institutional investors prefer acquiring stakes in firms that 
voluntarily disclose more information (Yuan et al., 2009). While disclosure alone may not 
discipline insiders, it can be complementary with other firm-level practices such as board 
independence (Cheng & Courtenay, 2006). Also, no study has found a negative effect 
between disclosure and the treatment of small investors. In essence, this literature suggests 
that while disclosure is an insufficient monitoring mechanism, it may represent an important 
condition contributing to prevent tunneling behavior when considered within a bundle of 
mutually reinforcing conditions.  
Thirdly, as outlined above, a rigorous independent audit is also part of the prescribed 
practices that can contribute to disciplining insiders. Since the present study is primarily 
interested in the governance structures implemented within the firm, the concept of rigorous 
audit is conceived through the internal mechanism primarily embodied by the audit 
committee of the board of directors and the independence of this committee. In one of the 
few studies looking at internal audit, Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003) indeed find that the 
presence of a financial expert on the audit committee of the board, which was mandated in 
the US as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and subsequently also required in China, has been 
found to reduce earnings manipulation in China. A number of other studies have looked at 
the impact of external auditors. While this does not directly capture the role of internal audit, 
it provides indications on the relevance and effectiveness of audit practices generally. Also, 
audit committees are responsible for the appointment of and the relations with external 
auditors. On the one hand, Liu and Zhou (2005; cited in Liu, 2006b) find that hiring large 
international accounting firms (the Big 4) to verify the annual report does not improve 
significantly the quality of reporting compared to companies hiring local accounting firms. 
They attribute this finding mainly to the desire of the Big 4 to expand their market shares in 
China, prioritizing client satisfaction over quality disclosure. On the other hand, Chen et al. 
(2011) find that rigorous auditing, measured as being audited by a top 8 auditor in China, 
reduces earnings manipulation in private firms, but not in SOEs. Similarly, Huyghebaert and 
Wang (2012) observe that being audited by a Big 4 auditing firm is negatively related to 
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tunneling behavior. Again, while the effectiveness of auditing practices is debated, no study 
has found a distinct negative impact. Therefore, rigorous audit, much like disclosure, is not 
in itself an effective deterrent but may within a bundle of complementary conditions 
contribute to the prevention of tunneling behavior.  
 
2.2.4 Financial factors. Past empirical work on shareholder expropriation points 
to two additional firm-level factors that can have a decisive impact on the salience of 
principal-principal problems, either because of a direct causal relation or because of 
interactions with the conditions reviewed above, namely the ownership structure, state 
control and corporate governance practices. This section provides a brief discussion about 
these two factors: firm size and leverage (i.e. firm indebtedness). 
Firstly, the existing literature provides equivocal results regarding the effect of firm size on 
the prevalence of tunneling behavior. Huyghebaert and Wang (2012) observe that firm size 
has a positive relation to tunneling. Based on comparable results, Yeh et al. (2012) suggest 
that the fact that firm size is positively related to tunneling is explained by the larger value 
to be expropriated and the potential role of large firms as transaction hubs of fund 
transferring in corporate networks. Yet, other studies obtain opposite results. Jiang et al. 
(2010) and Wang and Xiao (2011) find that firm size is negatively related to tunneling. This 
conundrum may be explained by another stream of literature, which suggests that the effect 
of firm size may depend on complementarities with other conditions. For example, Aguilera 
et al. (2008) suggest that small firms are less concerned with monitoring than with resource 
accessibility, while larger and more mature firms have structures geared more towards 
accountability. For instance, independent directors in young firms might be more concerned 
with resources and strategic decision making aimed at survival, while independent directors 
in mature firms focus their attention on monitoring. Moreover, board independence in large 
firms is complementary with information disclosure, which strengthens the communication 
between external directors and shareholders and strengthens investor confidence (Aguilera 
et al., 2008). Smaller ventures are typically subject to weaker compulsory disclosure 
requirements, have fewer external investors, a more concentrated ownership structure, and 
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fewer independent directors. The virtuous circle observed in large firms is simply not 
happening. This suggests that board independence, proactive disclosure and other corporate 
governance practices may provide more discipline on insiders in larger that in smaller firms. 
Secondly, high firm indebtedness (high leverage) has consistently been identified in the 
literature as a factor contributing to tunneling behavior (Jiang et al., 2010; Wang & Xiao, 
2011; Yeh et al., 2012). However, leverage has usually been used as a control variable in 
statistical models and none of the authors cited above provide substantive interpretation 
explaining this result. A possible explanation is that these firms may have access to more 
generous bank lending and are less concerned with the need to potentially raise capital from 
outside investors, reducing the incentive to honor the income rights of minority shareholders. 
Some firms in China, especially the so-called national champions that are handpicked by 
the state for preferential tax treatment in particular when they venture to invest abroad, 
indeed benefit from cheap capital from state-owned banks. Local officials are known to 
enjoy discretionary power in the attribution of loans (Park & Sehrt, 2001). Also, Chinese 
banks are notorious for not monitoring the usage of money once a loan has been granted. In 
her book Back-Alley Banking, Tsai (2002) documents how poorly enforced loan contracts 
are in China even in the private sector, especially by local banks. The evidence concerning 
indebtedness, in conjunction with poor banking monitoring, suggests that an underlying 
expropriation mechanism consists of contracting loans through regular channels of the 
capital market and subsequently tunneling this capital to related parties. A high leverage is 
therefore expected to be an important condition contributing to the presence of tunneling 
behavior.  
 
2.3 Proposition Building, Complementarities and Substitution Effects 
The previous section provided a review of the causal conditions that affect principal-
principal conflicts. Most of the empirical literature is however based on methods that isolate 
the effect of each determinant. Theory, on the other hand, is increasingly evolving towards 
a configurational understanding of corporate governance. Not only is the efficiency of 
governance structures contingent upon other elements such as the ownership structure and 
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firm size, but individual practices are often only functioning when part of a bundle of 
complementary practices. Complementarities can also create asymmetry when a condition 
produces opposite effects depending on the circumstances. In addition, there may be 
redundancy if two conditions have an equivalent function, which can result in potential 
substitution effects. 
Misangyi and Acharya (2014) explain that the argument that corporate governance practices 
are substitutes rests on the idea that they are chosen according to efficiency and costs 
considerations and that they balance each other to maintain an “equilibrium organization of 
the firm” (Demsetz, 1983: 384). For instance, to resolve principal-agent problems, more 
incentive compensation is deemed necessary if the level of monitoring is weaker (Beatty & 
Zajac, 1994). Similarly, internal monitoring is assumed to be able to palliate to the absence 
of external discipline provided by an active market for corporate control. Another stream of 
literature has suggested that corporate governance instead consists of coherent systems of 
synergistic practices that are best understood as bundles (Aguilera et al., 2008; Rediker & 
Seth, 1995). This idea of mutually reinforcing conditions has mostly been studied in the 
international context, comparing how firm level practices adapt to create complementarities 
with national level institutions (Aguilera et al., 2012). For instance, external control 
mechanisms and dispersed ownership are only possible in jurisdictions that enforce strong 
shareholders’ rights. Yet, complementarities do not necessarily entail rigid adherence to an 
archetype, but can be reduced to two or three practices that create synergies within the bundle 
(Garcia-Castro et al., 2013). Finally, while substitution and complementarity have typically 
been opposed as competing views in the literature, recent contributions in this field show 
that these effects are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, Misangyi and Acharya (2014: 1701) 
propose that “the effectiveness of the governance bundle involves the simultaneity of 
substitution and complementarity among the various monitoring mechanisms”. Garcia-
Castro et al. (2013: 309) also find empirical evidence supporting the idea that the presence 
of any two mechanisms that belong to the same coherent bundle is sufficient, as opposed to 
the whole bundle itself. They argue that this “functional equivalence across bundles of CG 
practices […] grants firms agency on which of the practices to implement”. 
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Beyond these expected complementarities and substitutions between corporate governance 
practices, interactions may also occur among other firm level conditions. Certain incentives 
or governance bundles may have an effect only in certain types of firms (Aguilera & Jackson, 
2003). As explained above, two conditions are especially relevant regarding the type of firms 
in the expropriation problem: firm size and private VS state control. For instance, the 
monitoring role of the board is expected to be more salient in large firms. This contingency 
is not uniform. For example, the argument that a large share of ownership by the largest 
shareholder reduces tunneling incentives applies to both large and small firms. 
Following these insights, most of the guiding propositions offered below are based on 
interaction effects that involve the various determinants discussed in the previous section. It 
should be noted that given its exploratory nature, the investigation is mostly interested in 
effects that might emerge in an inductive manner and that can contribute to understanding 
how the ownership structure, corporate governance practices and state control impact 
tunneling behavior. The propositions are mainly used to guide the empirical analysis and 
provide an explicit starting point to relate the findings to the existing literature. 
The first two propositions concern the incentives and mechanisms that contribute to 
tunneling behavior. Firstly, a low proportion of shares by the largest shareholder has been 
identified as a key element contributing to the misalignment of incentives between the many 
principals (Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2002). Secondly, a high leverage stands 
out as an important mechanism through which firms draw resources to be tunneled (Jiang et 
al., 2010; Wang & Xiao, 2011; Yeh et al., 2012). Thirdly, a low floating ratio has also been 
identified as offering an important incentive for controlling shareholders to find alternative 
ways to obtain cash flow that can hardly materialize through stock value appreciation (Chen 
et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2011). However, given that state-owned enterprises have strict 
restrictions on share trading, the impact of the floating ratio is expected to mainly concern 
private firms. In the case of SOEs, on top of the two first conditions that still apply (a low 
proportion of shares by the largest shareholder and a high leverage), there may be an 
additional interaction between state control and firm size. This follows Capalbo et al.’s 
(2014) finding that smaller SOEs are more prone to manipulate earnings and builds on Jiang 
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et al.’s (2010) and Cheung et al.’s (2010) finding that local SOEs, which are much smaller 
(McMillan & Evans, 2015), are more susceptible to engage into tunneling behavior. 
Proposition 1a: The largest shareholder in private firms will embark on tunneling if 
three conditions co-exist: high leverage, low floating ratio, and them holding a 
relatively low share of equity. 
Proposition 1b: In state-controlled firms a relatively low share of equity in the hands 
of the largest shareholder in combination with high leverage and small firm size leads 
to tunneling. 
In addition to the incentives discussed above, three propositions concern the commitment to 
best practices in corporate governance. The insights from Chen et al. (2011) suggest that 
firm-level corporate practices can keep tunneling behavior in check in the event that the 
controlling shareholder has the incentives and ability to engage in it. An independent board 
(Liu & Lu, 2007), proactive disclosure (Yuan et al., 2009) and rigorous internal audit (Xie 
et al., 2003) can contribute to preventing expropriation. The recent literature suggesting that 
corporate governance practices may be simultaneously complementary and substitutive 
(Garcia-Castro et al., 2013) warrants the formulation of the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: Provided that there are sufficient incentives for tunneling, the lack of 
at least two out of these three governance mechanisms leads to tunneling behavior: 
board independence, proactive disclosure, and independent internal auditing. 
Yet, this proposition does not encompass the extent of the causal complexity at play in the 
principal-principal problem. An important factor lies in the role of large minority 
shareholders, but past literature suggests that this condition may be marked by causal 
asymmetry. The inclination of such investors in Asia to collude in the diversion of cash flow, 
as opposed to those in Europe, may trickle from a lack of disclosure (Faccio et al., 2001). 
Disclosure may therefore be a crucial complementary element with the presence or large 
minority shareholders if these outsiders are to effectively monitor insiders. 
Proposition 3: Provided that there are sufficient incentives for tunneling (see P1) and 
that there are large minority shareholders, a lack of proactive disclosure is a crucial 
element contributing to tunneling. 
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Secondly, past literature is equivocal on the role of independent directors. As suggested in 
proposition 2, a conjunction with other corporate governance practices may instill more 
vigilance in safeguarding the interests of minority investors (Aguilera et al., 2008). Yet, 
especially in the Chinese context, boards may be used as rent generating mechanisms to 
reward friends of the regime (Su et al., 2008). It is expected that such rent seeking motives 
are mostly salient in state controlled firms, where nominations are used as an instrument to 
entrench the Party Nomenklatura (Brødsgaard, 2012). 
Proposition 4: In state controlled firms, a high proportion of independent directors 
contributes to tunneling. 
In what follows, a configurational analysis on a large sample of Chinese listed firms explores 
the causal conditions and interactions that emerge in the bundles of conditions that lead to 
tunneling behavior and those that avert it. The results are discussed in light of the preceding 
theoretically grounded propositions. 
 
3 EMPIRICAL STUDY: METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Data and Sample 
The empirical analysis uses firm-level data about 1337 firms listed with standard A-shares 
on the two Chinese stock exchanges, namely the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange. Two reasons compel the choice of the year 2005 for the data collection. 
Firstly, it is the last year and thus the most recent year during which the dependent variable 
was disclosed by Chinese firms. Secondly, the majority of the empirical studies analyzing 
tunneling in China, as introduced previously, use data from years ranging between 2002 and 
2005, which allows to compare the findings with the existing literature (Chen et al., 2009, 
2011; Huyghebaert & Wang, 2012; Jiang et al., 2010; Lin et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2011). 
During the year 2005, the total population of A-shares denominated firms was 1352. 15 firms 
were excluded from the sample because of missing data. The final sample therefore covers 
99% of the population. The data was collected from two sources, namely the GTA and the 
Sinofin databases. The measurements for each variable are detailed further below. 
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3.2 Set Theoretic Method 
The field of corporate governance research has been identified as an opportunity for research 
using configuration analysis. For instance, Short et al. (2008) suggest that looking at the 
interaction of several characteristics of boards of directors simultaneously could help to 
solve equivocal issues such as the effect of CEO duality and independent directors on firm 
performance (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998), which remain elusive when their 
effects are analyzed as competing determinants. Consequently, the set theoretic method 
(fsQCA) has increasingly been used in corporate governance studies as a way to empirically 
explore combinations of mechanisms as bundles and complementary factors rather than as 
isolated additive effects (Bell et al., 2013; Garcia-Castro et al., 2013; Misangyi & Acharya, 
2014). It allows to study the interactions among multiple variables simultaneously, while 
interaction effects in statistical methods are difficult to interpret beyond three-way 
interactions. For these reasons, fsQCA lends itself to an analysis of the interplay between 
ownership structure, state/private control and commitment to best practices of corporate 
governance shaping the controlling shareholder’s behavior in terms of tunneling.  
The appeal of set theoretic methods lies in the possibility of unraveling the complexity of 
causal relations. Greckhamer, Misangyi, Elms, and Lacey (2008: 697) explain that “(a) 
outcomes of interest rarely have any single cause, (b) causes rarely operate in isolation from 
each other, and (c) a specific causal attribute may have different and even opposite effects 
depending on context”. Of particular interest, configurational analysis allows for 
equifinality, causal asymmetry and the identification of core and peripheral causal 
conditions. Indeed, Fiss (2011: 410) summarizes the unique value of set theoretic methods, 
explaining that alternative statistical methods “offer only limited insight into the internal 
causal structure of the different types, the neutral permutations inherent to the types, and the 
asymmetric causal relationships present across the performance spectrum”. Firstly, 
equifinality involves a recognition that multiple causal paths can lead to a single outcome. 
Secondly, the identification of core conditions are useful to categorize different types of 
cases in which the causal relation to the outcome is supported by possibly interchangeable 
peripheral conditions (Fiss, 2011). Such second order equifinality may allow the 
identification of neutral permutations among peripheral conditions in a given configuration 
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and allow for a more subtle exploration of “intratype similarities and dissimilarities” (Fiss, 
2011: 398). In other words, peripheral conditions are the factors that may vary across 
configurations that share the same main (core) causal factors. Thirdly, Fiss (2011) and Ragin 
(2008a) develop the concept of causal asymmetry, conveying that while some causal 
conditions can explain the presence of an outcome, their opposite might not explain the 
absence of the same outcome. A different set of conditions might instead be needed. For 
instance, Fiss (2011) finds that the causal conditions that explain high and very high firm 
performance are not the same as those that explain low and below average performance.  
The operationalization of fsQCA rests the view that the outcome, the causal conditions and 
the relations between them are analyzed in terms of sets and subsets (Fiss, 2007; 
Greckhamer, Misangyi, & Fiss, 2013; Ragin, 2000, 2008a). A given case may have 
membership in more than one set, such as the set of large firms and the set of state-owned 
firms. The intersection of these sets, including the outcome set, provides evidence about the 
particular combinations of conditions that can produce the outcome. The set theoretic 
method allows studying causal mechanisms involving directional, one-way relations, but its 
value-added is where attributes and sets can be characterized by the concepts of necessity 
and sufficiency. An attribute is necessary if it is present in all combinations that produce the 
outcome. An attribute or combination of attributes is sufficient if it produces the outcome 
by itself. In the present chapter, the first part of the empirical study centers on the 
identification of configurations of attributes that are sufficient to produce the outcome of 
tunneling behavior. Following the insights on causal asymmetry, the second part aims to 
identify the configurations that are sufficient to produce the absence of tunneling. 
Originally, fsQCA had been designed as a method that would allow systematic analysis of 
relatively small samples (N < 50). The present study is part of an emerging trend that uses 
the above-mentioned benefits of set theory on larger samples (Bell et al., 2013; Garcia-
Castro et al., 2013; Park & El Sawy, 2013; Whittington, McKee, Goodwin, & Bell, 2013). 
For instance, Greckhamer et al. (2008) and Misangyi and Acharya (2014) have used QCA 
analysis on samples of 2841 and 1135 cases respectively. While the procedure remains 
largely the same as with small-N studies, some differences must be taken into account. Even 
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before starting the analysis, considerations must be given to the number of conditions 
included and to the calibration of variables into sets of causal conditions. 
Firstly, especially in small N studies, the number of conditions has to be low to avoid that 
each case becomes its own configuration and to facilitate the search for commonalities. 
Limiting the number of conditions in large N studies is still important to reduce complexity 
and facilitate interpretation, but the volume of observations allows for greater flexibility. 
Generally, Ragin (2008a) suggests that interpretation beyond 8-10 conditions may become 
elusive. Greckhamer et al. (2013) contend that large-N QCA studies could potentially use 
up to 12 conditions. In a recent large-N study, Misangyi and Acharya (2014) include 10 
explanatory conditions. The inclusion of 9 conditions in the present study is therefore in line 
with the dominant recommendations and strikes a balance between interpretability and the 
inclusion of the most important causal conditions identified in the literature. 
Secondly, the approach to calibration with large samples might need adaptation from 
cannons originally designed for small samples. Calibration is the procedure by which 
variables are transformed into sets. In crisp sets, membership is coded as 1 while non-
membership is coded as 0. Fuzzy sets allow for ordinal or interval scale variables to be 
calibrated along a spectrum between 0, full non-membership, and 1, full membership, where 
0.5 is the cross-over point where set membership is at “maximum ambiguity” (Ragin, 2008a: 
30). Because not all variance is meaningful (Crilly, 2011), the researcher is expected to use 
substantive knowledge during calibration to identify meaningful thresholds for full 
membership, full non-membership and the cross-over point (Fiss, 2011). However, 
Greckhamer et al. (2013) explain that in large-N studies, researchers are typically less 
familiar with each case. Using thresholds that are theory driven is preferable, but most recent 
studies that have used QCA on large samples used data-driven breakpoints to calibrate the 
variables that exhibit normal distributions. Greckhamer et al. (2008) centered most crossover 
points at the median. Fiss (2011) and Whittington et al. (2013) also use data driven 
breakpoints for all the conditions that were not based on Likert scales. This study uses a mix 
of theory-driven and data-driven calibration procedures depending on the nature of each 
condition. Five out of nine causal conditions were calibrated according to data-driven 
thresholds centered at the median. Yet, the fact that the breakpoints used in the data-driven 
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calibration rests on the distribution of the entire population of Chinese listed firms 
circumvents problems related to sample-specific biases. 
After calibrating the sets of causal conditions and the outcome, the procedure in fsQCA 
involves three main steps. The first step is the construction of a truth table. The lines of the 
table list all the possible combinations of causal conditions. For 9 conditions, there are 92 
lines for a total of 512 combinations. The columns of the table contain the causal conditions, 
the outcome variable, the frequency of firms that exhibit each combination and the 
consistency with which those firms are part of the outcome set. Roughly, the consistency 
represents the proportion of firms in each combination that display the outcome. Not all 
theoretically possible combinations are observed empirically. This phenomenon is referred 
to as limited diversity (Ragin, 1987, 2000). 
The second step requires the researcher to reduce the table by choosing a minimum 
frequency level and determine a consistency cutoff. Only those combinations that display 
the minimum frequency are kept for the analysis. It is recommended that the frequency 
threshold must be set in order to include around 80% of the sample in the analysis 
(Greckhamer et al., 2013). In small-N studies the frequency is often set at 1, keeping all 
empirically observable combinations in the analysis to maximize the diversity and coverage 
(see for instance Meuer, 2014). In large-N studies, a common rule of thumb suggests that a 
minimum frequency of 3 shall preserve a reasonably large coverage while maintaining the 
width of the solution to a manageable level. While full coverage is often expected in small-
N studies, a large coverage is desirable but not necessary in large N studies (Greckhamer et 
al., 2013). 
In terms of consistency cutoff, while the recommendations vary from a minimum of .75 
(Ragin, 2006) to .95 (Epstein, Duerr, Kenworthy, & Ragin, 2008), most studies consider .8 
to be a reasonable threshold. Others suggest looking for a natural break in the data 
(Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop, & Paunescu, 2010). Determining the minimum frequency and 
the consistency cutoff has an influence on the coverage and overall consistency of the final 
solution. A higher frequency increases the coverage but complexifies the solution. A higher 
consistency cutoff reduces the coverage while increasing the overall consistency. This study 
uses a process of iteration to reduce the arbitrariness involved in choosing the frequency and 
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consistency cutoffs. Every possible combination of frequency and consistency cutoffs were 
tested, incrementally adding 1 unit to frequency and .01 of consistency. The resulting table 
displays the product of the coverage and overall consistency of each solution. Every solution 
with 10 or more configurations was eliminated for purposes of interpretability, as well as 
those displaying an overall consistency lower than .8. The cell with the highest product 
(overall consistency x overall coverage) set the cutoff points for the analysis.  
The third step involves an algorithm that identifies the commonalities of the remaining 
combinations and reduces the solution into a single Boolean equation of sufficient 
configurations. The fsQCA software uses the truth table algorithm and produces a range of 
solutions (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). The complex solution uses fewer simplifying 
assumptions, producing exhaustive Boolean equations that are difficult to interpret, while 
parsimonious solutions take into account all the possible counterfactuals based on 
hypothetical but empirically absent configurations. The intermediate solution, which uses 
existing knowledge to discern the plausible counterfactuals to be used as simplifying 
assumptions (Ragin, 2008a), offers a balanced output in that it provides some level of 
complexity by including both core and peripheral conditions but in a relatively concise 
equation (Fiss, 2011; Greckhamer, 2011). These easy counterfactuals “refer to situations in 
which a redundant causal condition is added to a set of causal conditions that by themselves 
already lead to the outcome in question.” (Fiss, 2011: 403) 
The results are presented according to the notation suggested by Ragin and Fiss (2008). In a 
table, all the causal conditions are listed in the lines while the configurations appear in the 
columns. In each configuration, the core conditions are indicated with a big dot while 
peripheral conditions are indicated by a small one. Moreover, the conditions that must be 
present receive black dots while those that must be absent are displayed as crossed dots. 
(●: core present, ø: core absent, •: peripheral present, ø: peripheral absent).  
 
3.3 Outcome Variable: Inter-Firm Loans as a Measure of Tunneling Behavior 
In set theoretic methods, the dependent variable is called the outcome, which in this study is 
a measure of tunneling behavior. While the problem of tunneling is paramount for investors 
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and capital markets regulators, its prevalence is very hard to measure. There are two 
categories of measures: direct and indirect. Direct approaches require the identification of 
quantified and disclosed expropriation activities. Some of the direct measures that have been 
used in the past include the volume or price manipulation of related party transactions, inter-
firm loans with parent companies and the diverging valuation of two classes of shares 
(Deangelo & Deangelo, 1985). Some direct measures have looked at the opposite concept 
of tunneling, using variables such as divestures and dividends to approximate the protection 
of minority investors. Wu et al. (2011) use such an approach to measure the controlling 
shareholder expropriation by looking at divestiture activities in firms, which are assumed to 
be inversely proportional to expropriation. Indirect measures infer the extent of 
expropriation by looking at the relationship between measures of incentives for 
expropriation, typically the size of control rights of the largest shareholder, and firm 
performance, most often ROA or stock return (Chen et al., 2011; Ding, Zhang, & Zhang, 
2007; Heugens, van Essen, & van Oosterhout, 2009). 
Most tunneling transactions in China take the form of inter-firm loans (Jiang et al., 2005). 
Such corporate loans represent a particularly interesting measure to trace the extent of 
tunneling behavior because they do not require additional tests on firm value typically 
needed with indirect measures (Jiang et al., 2010). Before 2006, these loans were readily 
observable in the annual reports, not so well hidden under the heading “other receivables” 
(Jiang et al., 2005). It has been shown that, the higher the other receivables are, the larger is 
their proportion that can be directly traced to the largest shareholder. This item, listed in the 
firm's current assets, has been associated with future weakening performance and financial 
distress (Jiang et al., 2010). Also, in the top 10% of other receivables, firms had a 45% 
chance of receiving an unclean report by their auditor, which supports the idea that auditing 
can be effective to improve disclosure but casts doubts on the effectiveness of auditing alone 
to curb wrongdoing.  
For the specific issue of inter-firm loans to related parties, Yeh et al. (2012) ground their 
model on the internal capital market hypothesis, inspired by transaction cost theory 
(Williamson, 1964, 1979). Their findings show that such related party transactions are used 
in a group of firms to coordinate and allocate resources, thereby replacing external sources 
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of capital and also opening the door to rent seeking behavior. While some related party 
transactions are dutifully conform to regular business activities (Gordon, Henry, Louwers, 
& Reed, 2007), Yeh et al. (2012: 758) observe that “a general understanding is that a high 
level of related party transactions tends to be associated with tunneling practices that go 
beyond the legal boundaries”. 
Consistent with past literature showing that “other receivables” to total assets represent a 
valid measure of tunneling behavior in the form of inter-firm loans in China (Jiang et al., 
2005, 2010; Wang & Xiao, 2011), the present research design adopts the “other receivables” 
as the outcome variable (i.e. the dependent variable). The calibration of the set memberships 
was coded as follow: full non-membership was set at the 5th percentile, full membership was 
set at the 95th percentile and the crossover point was set at the median. Respectively, the 
values are 0, 34.5% and 2.8%. For the second part of the analysis, meant to identify the 
configurations that lead to the absence of tunneling, the outcome variable used is the 
reversed set: one minus tunneling. In order to facilitate interpretation, the same percentiles 
are used for the causal conditions whose calibration is also data-driven.  
 
3.4 Causal Conditions 
Large controlling shareholder. The proportion of shares of the largest shareholder 
is the most used measure of ownership concentration (Huyghebaert & Wang, 2012; Jiang et 
al., 2010; Lin et al., 2009; Qiu & Yao, 2009; Wang & Xiao, 2011; Wu et al., 2011; Yeh et 
al., 2012). The full non-membership, crossover point and full membership are again 
calibrated according to the 5th, 50th and 95th percentiles. The values are 17.6%, 37.8% and 
68%. Since the theoretical prediction is that a large controlling shareholder contributes to 
the absence of tunneling, these thresholds are consistent with results from past studies. Jiang 
et al. (2010) found that tunneling is highest when the largest block holder owns less than 
30% of total shares, which falls comfortably below the chosen crossover point of 37.8%. 
Chen et al. (2011) found that the proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder is 
positively correlated with firm performance until it reaches a threshold of 48%, which falls 
well above the crossover point. 
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Large minority. This variable replicates previous studies that use the sum 
proportion of shares of the second to tenth largest shareholders as a measure of the presence 
of large minority shareholders (Berkman et al., 2009; Faccio et al., 2001; Huyghebaert & 
Wang, 2012; Qiu & Yao, 2009). The 5th, 50th and 95th percentiles were respectively 1.7%, 
18.8% and 44.3%. The presence of this condition together with a large controlling 
shareholder indicates that the firm has a very high ownership concentration among the ten 
largest shareholders. 
Float. The floating ratio is the proportion of shares that are negotiable on the stock 
exchange. The 5th, 50th and 95th percentiles were respectively 25%, 39.6% and 63.5%. 
Independent board. Board independence is measured as the proportion of 
independent directors on the board of directors. According to the Guiding Opinion on the 
Establishment of the Independent Directors’ System by Listed Companies issued by the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 2001, independent directors cannot 
include any direct family member of anyone employed by or holding over 1% of the shares 
of the firm or of a subsidiary. The Opinion of the CSRC mandates that at least a third of the 
board must be independent as a minimum threshold. Following this, firms that display a 
proportion of independent directors lower than 33.3% are coded as 0. Those that barely 
comply with the 33.3% rule are coded as .25. Firms that display more than the mandated 
threshold of 33.3 % receive .51, meaning that they are slightly in the set. Following 
international best practices, including the rules of the NYSE and the conclusions from the 
Cadbury report in the UK as well as similar provisions in other countries (Australia, Brazil, 
Finland, etc.) which recommend that at least half of the board be independent, firms with at 
least 50% independent directors are coded as fully in (1). To complete the incremental scale, 
boards with at least 40% independent directors but less than 50% are coded as .75. Following 
this scale, the term “independent board” should be understood as boards consisting of more 
than a third of independent directors. 
Proactive disclosure. There is no single best systematic measure of disclosure used 
in the literature, but the timeliness of release of the annual report has been shown to be a 
sensitive element of disclosure in listed firms (Haw, Qi, & Wu, 2000; Haw, Park, Qi, & Wu, 
2006; McGee & Yuan, 2012; Park, Song, Yang, Hossain, & Koo, 2013). Following this 
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insight, the delay between year-end and the date of release of the annual report is used as a 
proxy for proactive disclosure. The scale is anchored according to the three reporting 
deadlines mandated by the Securities and Exchange Commission in the US for filing the 10-
k form, which is a standardized version of the financial statements handed to the authorities: 
60 days, 75 days and 90 days. While these forms are different in kind from full fledge 
corporate annual reports and despite the fact that the three deadlines are originally meant to 
apply to firms of different sizes, these dates are used as indications of proactive disclosure, 
which should intrinsically go above and beyond mere compliance. The CSRC in China 
indeed mandates a maximum deadline of 120 days for all listed firms. Consequently, a delay 
of 60 days or less between year-end and release was coded as fully in (1). 75 days or less 
was coded as in (.67). 90 days or less was coded as out (.33). More than 90 days was coded 
as fully out (0). 
Independent audit. Two distinct elements combine to construct a measure of 
independent internal audit. Firstly, to be included in the set, firms must have set up an audit 
committee in the board of directors. Audit committees are involved in the preparation of 
annual reports, have access to financial officers, are responsible for recommending external 
auditors and have privileged access to the auditors. The presence of audit committees is 
generally expected to improve the overall audit quality (Stewart & Munro, 2007). Secondly, 
audit committees in China are supposed to include a majority of independent directors, 
preferably including the chairman of the committee. Moreover, it is strongly advised that an 
independent director with an accounting title sit on the committee. Ample literature 
discusses the benefits of independent audit committees. Such independence has been found 
to reduce earnings manipulation (Klein, 2002), instances of fraud (Abbott, Park, & Parker, 
2000) and to enhance firm value (Chan & Li, 2008). While the composition of the audit 
committee is disclosed in the annual reports, including which members are independent 
directors, additional information was used to validate their independence. To be included in 
the set, the disclosed working address of the independent director with an accounting title 
must be different from the address of the firm. This resulted in a binary causal condition. 
Firms with an audit committee on the board in which the independent director with an 
accounting title has a different address than that of the firm were coded as 1. All other firms 
were coded as 0. 
75_Erim BW Tremblay_Stand.job
75 
 
High leverage. Consistent with previous studies, leverage was measured as a ratio 
of total liabilities to total assets (Jiang et al., 2010; Wang & Xiao, 2011; Yeh et al., 2012). 
However, to account for the considerable variance in leverage across industries, an adjusted 
measure subtracts the leverage from the industry average, using the first order CSCR 
classification and second order classification in the case of manufacturing firms. This 
procedure is often used in the literature (Acharya, Amihud, & Litov, 2011; Berger & Ofek, 
1995; Billett & Xue, 2007), including in studies of Chinese firms (Berkman, Nguyen, & 
Zou, 2011; Cheung, Jing, Lu, Rau, & Stouraitis, 2009). The 5th, 50th and 95th percentiles 
were respectively -32.5%, 0.2% and 42%. 
Large firm. In line with many past studies, total assets are used as a measure of 
firm size (Chen et al., 2009, 2011; Liu & Lu, 2007; Yeh et al., 2012). The 5th, 50th and 95th 
percentiles were respectively 345 million Yuan, 1,518 million Yuan and 9,325 million Yuan. 
With such a calibration, the absence of large firm can also be interpreted as the presence of 
relatively small firms. 
State control (SOE). This causal condition is coded as a simple binary variable. 
Firms ultimately controlled by a state agency at any level of government, as disclosed by the 
annual report, are coded as 1. Other firms are coded as 0. Considering the condition of state 
control in conjunction with large controlling shareholder provides an indication on the 
shareholding size of the state in SOEs.  
 
3.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 below provides the descriptive statistics for the outcome variable and the nine causal 
conditions. It provides the mean, the standard deviation, the minimum and the maximum for 
each variable. The variables SOE and independent audit are binary, so only the mean is 
reported. Also, three variables (other receivables, leverage and size) contained outliers that 
skewed the statistics. Extreme values do not affect the QCA analysis like in statistical 
methods because of the calibration process which puts emphasis on relevant variation and 
suppresses the irrelevant variation beyond the thresholds of full-membership and full non-
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membership. Still, such extreme scores have a great impact on the average and standard 
deviations reported here. To make the following statistics more informative, the top and 
bottom 1% were removed from these three variables. The procedure of winsorizing extreme 
scores is common in statistical methods, including in studies on corporate governance and 
tunneling problems (see for instance Jiang et al., 2010; Wang & Xiao, 2011). To provide a 
better demographic picture of the population, table 2 offers data on the geographic and 
industry distribution. Most listed firms in China are located in Eastern provinces and the 
South Central region. Guangdong, Shanghai and Beijing alone account for 33% of the 
population. Also, most firms operate in high-value manufacturing industries, predominantly 
in machinery and petrochemicals. Finally, the average firm age is 10.09 years, with a 
standard deviation of 3.91 years, a minimum of 2 years and a maximum of 26 years. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of tunneling variable and causal conditions 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Net other receivables (%) 7.27% 12.32% 0.04% 98.75%
Share of largest shareholder (%) 40.47% 16.16% 4.24% 84.98%
Share of 2nd to 10th shareholders (%) 20.05% 13.99% 0.50% 63.50%
Floating ratio (%) 41.59% 12.18% 8.68% 100.00%
Proportion of independents on BOD (%) 34.80% 4.62% 8.33% 60.00%
Days to release of annual report 91.15 24.12 19 243
Independent audit 36.05%
Financial leverage (%) 54.29% 25.97% 7.78% 265.36%
Size (mn RMB) 2639.6 3332.2 147.9 30041.0
SOE 65.30%
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Table 2. Provinces and industry distribution 
 
 
Region Province % Grouping Industry %
Anhui 3.29% Agriculture, forestry and fishery 2.77%
Fujian 3.14% Mining 1.65%
Jiangsu 6.66% Food & Beverages 4.04%
Jiangxi 1.72% Textiles & Apparel 4.56%
Shandong 5.53% Timber & Furnishings 0.30%
Shanghai 10.77% Paper & Printing 2.02%
Zhejiang 6.43% Metals 9.35%
Beijing 8.08% Petrochemicals 10.99%
Hebei 2.39% Electronics 3.52%
Inner Mongolia 1.27% Machinery 15.71%
Shanxi 1.80% Pharmaceuticals 6.66%
Tianjin 1.57% Other manufacturing 1.27%
Heilongjiang 1.80% Utilities 4.49%
Jilin 2.17% Construction 2.02%
Liaoning 3.22% Transportation 4.19%
Gansu 1.12% Information technology 6.13%
Ningxia 0.75% Retail and wholesale 6.73%
Qinghai 0.52% Finance and insurance 0.22%
Shaanxi 1.94% Real estate 4.26%
Xinjiang 1.94% Social services 2.84%
Guangdong 11.22% News and media 0.75%
Guangxi 1.50% 5.53%
Hainan 1.35%
Henan 2.47%
Hubei 4.11%
Hunan 3.44%
Chongqing 2.17%
Guizhou 1.20%
Sichuan 4.49%
Tibet 0.37%
Yunnan 1.57%
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4 RESULTS 
4.1 Outcome Tunneling: Operationalization and Solution Output 
The analysis is structured in two parts. The first part involves an analysis of the causal 
conditions that lead to high tunneling. The subsequent section (4.2) involves an analysis of 
the causal conditions that lead to low tunneling. The outcome variable in section 4.2 is 
therefore the reverse of the one used in this first section. Complementing the tunneling 
analysis with its mirror image allows to assess whether symmetry is observed between the 
causal conditions that lead to tunneling and those that lead to low or absent tunneling. The 
present section uses the fsQCA software to find the configurations involving nine causal 
conditions that combine to produce tunneling behavior in the form of inter-firm loans in 
1337 Chinese listed firms. After constructing the truth table listing every theoretically 
possible combination of causal conditions, the first tasks were to exclude a number of 
combinations based on frequency and consistency thresholds and to input the simplifying 
assumptions used to produce the intermediate solution. In order to allow for complexity and 
asymmetry to emerge in the solution, the only assumptions included were those strongly 
supported by the literature, namely that a high leverage should be “present” and that 
proactive disclosure, independent audit and float should be “absent”. The remaining 
conditions (large controlling shareholder, large minority, independent board, large firm and 
state control) were left as “present or absent” in the simplifying assumptions given the 
equivocal findings in the literature.  
Based on these assumptions, table 3 presents the results of the process of iteration used to 
find the frequency and consistency thresholds that would maximize the intermediate 
solution’s overall coverage and consistency. The table reports results for frequencies of 2 
and 5 for purposes of comparison even if the selection criteria command the exclusion of 
these thresholds (2 being lower than the recommended threshold of 3, and 5 leaving an 
insufficient proportion of cases with 63%). Other thresholds that do not meet the selection 
criteria are marked with an X. Among the six solutions that match the selection criteria, the 
solution with the highest resulting factor of overall consistency and coverage is that using a 
frequency of 4 and a minimum consistency threshold of 0.84. Although solutions involving 
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frequencies of 2 and 5 were excluded on methodological grounds, their factors were still 
lower than the selected solution. 
Table 3. Frequency and consistency thresholds (outcome: tunneling) 
 
 
The solution table draws from two of the three resulting solutions from the output in fsQCA. 
The parsimonious solution, which uses a maximum of counterfactuals, is used to outline the 
core conditions in each configuration. The Boolean equation10 resulting in the parsimonious 
solution reads as follow: 
Tunneling = ~Minority*~Audit*~SOE + 
~Large controlling shareholder*~Float*Independent board*Leverage + 
~Large controlling shareholder*~Minority*Independent board*Leverage + 
Independent board*Audit*~Large firm*SOE + 
~Float*~Disclosure*~Audit*Leverage*~SOE + 
~ Large controlling shareholder *Float*~Disclosure*Leverage*~Large firm 
+ 
Independent board*~Audit*Leverage*~SOE 
 
The parsimonious solution is also displayed within the intermediate solution table as the 
large dots. The full intermediate solution is shown in table 4 and contains a total of nine 
configurations. Two couples of two configurations (2a/2b and 5a/5b) are variations that stem 
from the same group of core conditions as observed in the parsimonious solution. The overall 
solution consistency is 0.819, which is comparable to that of other large N set theoretic 
                                                          
10 Symbols are read as follow: ~ stands for logical “absent”, * stands for logical “and”, + 
stands for logical “or”. 
0.82 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.88
2 X X X X 0.314 0.202 X
3 X X X 0.363 0.275 0.151 X
4 X X 0.386 0.343 0.266 X X
5 X 0.373 0.372 0.235 X X X
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studies. Fiss (2011) reported consistencies between 0.8 and 0.81, while Misangyi and 
Acharya’s (2014) solutions were between 0.82 and 0.86. The overall coverage is 0.471, 
which advantageously compares to Fiss’ (2011) range of 0.27 to 0.36 and Misangyi and 
Acharya’s (2014) range of 0.04 to 0.16. The four main findings derived from the 
intermediate solution are discussed below. Interpreting a complex set theoretic output can 
be daunting for the inexperienced reader. Therefore, tables presenting subsets of the solution 
accompany the discussion of the results to provide more visually intuitive support for the 
argument. As opposed to many QCA studies, the detailed presentation of the findings is not 
organized according to each configuration individually. Instead, the text is organized 
according to the main issues related to the interactions among causal conditions, mainly 
focusing on complementarities and substitution effects. 
Table 4. Solutions for tunneling 
 
 
4.2 Outcome Tunneling: Findings 
Tunneling incentives and mechanism. The first finding concerns the tunneling 
incentives and mechanisms embodied in the conditions of large controlling shareholder, high 
leverage and large firm (see table 5 for the solution subset). To begin with, the solution 
1 2a 2b 3 4 5a 5b 6 7
Large controlling shareholder ø ø ø ø ø ø ø ø
Large minority • • • • ø ø ø
Float ø ø ø ●
Board independence ● ● ● ● ● ø ø ø ø
Proactive disclosure ø ø ø ø ø ø ø ø ø
Independent audit ø ● ø ø ø ø
High leverage ● ● ● ● • ● ●
Large firm ø ø • ø ø
State control ø • ● • ø ø ø
Consistency 85.5% 85.8% 83.3% 82.7% 82.9% 86.0% 88.5% 84.8% 85.6%
Raw coverage 9.2% 25.0% 14.8% 6.7% 9.1% 9.4% 8.5% 8.6% 35.2%
Unique coverage 0.6% 0.9% 0.6% 0.9% 0.8% 1.5% 0.8% 1.0% 9.0%
Overall solution consistency: 81.9% Overall solution coverage: 47.1%
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strongly supports the claim that the effect of the proportion of shares of the largest 
shareholder lies in the cash flow rights (the incentives effect) rather than the control rights11, 
confirming that in China even relatively small control rights are sufficient to have a control 
stake. Because smaller cash flow rights result in a misalignment of incentives between the 
controlling shareholder and minority investors, relatively small ownership by the largest 
shareholder generate incentives for tunneling. It is a quasi-necessary condition, appearing 
in eight out of nine configurations in the solution, but it is not in itself a sufficient condition 
for tunneling. Additionally, a dominant mechanism to draw resources to be tunneled 
appears to be high firm indebtedness, signaled by the high leverage. A high leverage is 
indeed a present condition in seven out of nine configurations. This does not make it a 
necessary condition but it lends strong support to the contention that firms use regular 
channels in the banking sector to borrow money, providing resources that are then tunneled 
to related parties through inter-firm loans. 
Table 5. Tunneling incentives and mechanism 
 
An additional condition appears to complement the incentive stemming from relatively low 
cash flow rights and the use of firm indebtedness: relatively small firms. The effect of small 
firm size is not completely homogeneous since configuration 4 requires a large firm (this 
exception is discussed below). Yet, the absence of large firms is a causal element in four 
configurations. This suggests that minority investors in small firms are more vulnerable to 
the controlling shareholder expropriation problem. All in all, the solution shows that every 
configuration except one exhibits at least two of the three conditions: absence of large 
controlling shareholder, presence of high leverage and absence of large firm (see table 5: 
there are at least two grey areas in all but one column). This partly complementary and partly 
substitutive effect is further supported by the neutral permutation observed in configurations 
                                                          
11 The italicized text is used to emphasize the main findings. 
1 2a 2b 3 4 5a 5b 6 7
Large controlling shareholder ø ø ø ø ø ø ø ø
High leverage ● ● ● ● • ● ●
Large firm ø ø • ø ø
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5a and 5b. Specifically, these two configurations display the same core conditions, but differ 
slightly in the peripheral conditions: 5a must have a small controlling shareholder, while 5b 
must instead be a small firm with a high leverage. In this context, the absence of a large 
controlling shareholder is a functional equivalent to a small indebted firm.  
Although these findings are generally in line with propositions P1a and P1b, three elements 
offer some degree of departure from the predictions based on the extant theory. Firstly, while 
firm size was expected to play a role mainly in SOEs (P1b), the effect of small firms also 
applies to private firms. Secondly, while the propositions advanced that these conditions are 
complementary, they also exhibit a partly substitutive effect, much like that theorized in 
proposition P2 for corporate governance practices. Thirdly, a low floating ratio, which was 
put forward as a tunneling incentive in proposition P1a, does not contribute as a substitute 
in the three-way interaction among the three other elements: small controlling shareholder, 
high leverage and small firm. 
Dispersed ownership. This section analyses the two exceptions from the findings 
discussed above. Indeed, two configurations diverge with part of the preceding argument 
about incentives and mechanisms in two distinct ways. Firstly, configuration 5a is the only 
one that does not present at least two of the three conditions discussed above (small 
controlling shareholder, high leverage and small firm). Secondly, configuration 4 is the only 
one in the solution that includes the condition large firms. These two odd configurations 
share the unique feature that they have dispersed ownership, displaying both absent large 
controlling shareholder and absent large minority. By Chinese standards, the 10 largest 
owners of these firms have relatively small shareholding. Configuration 5a shows that for a 
private firm with dispersed ownership to engage in tunneling, all three conditions related to 
corporate governance practices must be absent. Configuration 4 shows that the propensity 
for tunneling in SOEs with dispersed ownership rather rests on indebtedness and firm size. 
It is worth noting that in the three configurations that require absent large minority, including 
the two with dispersed ownership, the floating ratio has no causal relation to the outcome. 
In other words, this suggests that the proportion of tradable shares does not matter where 
minority investors are relatively small. In addition, these three configurations all rely on 
insider-controlled audit. 
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Table 6. Absence of governance practices 
 
Absence of corporate governance practices. The absence of commitment to best 
corporate governance practices plays an important role leading to tunneling behavior (see 
table 6 for the solution subset). The way in which this effect unfolds depends on the presence 
of large minority shareholders. In the five configurations that do not include the presence of 
large minority (on the right side of table 6), at least two out of three corporate governance 
practices (disclosure, audit, independent board) must be absent. The four configurations 
involving large minority shareholders ask for a closer look (left side of table 6). As table 6 
indicates, a low floating ratio becomes an important corporate governance indicator in the 
presence of large minority shareholders, which supports Wang and Xu’s (2004) idea that the 
floating ratio might be considered as a valid proxy for good corporate governance. 
Specifically, configurations 2a and 2b seem to support a substitutive effect between the 
absence of float and the absence of independent audit in firms with large minority investors. 
Including float among the governance indicators increases the number of configurations with 
at least two missing governance indicators at eight out of nine.  
These findings are largely in line with proposition P2, namely that provided that there are 
tunneling incentives, the absence of governance practices plays an enabling role towards 
tunneling. Yet, in the results, this relation is bounded to configurations that do not rely on 
large minority shareholders. In this later case, a low floating ratio becomes a valid substitute 
explaining the lack of control on insiders. It should also be noted that the absence of 
disclosure is a contributing element in every configuration within the solution. The absence 
of proactive disclosure is not by itself a sufficient condition leading to tunneling behavior, 
but it can be considered as a quasi-necessary one. This is fully in line with proposition P3. 
However, the effect of absent disclosure is not limited to configurations that include large 
1 2a 2b 3 4 5a 5b 6 7
Large minority • • • • ø ø ø
Float ø ø ø ●
Board independence ● ● ● ● ● ø ø ø ø
Proactive disclosure ø ø ø ø ø ø ø ø ø
Independent audit ø ● ø ø ø ø
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minority shareholders as put forward in the theory, but rather applies to all firms in the 
solution. 
Table 7. Asymmetry and board independence 
 
Board independence and asymmetric effects. The three conditions that particularly 
display asymmetric effects also present complementarities. Table 7 (solution subset from 
table 4) shows in configurations 1 to 3 that the presence of large minority shareholders is 
always accompanied by a large proportion of independent directors on the board. This result 
is particularly striking. The literature (see Faccio et al., 2001) had suggested that, as opposed 
to Europe where they contribute to internal monitoring, large minority investors in Asia may 
collude with the controlling shareholder and thus allow for tunneling behavior, possibly in 
an attempt to obtain private benefits along with the insiders. Yet, many empirical studies 
have provided rather equivocal results. The evidence supplied here suggests that the 
presence of an important group of independent directors, which are supposedly the 
watchdogs of small shareholders’ interests, has an enabling effect for collusion when the 
proportion of shares of minority investors is relatively high. A similar effect seems to play 
a role in state-owned enterprises. Table 7 indeed shows that every configuration involving 
state control as a causal condition also relies on board independence. The nomination of 
selected outsiders to the board in SOEs thus appears to play an enabling role for state agents 
to tunnel cash flow out of the firms. While the main object of the present study is to document 
the conditions under which tunneling takes place rather that why and where cash flow is 
channeled, this seems to support the contention that directorships in SOEs are awarded as a 
rent generation mechanism within the Party Nomenklatura (Brødsgaard, 2012), in which 
performance criteria are driven by political goals rather than the maximization of normal 
shareholders’ wealth. Taken together, these observations show that independent directors, 
when supported by strong outsider groups like large minority shareholders in private firms 
or by the government agents who nominated them in SOEs, actively contribute to tunneling 
1 2a 2b 3 4 5a 5b 6 7
Large minority • • • • ø ø ø
Board independence ● ● ● ● ● ø ø ø ø
State control ø • ● • ø ø ø
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behavior. These findings are in line with proposition P4, with the additional observation that 
the rent generating role of independent directors also applies with the presence of large 
minority shareholders. 
To summarize, the most striking findings from this analysis are threefold. Firstly, a 
combination of at least two out of these three conditions is found in firms where the 
controlling shareholder engages in tunneling behavior: small proportion of shares by the 
largest shareholder, high financial leverage and small firm size. Secondly, the lack of 
effective corporate governance practices (board independence, rigorous internal audit and, 
most importantly, proactive disclosure) plays an enabling role towards tunneling in firms 
that do not rely on large minority investors or on state control. Thirdly, independent directors 
seem to assist collusion to facilitate tunneling in firms controlled by the state and in those 
with large minority shareholders, which is an interesting limitation to the governance best 
practices of board member independence. 
 
4.3 Outcome No Tunneling: Operationalization and Solution Output 
The second part of the empirical analysis applies the same methodology but uses the reverse 
of the outcome: absent tunneling (~Tunneling). The calibration of every variable remains 
the same, except for the outcome variable which is calculated as one minus the set 
membership of tunneling. The sample remains the same with 1337 Chinese listed firms. In 
order to facilitate the comparison between the two empirical sections, the simplifying 
assumptions drawn for the intermediate solution are simply the reverse of those used in the 
first part. Leverage was marked as “absent”, while proactive disclosure, independent audit 
and float were marked as “present”. The remaining five conditions were left as “present or 
absent”. Again, an iteration process was used to identify the frequency and consistency 
thresholds in the truth table in order to maximize the solution’s overall coverage and 
consistency. Since the number of causal conditions also remains the same, the choice of 
frequency was limited between 3 and 4 to avoid excluding too many cases. Table 8 shows 
that the only combination fitting the selection criteria uses a frequency of 4 and a minimum 
consistency threshold of 0.97. It also reports iteration results for a frequency of 5 for 
purposes of comparison. 
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Table 8. Frequency and consistency thresholds (outcome: no tunneling) 
 
The parsimonious solution resulting from the process of logical reduction contains 8 
configurations. Its Boolean equation is shown below. This solution is also embedded in the 
full intermediate solution presented in table 9. The solution contains nine configurations, 
among which two (3a/3b) are separate subsets of the same configuration of core conditions. 
The overall consistency is 0.950 and the overall coverage is 0.368. These measures of fit are 
above those of comparable studies (Fiss, 2011; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014). One of the 
reasons for the lower overall coverage observed here compared with that of the first analysis 
is the lack of solutions involving private firms. Eight out of nine configurations concern 
SOEs. This entails that there is a much wider diversity of configurations for private firms to 
achieve the outcome of absent tunneling. Fiss (2011) encountered a similar situation in his 
study of firm performance when he studied the reversed outcome, concluding that there are 
few ways to achieve high performance while there are many ways to obtain low 
performance. For the present study, this means that there are few ways for owners of private 
firms to achieve high tunneling, there are many ways to achieve low tunneling. Hence, 
because the interpretation of the results must be very cautious regarding private firms due to 
its low coverage, configuration 8 (the one with absent SOE) will be discussed separately. 
Therefore, one remark worth emphasizing is that unless otherwise mentioned, the findings 
presented below concern only SOEs. Again, tables presenting subsets of the solution are 
used to provide visually intuitive support to the argument. 
~Tunneling = Float*Disclosure*Large firm + 
Large controlling shareholder*~Float*Disclosure*~Leverage + 
Large controlling shareholder*Large minority*~Leverage*Large firm + 
Large controlling shareholder*Float*Independent board*~Audit*~Leverage*Large 
firm + 
Disclosure*Large firm*~SOE + 
0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98
3 X X X X
4 X X 0.35 X
5 X 0.338 0.288 XFr
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Large controlling shareholder *Disclosure*Audit + 
Large minority*Independent board*~Leverage*Large firm + 
Large controlling shareholder *~Float*~Independent board*Audit*~Leverage*Large 
firm 
 
Table 9. Solutions for absent tunneling 
 
 
4.4 Outcome No Tunneling: Findings 
Tunneling incentives and mechanism. The most striking finding from this solution 
is the symmetry with the tunneling incentives and mechanisms observed in the previous 
analysis (section 4.2 on tunneling). Every configuration includes a large controlling 
shareholder, which is the reverse of the tunneling solution. Whether a firm embarks on 
tunneling or not depends on the incentive for the largest shareholder. If he is satisfied with 
his share of cash flow then he will refrain from tunneling, and his interests are aligned with 
those of small investors. This happens only in combination with low debts (leverage) or large 
firm size. Six out of eight configurations apply to firms with relatively low leverage, 
meaning that low indebtedness is also accompanied by low inter-firm loans. The few bank 
loans that they have may not allow them to embark on inter-firm loan schemes or possibly, 
they have low debts because they object to tunneling, thus keeping their financial needs low. 
Finally, every configuration except one includes at least two of the three conditions: large 
1 2 3a 3b 4 5 6 7 8
Large controlling shareholder ● • ● ● ● ● • ● ø
Large minority ø ø ø ● ● •
Float ● ø ø ø ● •
Board independence ø ø ø ● ● ø ø
Proactive disclosure ● ● ● ● ●
Independent audit ● ● ø ●
High leverage ø ø ø ø ø ø
Large firm ● ø ø ● ● ● ● ●
State control • • • • • • • • ø
Consistency 92.2% 97.5% 96.5% 96.5% 97.1% 97.5% 97.3% 97.7% 96.7%
Raw coverage 6.3% 11.5% 11.5% 12.5% 8.7% 10.1% 4.7% 16.9% 5.6%
Unique coverage 0.8% 1.2% 0.3% 0.6% 1.8% 1.7% 0.7% 3.0% 5.6%
Overall solution consistency: 95.0% Overall solution coverage: 36.8%
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controlling shareholder, low leverage and large firm (see table 10 for the solution subset). 
Under these conditions, the controlling shareholder is likely satisfied with the income he 
receives, likely from large firms. These observations are the exact mirror of those obtained 
for tunneling in the previous section, thus exhibiting very symmetric results. This confirms 
and strengthens the findings in section 4.2 regarding the incentives and the mechanisms 
involved in tunneling behavior. Much like the results of the previous section, these findings 
are in line with propositions P1a and P1b, aside from the departures discussed earlier. In 
addition, the only two configurations that display very concentrated ownership (6 and 7), 
with both a large controlling shareholder and large minority investors present, include each 
of the three conditions limiting tunneling incentives and mechanisms. 
Table 10. Incentives and mechanisms 
 
Corporate governance practices. The symmetry argument does not apply to the 
design of bundles of corporate governance practices. While it has been shown that tunneling 
is combined with a disregard for the corporate governance blueprint as stipulated in the laws 
and regulations, low tunneling cannot be linked to a commitment to such standards. If the 
tunneling incentives and mechanisms are absent, a commitment to corporate governance 
practices is not necessary to prevent tunneling. Indeed, only two configurations involve the 
presence of more than one governance practice (independent board, independent audit or 
proactive disclosure). If there are incentives for tunneling, the dismissal of corporate 
governance procedures enables tunneling. Yet if there are no incentives for tunneling, then 
such components of good governance do not matter. This implies that good governance 
alone is a weak tool for preventing tunneling. While the first analysis was coherent with 
proposition P2, these results show that the association theorized in the proposition is not 
symmetric since governance mechanisms do not prevent tunneling if incentives are present. 
There is one exception to this finding. Configuration 1 displays only one condition out of 
the here conditions that reduce the incentive for tunneling; it has a large controlling 
1 2 3a 3b 4 5 6 7
Large controlling shareholder ● • ● ● ● ● • ●
High leverage ø ø ø ø ø ø
Large firm ● ø ø ● ● ● ●
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shareholder, but not necessarily a low leverage or a large firm size. Interestingly, it is also 
the only configuration that requires both proactive disclosure and independent audit. A 
deeper investigation of this configuration could provide valuable insights about the 
effectiveness of control mechanisms in these firms, especially to contextualize the 
complementarities between audit and disclosure, but such an endeavor falls outside the 
boundaries of the present study. 
The only instance of symmetry with the results from the first analysis lies in role of proactive 
disclosure. Including configuration 8 (private firms), strong disclosure appears as a causal 
condition in five out of nine configurations, while none of the solutions rely on weak 
disclosure. In particular, disclosure is present in every configuration of small firms and those 
in which large minority shareholders are absent (see table 11 for the solution subset). This 
suggests that disclosure is especially sensitive when the state has a large controlling stake 
in small firms or in firms where all the other shareholders are relatively small. The 
conjunction of proactive disclosure and small minority shareholders leading to absent 
tunneling is the symmetric corollary of the theoretical prediction made in proposition P3. 
The proposition posited that absent disclosure and present large minority shareholders lead 
to tunneling. The results reported here show the opposite, that disclosure and absent large 
minority shareholders lead to absent tunneling. 
Table 11. Disclosure complementarities 
 
The floating ratio. The assumption of the China-specific literature that a low 
floating ratio (proportion of tradable shares on the stock exchange) almost forces firms to 
embark on tunneling gets questioned by the results (see table 12 for the solution subset). 
While a high proportion of tradable shares is a causal condition in three configurations 
producing absent tunneling (2, 5 and 6), three other configurations rely on a low floating 
ratio (3a, 3b and 4). It appears that the effect of the floating ratio depends on interactions 
1 2 3a 3b 4 5 6 7
Large minority ø ø ø ● ●
Proactive disclosure ● ● ● ●
Large firm ● ø ø ● ● ● ●
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with board independence and firm size. Firstly, in the four configurations where both “float” 
and board independence appear as causal conditions, their presence and absence are aligned. 
In other words, the floating ratio and board independence display symmetric 
complementarities. When the state has a large controlling stake, the shareholders of a firm 
with limited exposure to the capital market are better served by insiders on the board of 
directors. Conversely, the monitoring role of external directors is more salient in firms that 
are more exposed to capital markets. These complementarities are also partly supported in 
the analysis on tunneling in section 4.2, but in the form of misalignment. Indeed, in three 
out of four configurations where float and independent board appear in the causal set for 
tunneling, their presence or absence is opposite. This suggests that more research is needed 
on voice and exit options as manifested by float and independence.  
Secondly, the presence and absence of the conditions float and large firm are also aligned in 
five out of six configurations in which they both appear. This suggests that when the state 
has a large controlling stake and the firm is well exposed to the capital market, shareholders 
are better treated if the firm is relatively large. Possibly, the trading volume in large firms 
is higher, thus providing small shareholders with a more concrete exit option. In smaller 
firms, limited exposure to the capital market contributes to the mitigation of the principal-
principal problem. For example, the relative weight of each investor might be higher in 
smaller firm, allowing more reliance on voice rather than exit as a control mechanism. 
Table 12. Floating complementarities 
 
Private firms. Configuration 8 is the only one that applies to private firms. In this 
sense, private firms offer a picture that does not allow identifying clusters or dominant 
configurations. This indicates that private firms that don’t engage in tunneling are still 
undergoing a process of experimentation with different and shifting corporate governance 
mechanisms. Also, as the only one that applies to private firms, configuration 8 is strikingly 
1 2 3a 3b 4 5 6 7
Float ● ø ø ø ● •
Board independence ø ø ø ● ● ø
Large firm ● ø ø ● ● ● ●
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different from SOEs. The proportion of shares of the largest shareholder doesn’t play a 
dominant role, nor does the floating ratio. It does not rely on low firm indebtedness, thus 
excluding two of the conditions limiting tunneling incentives and mechanisms. It neither 
displays a strong commitment to corporate governance practices. Still, the fact that this 
configuration relies on large minority investors and that it requires proactive disclosure 
makes it somewhat in line with proposition P3, namely that disclosure plays an important 
role in the presence of large minority shareholders. Specifically, proactive disclosure and 
an insider-dominated board are important to mitigate principal-principal problems in firms 
with large minority shareholders and a relatively small private controlling shareholder. 
Interestingly, the fact that an insider-dominated board has a positive effect in the context 
mirrors the finding of the previous section that independent directors are conducive to 
tunneling in the presence of large minority investors. Again, this is the only configuration 
that could be recorded regarding private firms, so any interpretation based on it is limited. 
To summarize, there are three main findings from this analysis. Firstly, the conditions that 
set the incentives and mechanisms for tunneling in the first section have a symmetric effect. 
Specifically, any two of the following three conditions is sufficient to set disincentives to 
engage in tunneling behavior: large controlling shareholder, low leverage and large firm 
size. Secondly, while a lack of commitment to best corporate governance practices had been 
found to enable tunneling, governance mechanisms do not matter in the absence of tunneling 
incentives. Also, provided that there are tunneling incentives, corporate governance 
mechanisms cannot deter the diversion of cash flow. Finally, while the solution identifies a 
few dominant configurations for SOEs with low tunneling, there is a large diversity of forms 
among private firms that cannot be synthesized in the current research design.  
 
4.5 Limitations 
This research is not without limitations, a number of which are common to every study using 
the QCA method. Firstly, QCA does not allow time series. The year was carefully chosen 
based on data availability, comparability with the existing literature and recency. Still, the 
findings would benefit from additional analysis using data from a longer time period to 
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ascertain that the results are not time specific. Secondly, a QCA output does not offer an 
exhaustive view. The configurations presented in the solution sets do not cover every firm 
in the sample. Still, the sample includes 99% of the population and the overall coverage 
compares advantageously with equivalent studies. Also, although a larger diversity of 
configuration exists in the entire population, the solutions offer the most common bundles 
of conditions that produce the outcome. Thirdly, QCA uses a limited number of conditions. 
As opposed to statistical methods, set theoretic methods cannot include an exhaustive list of 
control variables. Still, in order to cover the most important factors, a relatively high number 
of conditions are used, which increases the challenge of presenting the findings in an 
understandable and compelling way. To help the reader, tables were used to present subsets 
of the solution to highlight the argument. These subsets cannot however be understood in 
isolation because configurations consist of indivisible coherent bundles of causal conditions. 
It is also relevant to note that the use of an overly large number of control variables in 
statistical models has drawn recent criticism (Davis, 2010). Fourthly, this study concerns 
only one type of tunneling. Although inter-firm loans have been identified as the most 
prominent kind of tunneling transactions in China, additional research would be warranted 
to verify the applicability of the findings to other forms of expropriation. 
 
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
One of the main objectives of this study is to bridge new insights from the literature on 
complementarities and substitution effects in firm level corporate governance practices and 
the increasingly large body of empirical work on principal-principal problems. A new 
methodological approach, the fuzzy set QCA, is used to study the issue of tunneling behavior 
from a configurational perspective (Fiss, 2007). This set theoretic method allows to treat 
governance structures as bundles and to contextualize practices in relation to the surrounding 
causal conditions (Aguilera et al., 2008). In the field of corporate governance, this method 
is increasingly used in comparative corporate governance and in studies focusing on 
principal-agent problems (Garcia-Castro et al., 2013). Its main advantage is to emphasize 
the interdependencies among conditions instead of looking at the additive effects of practices 
93_Erim BW Tremblay_Stand.job
93 
 
taken in silo. As Misangyi and Acharya (2014: 1703) put it, “to truly understand governance 
effectiveness, we must stop thinking about the mechanisms in isolation”. 
This article shows that configurational analysis is particularly well suited to examine the 
controlling shareholder expropriation problem because it can unravel the causal complexity 
of the phenomenon and it recognizes the diversity of causal paths that can lead to the 
outcome. Specifically, the fsQCA method was used to study data from 1337 Chinese listed 
firms in 2005 to find the complementarities and substitutions that explain the presence and 
absence of tunneling in the form of inter-firm loans. Tunneling behavior depends on a 
number of conditions involving the ownership structure, the commitment to best practices 
of corporate governance, whether a firm is private or state-owned and on key financial 
factors, namely firm size and leverage. By examining the interaction effects and the causal 
asymmetry that shape principal-principal problems, the empirical study lays a number of 
conceptual building blocks that offer a starting point to reconcile the many equivocal results 
that have beset the literature. The findings raise a number of interesting questions. 
The first findings concern the incentives and mechanisms that drive tunneling behavior. 
Firstly, the results unambiguously show that the main effect of the proportion of shares of 
the largest shareholder rests in the income rights, which determine the alignment or 
misalignment of interests with minority investors. This confirms that a relatively low 
ownership concentration at the very top represents the main incentive for tunneling 
(Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2002). Secondly, one of the two main mechanisms 
employed in tunneling that emerge from the study is that insiders obtain funds by contracting 
debt from banks and subsequently tunnel this money to related parties through inter-firm 
loans. Indeed, a high leverage is found to be a key condition leading to tunneling, which is 
in line with the results of other studies (Jiang et al., 2010; Wang & Xiao, 2011; Yeh et al., 
2012). Thirdly, the other mechanism identified lies in the vulnerability of smaller firms. 
Previous studies had shown that the more there is tunneling through inter-firm loans, the 
larger is the proportion that can be traced to a parent company (Jiang et al., 2010). That small 
firm size appears as a key condition for tunneling suggests that these firms are more easily 
subject to expropriation by larger corporate entities. Small investors are thus more 
vulnerable to tunneling in small firms, which confirms the results of Wang and Xiao (2011). 
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Insights from the studies of Jiang et al. (2010) and Cheung et al. (2010) about malpractice 
in local SOEs had suggested that this effect would predominantly apply to state controlled 
firms, but the present findings show that it also applies to private firms. The fact that the 
results on the effect of firm size run counter to those of Huyghebaert and Wang (2012) and 
Yeh et al. (2012) might be explained by the fact that large firms may also be involved in 
related party loans, but that their position may be less detrimental to small shareholders 
because larger firms may act as transaction hubs on the receiving end of the inter-firm loans. 
This specific relation would benefit from additional research. Finally, the analysis shows a 
three-way partly substitutive and partly complementary interaction among these three 
conditions. Nearly all configurations that display at least two conditions (small firm, high 
leverage, low shareholding by the largest shareholder) lead to tunneling behavior. This 
interaction is fully symmetric since nearly every configuration that displays at least two of 
the opposite conditions (large firm, low leverage, high shareholding by the largest 
shareholder) lead to the absence of tunneling. 
The second group of findings concerns the role of corporate governance practices. The most 
salient effect occurs when tunneling incentives and mechanisms are in place. Then, the 
absence of a commitment to governance plays an enabling role towards tunneling. The only 
systematic and symmetric effect concerns proactive disclosure. Its absence is a causal 
condition in every configuration leading to tunneling and its presence contributes to a 
majority of configurations that do not produce tunneling, especially those that involve small 
firms or small minority shareholders. This evidence validates empirically the preference of 
outsiders for strong disclosure practices reported by Liu (2006b). The absence of disclosure 
alone is not sufficient to act on tunneling incentives. It must be complemented by the absence 
of at least one other governance practice. In configurations that do not rely on large minority 
investors, the complementary condition may rest in either the absence of rigorous internal 
audit or the absence of board independence. This lends some support to the idea of a 
complementary monitoring role among corporate governance practices (Aguilera et al., 
2008; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006). In configurations that do rely on large minority 
shareholders, board independence exhibits an asymmetric effect that will be further 
discussed below. Yet, in this context, a low floating ratio appears to offer an additional 
possible complementary condition with absent disclosure. This lends support to the claim 
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that the floating ratio may be a valid measure of governance (Wang & Xu, 2004), but its 
effect is mostly bounded to configurations that rely on large minority investors. In sum, the 
results show that, in the presence of tunneling incentives, while the absence of commitment 
to best corporate governance practices plays an enabling role for expropriation, a strong 
commitment to governance cannot effectively deter it. Furthermore, in the absence of 
tunneling incentives, the monitoring role of mutually reinforcing corporate governance 
practices is not relevant. 
The third main finding concerns the specific role played by independent directors in 
principal-principal problems. The effect of board independence is one of the most disputed 
elements in the literature and has produced unsettling and equivocal results in past empirical 
work. In turn, board independence has been found to deter tunneling behavior (Liu, 2006b; 
Liu & Lu, 2007), to contribute to it (Su et al., 2008) and to be merely symbolic or 
insignificant (Chen et al., 2011; Huyghebaert & Wang, 2012; Peng, 2004). The present study 
provides very interesting results that shed light on the interactions that drive the asymmetric 
effect of board independence. Most importantly, when tunneling incentives and mechanisms 
are in place, board independence is detrimental when combined with state control or large 
minority investors. In the case of SOEs, this finding lends support to the idea that board 
nominations are used by state agencies as a rent generating mechanism to reward friends of 
the regime and ensure the prioritization of political objectives over the wealth maximization 
of shareholders (for a discussion on the Party Nomenklatura system, see Brødsgaard, 2012). 
In the case of firms with large minority shareholders, independent directors are instrumental 
to the alignment of interests among the most prominent principals and contribute to 
tunneling behavior. The results obtained by Faccio et al. (2001) to the effect that the presence 
of large minority shareholders in Asia do not contribute to effective monitoring like those in 
Europe but rather engage in collusion with the controlling shareholder are contingent upon 
a large proportion of independent directors on the board. Otherwise, in every configuration 
leading to tunneling that involves neither state control nor large minority investors, the 
reliance on absent board independence confirms the monitoring role independent directors 
and that the controlling owner of private firms that have relatively low shareholding will 
prefer to set up an insider-dominated board if they are to engage in tunneling. Finally, the 
results show an additional symmetric complementarity between board independence and the 
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floating ratio. The alignment of the presence or absence of these two conditions contributes 
to a positive outcome. In other words, an insider dominated board plays an effective 
monitoring role in firms that are less exposed to the capital markets while an outsider-
dominated board plays an effective monitoring role in firms that are more exposed to the 
capital markets. Additional research would be desirable to provide a more substantive 
explanation about this interaction. 
Taken together, these findings contribute to the corporate governance literature in several 
ways12 by identifying firm-level interdependencies among corporate governance practices, 
including asymmetric effects and functional equivalents. The corporate governance problem 
analyzed in this chapter, the controlling shareholder expropriation problem through related-
party transactions, is the most salient problem in Asia and China. The large number of 
studies on the issue provide conflicting and equivocal results mainly derived from statistical 
methods and fail to identify a consensual set of determinants of tunneling behavior (Chen et 
al., 2009; Huyghebaert & Wang, 2012; Jiang et al., 2010; Wang & Xiao, 2011). In this 
chapter, the use of a configurational method has allowed to consolidate the literature by 
identify two main and distinct components in the problem. Three drivers of tunneling 
behavior provide the incentives and mechanisms for firms to engage in related party loans. 
Then, several features of monitoring affect the ability of controlling shareholders to achieve 
expropriation. While the drivers are stable across configurations, the effective set of 
monitoring practices depends on the ownership structure. Most importantly, the findings 
show that within each component (drivers, monitoring), causal conditions may at the same 
time be complements and substitutes. This is a direct extension of the work of Garcia-Castro 
et al. (2013) and Misangyi and Acharya (2014) on principal-agent problems. 
The study clarifies, in the context of ill-functioning legal institutions and weak property 
rights, under which types of ownership structure a lack of commitment to best corporate 
governance practices enables a misalignment of interests between controlling shareholders 
and minority investors. Because of its socialist past, China carries a tradition of government 
involvement and of weak protection of formal property rights. The findings reported above 
                                                          
12 See the general conclusion for a detailed discussion of the contributions. 
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show that the heritage of the common property regime still weights on corporate governance 
structures in listed firms. The deployment of the state agents through board directorships in 
SOEs hurts the interests of small shareholders. Finally, the findings support the view of 
Filatotchev and Allock (2010) and Garcia-Castro et al. (2013) that, given the causal 
complexity of corporate governance embodied in complementarities, substitution effects and 
asymmetry, a soft law approach of “comply or explain” might be better suited as one size 
doesn’t fit all (Arcot, Bruno, & Faure-Grimaud, 2010; MacNeil & Li, 2006). Yet, the 
prominent importance of disclosure in the results suggests that such an approach might be 
contingent upon the actors’ access to reliable information to be empowered to conduct 
effective monitoring. To conclude, this article shows that coherent bundles of governance 
mechanisms that could effectively prevent tunneling even in the presence of incentives are 
still to be designed.
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CHAPTER 3 – POLITICAL EMBEDDEDNESS 
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
HETEROGENEITY AND HYBRIDIZATION IN 
CHINA 
 
Abstract: Chinese listed firms must navigate between far reaching corporate 
governance reforms and resilient institutions of political embeddedness. Firms 
come up with diverse solutions for combining corporate governance with the 
requirements of their political and economic environment. To capture the 
heterogeneity, this chapter applies a research design based on configurational 
analysis using fsQCA which allows comparing private firms with state-owned 
firms. The results show that (1) there is indeed considerable heterogeneity of 
forms of corporate governance in China, (2) that political embeddedness plays 
an important role especially in SOEs, (3) that both insider-control models and 
outsider influenced models coexist, (4) that several functional equivalents and 
neutral permutations prevail among governance practices and (5) that hybrid 
forms emerge. These findings demonstrate that some of the inherited 
institutions of political governance are evolving within consistent 
configurations that can reliably lead to firm performance. This suggests that 
the conceptualization of reforms as a linear transition from central planning to 
western-style market institutions misses the complexity induced by 
institutional tensions. 
 
Keywords: China, political embeddedness, transition economy, configuration 
analysis, corporate governance, QCA. 
 
JEL Classifications: G32, G34, K22, O17, O53, P21, P31 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
That we find a multitude of corporate governance forms worldwide cannot come as a 
surprise. After all, corporate governance today refers to more than the alignment of interests 
between firms in search of investors and investors in search for sufficiently high and steady 
returns on their capital. One way to empower investors is to offer them control rights in 
addition to the income (cash flow) rights usually harnessed by national legislation. In turn, 
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the degree to which the law enforces the rights of investors (owners) to limit the 
discretionary power of the top management differs across countries. The field of 
Comparative Corporate Governance has identified two models primarily theorized based on 
listed firms: the Anglo-Saxon model derived from the British and American markets and a 
continental European model mostly inspired by the German market (Aguilera & Jackson, 
2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The former model was specified as one of outsider control 
characterized by dispersed ownership, strong shareholders’ rights, an independent board, 
incentives compensation for the management, and a market for corporate control. The latter 
in contrast, called insider control system, relies on concentrated ownership, a two-tier board 
and multiplex relationships with powerful stakeholders. This dichotomy between insider and 
outsider control systems was first put forward in Jenkinson and Mayer (1992) and Franks 
and Mayer (1997), and more recently synthesized in Garcia-Castro, Aguilera and Arino 
(2013). As important as these studies have been for the analysis of corporate governance, 
recent empirical work has proved that they offer a too simplistic view. They don’t allow 
domestic heterogeneity (an exception is Whitley, 2006), they make it hard to employ their 
models to those markets, like transition economies, where investors cannot rely on 
accompanying legal empowerment, and they disregard the strong ties between the corporate 
elite and the political elite (exceptions here include studies on the link between political 
regimes and corporate governance, such as  Hall and Soskice’s (2001) enquiry on the 
varieties of capitalism and Mark Roe’s (1991, 2000, 2003) legal studies research agenda on 
politics and firm ownership structures). However, there is little research on political 
connections and firm level corporate governance structures. 
The concept of political embeddedness offers a promising supplement to the conventional 
corporate governance analysis. Political embeddedness has been defined as a “specific form 
of social embeddedness characterized by a mix of formal and informal ties with political 
agents” (Krug, 2012: 347; see also Grabher & Stark, 1997a, 1997b). Regarding corporate 
governance, political embeddedness specifies the principal-agent problem by integrating 
political actors as an influential stakeholder whose interests may conflict with those of 
economic principals, i.e. shareholders. The integration of these concepts into firm-level 
analyses allows going beyond the question of why a multitude of different forms of 
governance exist, but instead pursuing the question of how well-functioning and profitable 
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firms with different forms of corporate governance coexist within a single jurisdiction. The 
debate around whether politics nourishes or harms the performance of firms, elegantly 
presented by Frye and Shleifer (1997) and Shleifer and Vishny (1998) as a contest between 
the competing hypotheses of the Helping Hand and the Grabbing Hand of the state, is so far 
unresolved. For instance in China, there is evidence of a positive effect (Peng & Luo, 2000), 
supporting some form of the helping hand hypothesis whereby political connections provide 
access to resources, discipline management and reduce policy uncertainty. There is also 
evidence of a negative effect (Fan et al., 2007), supporting the Grabbing Hand hypothesis 
which suggests that political agents pursue goals that diverge from the financial interests of 
shareholders leading to misallocation of resources, over-employment or disproportionate 
compensation (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994).  
The Chinese case offers a fertile ground to study the impact of political embeddedness on 
corporate governance structures. As a transition economy, reforming state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) has been considered a core objective of market oriented reforms in China 
since the early 1990s (Qian & Wu, 2003). The government wanted to downsize the state 
sector by privatizing its assets. For this purpose, the two mainland stock exchanges were 
created as a mechanism to corporatize SOEs (Allen & Shen, 2012). Moreover, several laws 
were adopted clarifying economic performance criteria and attempting to separate the 
functions of management and ownership. Over the years, the Chinese legal framework for 
corporate governance has largely become a transplant of Western best practices, with the 
difference that ownership rights were clarified only recently. Such a shift could bring about 
important systemic changes promoting financial development: promote “scientific 
management” by shielding decision making from the political agenda and protect the income 
rights of small individual shareholders since stock exchanges draw an important portion of 
domestic savings. While the Chinese state has implemented reforms for the purpose of 
empowering private investors and reining in undue political interference, a relevant question 
is whether the observed reality has actually translated these intentions into practices, 
especially in firms that perform well. Indeed, the old structures of political governance 
appear to have remained effective in a large proportion of listed and non-listed firms, not 
only in the form of state ownership, but also through networks of political connections in 
the private sector. The Party maintains influence in listed firms through Party committees 
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and the affiliation of top executives to the Party Nomenklatura (Brødsgaard, 2012). Chinese 
firms, as in any other transition economy, are thus facing increasingly strong market forces 
and are coerced into adopting governances structures modelled on the outsider-control 
system imported from the West, while at the same time still relying to a large extent on 
insider control, mostly executed by large former state firms, and on the persistent institutions 
of political embeddedness that transfer residual control rights to political cadres.  
The following study aims at contributing to the literatures on political embeddedness and on 
comparative corporate governance by identifying those firm-level corporate governance 
configurations that lead to economic performance. Three main models are identified in the 
above-mentioned literature: an insider-control system and an outsider-control system 
(Franks & Mayer, 1997), and an inherited Chinese model of political governance 
(Brødsgaard, 2012). The present exploratory study aims at answering the following question: 
what dominant model(s) can be observed in successful Chinese listed firms one decade after 
the introduction of laws set to professionalize corporate governance practices? The primary 
research objective is therefore to look into the domestic heterogeneity of governance forms 
(Whitley, 2006), which suggests that the distinct ideal-type models identified across 
countries coexist within a single jurisdiction. Is there heterogeneity? If so, does this 
heterogeneity conform to ideal-type systems? Indeed, beyond the co-existence of forms, this 
study aims at identifying ‘hybrids’, whereby firms recombine elements pertaining to 
different models to create novel corporate governance configurations (for examples see 
Boisot & Child, 1996; Nee, 1992). Finally, are there still successful politically embedded 
forms of governance? If so, do these forms mainly prevail in state owned enterprises?  
This chapter presents an inductive exploratory study that investigates the recent Chinese 
landscape of corporate governance configurations. The research design applies a set 
theoretic method on two large samples of Chinese firms. The first sample contains 942 
private firms. The second concerns 810 SOEs. The decision to divide the population into 
two separate samples rests on the idea that the private sector and the state sector operate 
under distinct institutional contexts. In line with previous studies (Ding, Jia, Wu, & Zhang, 
2014; Nguyen & van Dijk, 2012), we thus adopt a comparative approach to the private and 
SOEs sectors which allows not only to highlight the differences but also document the 
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specific corporate governance features adopted by SOEs which have received little attention 
in the literature (Mahadeo & Soobaroyen, 2012; Sokol, 2010). This configuration analysis 
is operationalized with the fsQCA software to identify the dominant governance models that 
have produced above-average performance in each sample (Fiss, 2007; Ragin, 2000, 2008a; 
Ragin et al., 2006). Such a method is helpful to study complex causal relationships. It allows 
for equifinality, meaning that many distinct configurations may lead to the same outcome. 
Also, it facilitates the analysis of multiple interactions among variables, including 
asymmetric effects as certain configurations may rely on the presence of a condition while 
other configurations may rely on the absence of the same condition. The models used here 
are based on the governance conditions that feature centrally in the ideal-type models 
identified in the literature: board independence, participation-enhancing measures during 
shareholders’ meetings, proactive disclosure, management incentives, large minority 
shareholders, the proportion of shares of the largest shareholder, and an active supervisory 
board. To account for the China-specific context of inherited political embeddedness, the 
model also includes conditions of political ties at the individual level, differentiating political 
connections among top officers generally (board of directors, top executives, board of 
supervisors) and political connections at the leadership level (CEO, board chairman). For 
the SOE sample, an additional condition is used to account for an institutional divide in 
terms of ownership: whether firms are ultimately controlled by a traditional state agency or 
by the central asset management commission (SASAC) (see Wang, Guthrie, & Xiao, 2012). 
This specific institutional feature was selected over alternatives such as a central-local 
dichotomy because the SASAC is a mid-range institution that was specifically set up by the 
government to distance asset supervision from the State Council, which represents an 
explicit distinction regarding political control and governance.  
The results display a high level of heterogeneity of governance forms among both private 
firms and SOEs. Four distinct models emerge from the sample of private firms. Two models 
are close kin to the outsider-control system, one relying mainly on market pressure as a 
disciplining mechanism and the other making room for outsiders’ voice through the internal 
governance structure. The two other models are versions of the insider-control system and 
the politically embedded model. Three main models are identified in the SOE sample. The 
external pressure model concerns firms with a relatively small controlling shareholder and 
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presents two distinct variations. One is closest to the outsider-control system and the external 
pressure is exerted by market forces. The other is politically embedded and external pressure 
comes from political agents. The second model is very close to the insider-control system. 
The last model is labelled national champions as it concerns firms ultimately controlled by 
the SASAC. The sample of private firms exhibits a higher level of adherence to fewer 
configurations, while there seems to be a higher diversity of models that lead to performance 
among SOEs. Among private firms, the two causal paths that involve political connections 
both rely on a politically connected leadership (CEO or board chairman), signaling that 
political connections generally may not be beneficial without a connected leadership. Yet, 
among the firms covered by the solution set for private firms, only 23 out of 205 involve 
political connections. While this shows that some politically connected forms are still used 
by successful firms in the private sector, most dominant governance models among private 
firms are exempt from any form of political embeddedness. Not surprisingly, a majority of 
models among SOEs involve political embeddedness. However, as opposed to the sample 
of private firms, political leadership is absent from seven out of the eight configurations that 
emerge from the analysis. While 30% of SOEs have a politically connected leadership, less 
than 6% of firms in the solution set do. This indicates that a politically tied leadership in the 
state sector is most often not beneficial to firm performance. Finally, some SOEs exhibit 
practices that usually belong to systems of outsider-control, which shows a degree of 
adaption in the state sector to new norms of corporate governance. This is especially true 
where the state has a relatively small controlling stake, which amounts to a mild form of 
ownership dispersion. 
These results are important in several ways. Firstly, despite the dichotomy that typically 
characterizes national systems of governance, there is a high level of heterogeneity of 
corporate governance forms in well-performing firms in the Chinese landscape. Secondly, 
the study documents the emergence of hybrid forms of governance that diverge from the 
clear-cut ideal types discussed before. These creative blends demonstrate that practices that 
are claimed to pertain to distinct models are not necessarily devoid of complementarities. 
For instance, the presence of SOEs with mild dispersed ownership that rely on large minority 
shareholders and active supervisory boards dispels the idea that large state-run enterprises 
are ill-equipped to draw capital from a large pool of investors on the market to achieve 
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performance. Another example is the existence of private firms with concentrated ownership 
that rely on various mechanisms strengthening outsiders’ voice, which shows that even a 
firm with a large dominant controlling owner can gain from adopting practices that empower 
external investors to actively participate in the governance structure. Thirdly, the continued 
success of some firms that still rely on political connections suggests that the old multiplex 
relationships are adapting to new corporate structures, sometimes even acting as functional 
equivalents to some of the new practices to discipline management. This leads to believe 
that many institutions inherited from the command economy are not simply vanishing in the 
wake of market oriented reforms, but adapting and contributing to the emergence of hybrid 
forms. In essence, political agents have invested new bodies of decision making brought 
about by the recent wave of corporate governance reforms. Yet, most dominant models of 
profitable firms in the private sector concern firms that have moved beyond political 
governance. To sum up, the legal framework in China is spacious enough to accommodate 
a heterogeneous pool of governance forms, both among private and state-owned firms. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next two sections are meant to 
provide the contextual and conceptual underpinnings of the exploratory study. Section two 
presents an applied perspective of the concept of political embeddedness by providing a 
detailed account of the Chinese experience in terms of reforms and of the networks between 
large firms and the political elite. The section also discusses the possible impacts of political 
connections on firm performance. Section three lays the theoretical groundwork for the 
corporate governance analysis. It starts by presenting the two main ideal-type models that 
dominate the comparative corporate governance literature: the insider-control system and 
the outsider-control system. An explanation of these models is necessary since their features 
and the interactions among them inform the selection of corporate governance conditions 
that are used in the exploratory empirical study. Apart from presenting the ideal type models, 
section three contains a theoretical discussion about (1) domestic heterogeneity to 
conceptually justify an inductive study that aims to break the mold of unitary national 
systems, (2) about China’s specificity to provide insights about how features of political 
embeddedness may interact with the features of the two ideal-type systems and (3) about 
hybridization to introduce the idea that features of different ideal-type systems may be 
deconstructed and recombined. Section four presents the methodology, including the sample 
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description, calibration of conditions and operationalization. Section five presents the results 
for each sample. Section six concludes with some limitations and avenues for future 
research. 
 
2 POLITICAL GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL EMBEDDEDNESS IN CHINA 
2.1 Corporate Governance Reforms: An Issue of Depoliticization 
The transition from political governance to corporate governance was the biggest challenge 
in the privatization and corporatization of state assets in China. Portraying the reform of 
SOEs as a cornerstone in establishing arm's length business to government relations, Qian 
and Wu (2003) argue that the implementation and professionalization of corporate 
governance practices was the most crucial but difficult step in the reform of state assets. In 
other words, reining in political governance requires a fundamental realignment of 
allegiance among professional managers to the firm's autonomy and to its shareholders. In 
September 1999, the fifteenth Party Central Committee pledged itself to a wave of important 
reforms, signaling the withdrawal of the state from a wide array of economic sectors. Still, 
the Party expressed its intention to maintain control over strategic sectors, including 
industries related to national security and public goods, but also to natural monopolies and 
high technology champions. For those national champions, the reforms brought about a 
dislocation in the chain of command by creating the State Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC), an intermediary of the government directly under 
the State Council solely dedicated to managing and monitoring central state assets (Wang et 
al., 2012). In 1999, the Party Central Committee also made reference for the first time 
officially to the term corporate governance, as a mechanism to allocate decision making 
rights, align incentives and formalize control (Qian & Wu, 2003). This was deemed 
necessary to accompany the diversification of ownership pursued using listings on the stock 
exchanges, by which the state could transfer control stakes or minority stakes of equity in 
SOEs to private investors. Corporate governance reforms became, and still are, a major 
policy issue in China. The Chinese state has vowed to transform the corporate field from 
political steering towards capital market based governance mechanisms. 
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For the Chinese leadership, achieving a dynamic, liquid market has many systemic benefits. 
Generally, such financial development supports economic growth, capital accumulation and 
technological progress (King & Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997). An efficient market of 
financial intermediaries improves firm productivity in developing countries (McKinnon, 
1973), which holds true in both cases of banking development and stock market liquidity 
(Levine & Zervos, 1998). More specifically, especially in fast growing economies, financial 
development is necessary to improve firms' access to external finance to adequately meet 
expansion needs (Rajan & Zingales, 1998). Evidence suggests that large Chinese firms listed 
simultaneously in China and abroad (i.e. Hong Kong, New York) raised most of their fresh 
capital on foreign markets while domestic exchanges ended up floating equity that was 
largely owned already by incumbent shareholders prior listing (Allen & Shen, 2012). To 
level the playing field, the Chinese leadership had an incentive to professionalize the 
corporate governance of listed firms through formal standards to improve their ability to 
raise capital by increasing investors' confidence. Indeed, corporate governance laws and 
codes have been found to improve capital markets and increase their efficiency to attract 
capital and channel domestic savings (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004).  
The effective drive towards professionalization and standardization really took off in China 
around 2001 with the adoption of the first code of corporate governance. Over the following 
decade, many laws and regulations were implemented to improve the protection of minority 
shareholders’ interests in publicly traded firms. These objectives motivated the promulgation 
of the new Company Law and the new Securities law in 2006 to strengthen the supervision 
and regulatory management system. These laws introduced new standards of disclosure 
regarding the timeliness of reports, the background of managers and directors, the identity 
of the largest shareholders and their relationship with managers. Formal procedures for 
shareholder’s meetings would allow small shareholders to nominate directors, submit 
proposals, use proxy voting and normalize the rule of one share one vote. The legal liabilities 
of top executives and the criminal punishments for insider trading and partial disclosure 
were both strengthened (Chen et al., 2009). These major reforms were complemented by the 
Guidelines for protecting investors in the SME listing board and the Rules on Supervision 
over Securities Companies in 2008.  
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The point to note here is that the introduction of the new company and securities laws 
indicates a commitment to further company and capital market reform. It clarified that the 
reforms did not only aim at downsizing the state sector, but also replacing political control 
structures with “Western style” corporate governance. Reducing the dependence on state 
and state bank alimentation and opening the way for firms to refinance themselves by other 
(capital) market means would eventually improve the allocation of decision making rights 
in the firm and improve its governance and management. 
 
2.2 The Resilience of Political Embeddedness in China 
Overall, the efforts to stimulate private businesses and downsize the state sector have been 
successful. The proportion of listed firms that are ultimately controlled by a state agency 
dropped from over 80% in 2001 to 45% in 2010. Privately controlled firms increased from 
10% to over 50% during the same period. Still, this successful formal transition in the state 
sector doesn’t convey the whole story. While more firms are ultimately controlled by private 
parties, the OECD estimates that no less than 83% of market capitalization was still held by 
the state in 2007 (OECD, 2011b), taking into account both firm size and the ubiquitous cross-
shareholding among listed firms. Also, two decades after their creation, the main Chinese 
stock exchanges remain rather small relative to the surrounding economy, most governance 
mechanisms are ill-functioning and prices are volatile. In this context, many functions of 
full-fledged stock markets are not supported, including risk hedging but also prices that do 
not act as a potent signaling and external disciplinary mechanism (Allen & Shen, 2012).  
Even more important is the lagging enforcement that allows a gap between formal law and 
actual practices (Opper & Schwaag-Serger, 2008). Resistance to the implementation of new 
norms and practices in organizations should be expected to be met with resistance by those 
whose behavior the new norm is constraining. The tolerated disconnect between technical 
activities and the organization's structure has been labelled decoupling (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Regarding corporate law, “surface compliance may suffice where 
deep control is impractical, or indeed, impossible” (Fiss, 2007: 20). For instance, Carpenter 
and Feroz (1992, 2001) show that new accounting standards were often adopted by US states 
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to keep the books up to best practices expected by markets and credit agencies, without really 
enforcing the new measures. This decoupling view is useful to understand the Chinese 
context, where de jure corporate governance requirements are strict, while the weak judicial 
system cannot enforce de facto implementation. Local courts are not independent, and often 
subject to interference from local Party units (Findlay, 1999). Even winning cases are not 
necessarily followed by effective enforcement. Opper and Schwaag-Serger (2008: 259) 
report that not more than 60% of business rulings are duly enforced. Also, the state being a 
major shareholder in a majority of listed companies in China, the legitimacy of corporate 
insiders to let practices diverge from the legal norm is implicitly acknowledged 
institutionally by the owner, the law maker. Yet, there is no consensus in the empirical 
analysis of Chinese firms on whether SOEs are more law abiding due to the stricter political 
control, or less so due to the ability of state agencies at the local level to facilitate and 
‘protect’ non-compliance.  
For this reason, and perhaps highlighting one of the main distinctions of the Chinese system, 
the legal discussion overlooks the informal institutions embedded in bottom-up business 
practices that may moderate the effectiveness of corporate governance reforms. Despite a 
push for scientific management, political governance is a resilient force in the Chinese 
system. Even in the private sector, as is further discussed below, firms are influenced by 
informal forces where political networks inherited from the past are tightly woven into the 
networks of the new economic elite. In this context, a firm’s corporate governance structure 
is shaped by a negotiation for which the outcome is hardly predictable. 
Indeed, the hierarchy of actors in decision making in Chinese listed firms is puzzling. Using 
a survey of Chinese listed firms in 1999 conducted by the Shanghai Stock Exchange about 
decision making power of various actors (BOD, shareholders' meeting, managers, local 
Party committee, state administration agencies) regarding 63 types of corporate decisions, 
Nee, Opper, and Wong (2007) report that directors (3.61/5), managers (3.02/5) and 
shareholders (2.66/5) had higher average decision making power than Party committees 
(1.65/5) and government agencies (1.25/5). The five decisions in which the Party committee 
had the highest decision making power were all personnel-related decisions: selection 
department, branch and subsidiary managers, and selection of vice-CEO. Except for the 
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election and dismissal of the board chairman, the five decisions over which government 
agencies had the highest power are concentrated in financial matters: merging with or being 
merged by other firms, changes in shareholding structure, determining share placement and 
new issues. On the surface, this seems to suggest that, even before the recent wave of 
reforms, the allocation of decision making power rested more in corporate rather than 
political governance bodies within Chinese listed firms. 
Allen and Shen (2012: 173) provide a very different portrait of the role of Party committees 
in listed firms, especially in SOEs, describing their members as having a much wider 
influence than would be suggested by only looking at the committees` official roles. They 
explain that the committee is “headed by a Party secretary, who will often sit on the 
company's supervisory board, will direct the voting of state-controlled shares, will nominate 
both “independent” directors and insiders, and will have significant influence in designating 
or dismissing the CEO”. So while officially the range of tasks mandated to the committee 
specifically is limited and often subordinate to other decision centers, the people actually 
sitting around the table wear many hats. Distinguishing decision making rights and liabilities 
across various governance bodies within the firm is pointless if the Party secretary also 
represents the largest shareholder, thus nominating directors, therefore choosing managers, 
while sitting at the supervisory board. From this perspective, the role of the BOD is still 
largely ceremonial and the important decisions are made by Party members within 
governance units that are accountable to none but the Party itself. 
This view of political interference exercised by internal Party committees is supported by 
Wong, Opper, and Hu (2004). In the context of partial privatizations in China, Party 
committees are a vehicle for political control by the central leadership of the Party. The 
authors explain that the committees have formal authority to “supervise Party cadres and 
any other personnel” (Wong et al., 2004: 33), but that path dependency following an era of 
total formal control by political bodies suggests that the Party committees are still expected 
to have an influence on a broad range of corporate matters. For this reason, annual 
shareholders' meetings in China have been found to be mostly ceremonial manifestations 
endorsing backdoor politics (Berkman, Cole, & Fu, 2010). 
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The discussion on the relative influence of Party committees and external government 
agencies overlooks the fact that many top executives in listed firms are involved in the Party 
hierarchy, whether they sit on the committee or not. A survey conducted in 2000 reveals that 
69% of all directors on the boards of listed companies in China were appointed by the state 
or lower level organizations controlled by the state (Qiang, 2003). In essence, most 
appointments were steered by the political elite. State agencies could also intervene in the 
nomination process of key managers in top management teams, especially the CEO. The 
government therefore had substantial power to influence corporate objectives, sometimes 
intervening in transactions, and had a dominant voice amongst insiders to monitor the CEO's 
work, performance and allegiance (Tam, 2002). Similarly, The World Bank's Investment 
Climate Survey in 2003 found that 84% of CEOs of listed firms were Party members, 65% 
of which held official positions within the party hierarchy and 20% of which were hired 
directly by state agencies. The coding and calculations based on the original dataset used for 
the empirical section of the present study for 2129 listed firms in 2010 indicate that many 
top executives held formal Party positions outside their firm. In 21.3% of the firms, either 
the general manager or the board chairman held such a position. Also, 50% of the firms had 
at least one person among the senior management, the board of directors or the board of 
supervisors holding a Party position outside the firm. Among those firms, an average of 2.2 
people had external political participation. 
Brødsgaard (2012) observes that there is very little research about the role of the Party in 
human resources and appointment decisions in listed firms. Yet, as shown above by 
empirical evidence, many business managers are part of the Nomenklatura system of the 
Party. The Nomenklatura is defined as “a list containing those leading officials directly 
appointed by the Party as well as those officials about whom recommendations for 
appointment, release or transfer may be made by other bodies, but which require the Party’s 
approval” (Brødsgaard, 2012: 633). This is even more salient in the 53 largest SOEs (so-
called national champions) where CEOs are still directly appointed by the Organizational 
Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and have 
ministerial or vice-ministerial status. Most of these firms are among the 118 large 
corporations directly controlled by the SASAC, the central asset management commission 
of the State council. The Party thus has powerful leverages to orchestrate rotations of key 
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official between political and corporate positions. One of the government’s incentives to 
prefer political connections among top officers is to ensure compliance with government 
policy. This is supported by the fact that private firms in China are more likely than SOEs 
to find legal loopholes, resist intervention and generally disregard the law in favor of their 
own business interests (Chan, Cheng, & Szeto, 2002). Brødsgaard (2012) uses the term 
integrated fragmentation to describe this mixed system of formal autonomy in corporate 
decision making and backstage political networks.  
To sum up, informal political networks persist in China even in the private sector. Also, 
political control may take different forms, such as the SASAC at the central level. In this 
context, the degree of compliance to the new laws might differ across firms, generating a 
variety of forms of corporate governance. The assumption that only two dominant forms 
will emerge, one in the state sector and one in the private sector, overlooks the resilience of 
political influence. All of which points into the direction that the de facto corporate 
governance reflects not merely compliance with the new laws but the outcome of a 
negotiation between diverse stakeholders and their attempt to align their interests. 
Importantly, this raises the question of how these links to the Party influence the 
performance of listed firms. 
 
2.3 Political Embeddedness and Firm Performance 
In the Chinese context, nurturing a good relationship with the state and the political 
apparatus is often presented as a necessary condition for the survival of corporations. Yet, 
the literature on the impact of political connections and state involvement on firm 
performance is equivocal. This fuelled the popular State Capitalism debate which dominates 
today’s discussion on state intervention (Krug, forthcoming). The two main views can be 
summarized using the helping hand and grapping hand metaphor. The helping hand of the 
state can come through access to scarce resources, mitigation of policy uncertainty and close 
monitoring of management agency problems (Nee, 1992; Qian, 1995; Walder, 1995). From 
this perspective, the political leadership is assumed to have an incentive to enhance firm 
performance to obtain fiscal benefits (Wong, 1992). The grabbing hand assumes that 
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government officials have political priorities, are rent seeking, and attempt to maximize state 
revenue, including in ways that may diverge from the interests of shareholders (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1994). In this scenario, the state dominates managers, thus limiting the influence of 
outsiders (Opper & Schwaag-Serger, 2008).  
Looking at the improvement of corporate governance practices in Chinese listed firms, Nee 
et al. (2007) argue that while it is uncontested that the state played a role in the development 
of the Chinese economy, direct involvement in decision making produces negative effects 
at the firm level. On top of rent seeking behavior expected from any shareholder with 
sufficient decision making rights (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994), state officials can prioritize 
political objectives over maximizing returns, such as nurturing local job creation (Boardman 
& Vining, 1989; Sappington & Stiglitz, 1987; see also Blanchard & Aghion, 1996; Hellman 
& Schankerman, 2000). The over-employment problem of state firms (and employee owned 
firms) is more severe in labor intensive industries (Aguilera et al., 2008). 
In the specific case of SOEs, problems stemming from political embeddedness are two-fold. 
Firstly, the complete dominance of state representatives in the decision making process 
“guarantees close cooperation and communication ties” with management and supervisors, 
ensuring that “private shareholders have virtually no voice when it comes to crucial company 
decisions such as the selection of CEOs, and the nomination of members of the supervisory 
board” (Opper & Schwaag-Serger, 2008: 255). Secondly, the lack of a unity of command 
among state actors can lead to commitment problems. The case of large public utilities 
exemplifies problems of coordination between multiple state agencies and the ensuing lack 
of contractual commitment towards private firms that translates into opportunistic ex-post 
renegotiation and potential state capture (Krug, 2012). Yet, not all state firms are equal. 
Wang et al. (2012) consider SASAC as a sort of mid-range institutional investor that, 
although tightly connected to the Party, enjoys a reasonable level of autonomy and unity of 
command. They demonstrate that shareholding by the SASAC and its subsidiaries has a 
positive effect of firm profitability compared to traditional state ownership, but still a lower 
positive effect than private shareholding. 
These adverse effects do not only follow the ownership rights of the state, but also the 
decision making rights secured through ties with the Party even in private firms. Fan et al. 
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(2007) find that, during the first three years after their IPO, firms headed by politically 
connected CEOs display lower stock returns, sales growth and earnings growth. Their board 
also contains more directors with bureaucratic and political backgrounds. Similarly, Nee et 
al.'s (2007) results show that involvement of party committees and of administrative 
agencies in decision making have a negative impact on firm performance. 
On the other hand, Guthrie and Slocum (2010) argue that the Chinese experience, 
exemplified by PetroChina and other successful public-private partnerships such as the 
China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park Development Co., challenges the long held 
Western assumption that entities owned by or closely connected to the state are inherently 
less efficient than private initiatives (Kornai, 1980; Sachs, 1992). Chinese institutional 
innovations call for “more theoretical research on how and the conditions under which state 
ownership might lead to efficient outcomes” (Guthrie & Slocum, 2010: 307). 
Indeed, political embeddedness can generate positive outcomes for market players, partly or 
fully offsetting the negative effects of rent seeking and political objectives on performance. 
As an example, Krug (2012) uses the case of TVEs to demonstrate that political agencies 
are often not mere agents relaying the central leadership's preferences but instead become 
active market players that support market thickness and effective coordination. The local 
nature of embeddedness in TVEs facilitates coordination through trust and tradition. Also, 
ties to the state can provide access to capital and administrative resources. The involvement 
of the state can be of great value for a firm in an institutional framework characterized by 
controlled resource allocation and administrative monopoly. Firms in the state sector in 
China have access to cheap and abundant capital through the large state-owned banks since 
local government officials can influence loan attributions (Park & Sehrt, 2001). 
Administrative approvals and procedures for market entry can also be eased when managers 
are connected to government officials. Furthermore, pressure from local Party committees 
on controlling shareholders has been found to restrain expropriation of the firm’s cash-flow 
(Chang & Wong, 2004). Peng and Luo (2000) demonstrate empirically that managerial ties 
with government officials have a highly significant and positive impact on a firm’s market 
share and profitability.  
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The fact that political connections can provide alternative means of financing has also been 
demonstrated in other countries. In the case of Indonesia for instance, Leuz and Oberholzer-
Gee (2006) find that politically connected firms are much less likely to seek foreign capital 
than other firms, suggesting that political connections and foreign capital are substitutes. 
However, a change of political regime alters their privileged access to finance through their 
former connections, initially leading to under-performance until firms successfully attract 
foreign capital. In China, the stability of the political regime effectively eliminates the threat 
of regime change on the privileges of connected firms. 
Thus, the empirical evidence at the firm level is mixed on whether political connections 
(political capital) in transition economies are beneficial (helping hand) or detrimental 
(grabbing hand).The impact of state ownership, whether partial or with controlling stakes, 
can be negative to firm performance (Fan et al., 2007), but political capital can also have a 
positive effect (Peng & Luo, 2000). Even in the field, based on in depth interviews, Nee and 
Opper (2012) found two types of Chinese entrepreneurs: some perceive that political agents 
cannot bring much to the table and therefore refuse to play the political game, and others 
rate their political ties as a crucial asset. In essence, there is no consensus on whether and 
which kind of state involvement works to the benefit or detriment of firm performance and 
ultimately market development. As the State Capitalism debate demonstrates, new empirical 
approaches clarifying the different consequences of state interference at the firm level are 
needed to get a clearer and more nuanced view of the corporate governance and ultimately 
economic performance of firms (Krug, forthcoming). This requires an analysis of how 
features of political embeddedness are integrated to and interact with the corporate 
governance structures implemented by firms. The next section provides the building blocks 
for such an analysis by reviewing the two main ideal-type systems identified in the literature, 
which serve as starting points for the exploratory empirical study. 
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3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
3.1 Competing Models of Corporate Governance 
When it is assumed as discussed above that the new laws concerning firms and their 
operational environment must lead to heterogeneity of corporate governance in China then 
the question remains how to differentiate between the different forms. The literature on 
comparative corporate governance offers a valuable starting point by identifying the main 
ideal type systems, the features of which are useful building blocks to determine the 
corporate governance practices to be used in the exploratory study. The approach is 
grounded in the dichotomy between insider control systems and outsider control systems, 
which was first advanced by Jenkinson and Mayer (1992), and Franks and Mayer (1997) 
and more recently synthesized by Garcia-Castro et al. (2013). Generally, outsider control 
systems aim to maximize shareholder value through board independence, high disclosure, 
dispersed ownership, a market for corporate control, strict rules of anti-self-dealing and the 
absence of a two-tier board. Insider control systems rely on a two-tier board as broker 
between stakeholders, including banks and employees, and exhibit highly concentrated 
ownership. In China as in most transition economies control and the allocation of decision 
making rights superimposes the ownership question. An exploration of the impact of 
political embeddedness on these models is thus also presented below.  
Corporate governance was not the first international comparative research agenda to value 
firm level analysis. Hall and Soskice’s (2001: 6) theory on varieties of capitalism “regards 
companies as the crucial actors in a political economy”. It therefore seems particularly 
relevant to use insights from the comparative corporate governance literature to inform a 
study of firm level configurations. In their seminal theoretical analysis of the cross-national 
diversity of corporate governance, Aguilera and Jackson (2003) identify three dimensions 
that define the relations that capital providers entertain with the firm: financial VS strategic 
interests, commitment VS liquidity, and debt VS equity. In turn, these dimensions are 
influenced by three institutional domains: whether property rights favor small or large 
shareholders, whether the financial system is bank- or market-based, and whether inter-firm 
networks exhibit relationships multiplexity (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). These terms help 
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characterizing the various typologies and models of corporate governance observable around 
the world.  
Insider control system. Liu (2006b: 418) describes the dominant or typical 
corporate governance system observed in Chinese firms as a control-based model, which 
involves a “concentrated ownership structure, management-friendly boards, inadequate 
financial disclosure and inactive take-over markets”. The label “control” in this context 
should be understood as an insider-control system, also called insider-dominated model in 
Kim and Lee’s (2012) account of South Korean firms. Large block holders use internal 
monitoring mechanisms to discipline management (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010). Insider 
control systems typically rely on a strong supervisory board to balance the interests of 
powerful and informed stakeholders, like banks and employees, that play an active role in 
the governance structure and decision making process (Franks & Mayer, 1997). The 
complementarities between employee participation in decision making and a strong 
relationship with banks are exemplified by the Japanese case (Aoki, 2001, 2007). Such 
brokerage of interests between stakeholders is also necessary when corporate shareholders 
have a supplier-customer relationship or other forms of strong ties such as mutual cross-
shareholding. These inter-firm networks refer to the multiplexity of relationships between 
firms. A tight web of stakeholders compels firms to favor long term commitment over exit 
options (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). The Chinese market is known for the volume of related 
party transactions (Young et al., 2008), implying the presence of substantial multiplexity 
and suggesting a preference for commitment as the control mechanism. In a similar fashion, 
because Chinese firms are often politically embedded, the Party is positioned as a powerful 
and informed stakeholder. 
Insider-control systems are likely to prevail when property rights, referring to the legal and 
formal allocation of decision making rights, are less clearly defined (Aguilera & Jackson, 
2003). Where shareholder rights favor large investors, strategic interests and control via 
commitment tend to dominate. The Japanese system, which uses majority principles in 
voting rights and mandates little information disclosure, and the German system, which 
grants disproportionate power to block holders through the institution of two tier boards, 
both favor commitment and strategic interests. Such systems also typically rely on bank 
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based rather than equity market based systems (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). In fact, strong 
ties with financial institutions can undermine the market for corporate control (Aoki, 1994; 
Baums, 1993). Banks convert household savings into investments using debt and rely on 
longer term relationships, which reinforce the commitment to internal monitoring. Owners 
are thus expected to display a high level of commitment instead of relying on market 
liquidity (exit options) as a control mechanism and prefer bank loans as a means of financing 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). They also prefer a long term strategic orientation (Aguilera et 
al., 2008), which allows to pursue non-financial objectives such as gaining access to 
resources. As mentioned in the previous sections, state ownership in China may fall squarely 
into this category.  
Finally, the opportunity cost of information disclosure is also higher when a block-holder 
has a majority stake, since strategic decision making is ultimately not shared (Aguilera et 
al., 2008). For instance, family firms have concentrated ownership and their internal control 
is steered by insiders with strong commitment to long term strategic interests (Dhnadirek & 
Tang, 2003). Such a tight kin network of insiders is typically reluctant to disclose strategic 
information to outsiders. Information disclosure is not a good fit with insider-dominated 
firms, since it is not complementary with concentrated ownership and internal control, 
especially in weak legal environments.  The same preference is expected to prevail in highly 
politically connected firms. Yet, “state block holders may also require transparency to avoid 
claims of unfair competition in international markets” (Aguilera et al., 2008: 486). So SOEs 
might be forced against their will to provide high disclosure. 
Outsider control system. The outsider-control system, which has also been labelled 
the standard shareholder-oriented model (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001), rests on the 
primacy of shareholders in widely held corporations over other stakeholders. In such 
systems, thicker liquid markets can support a diversification strategy that allows for flatter 
ownership structures and securitized debt (obligations). Individual investors prioritize cash 
flow maximization and institutional investors, often dominated by pension funds, play an 
important role to diversify and maximize the financial interests of their investors (Aguilera 
& Jackson, 2003). Management discipline stems from liquidity and the market for corporate 
control because each individual shareholder, having diversified assets across firms to 
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manage risks, has little incentive to invest resources in monitoring activities (Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2010). In turn, this market for corporate control is highly dependent on high 
information disclosure and effective deterrence of insider trading (Franks & Mayer, 1997). 
So financial interests and market liquidity are predominant where the shareholder rights of 
small investors are legally well protected (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). These laws are usually 
accompanied by strong anti-trust regulations that prevent extensive multiplexity.  
The governance structures in outsider-control systems do not only rely on the investor’s exit 
option to discipline management. Shareholders rights are also meant to guarantee that 
investors can participate in the governance structure and voice their interests. For this 
purpose, a unitary board consisting of independent directors should monitor the firm to 
ensure shareholder wealth maximization (Franks & Mayer, 1997). The annual shareholder’s 
meeting should also allow minority investors to put forward proposals and nominate 
directors to the board. The textbook example of outsider-control systems is the Anglo-Saxon 
model used in the United States and the United Kingdom (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). In 
this model, executive incentives meant to align the interests of managers with those of 
shareholders are complementary with board independence and the market for corporate 
control. In turn, this combination is only effective with information disclosure and rigorous 
auditing. Indeed, for a firm that relies on equity markets to raise capital, especially with 
foreign investors, the benefits of information disclosure related to greater transparency with 
potential shareholders outweigh the costs (Goyer, 2003).  
There is evidence to suggest that the practices transplanted from the outsider-control system 
can be successful in the Chinese context. Liu (2006b: 418) demonstrates that companies that 
rely on features that diverge from the dominant control-based model, such as “dispersed 
ownership, active take-over market, independent board, high level of information disclosure 
and institutional investors”, are more likely to make decisions in the interest of minority 
shareholders, have better accounting standards, and provide higher stock returns. 
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3.2 Domestic Heterogeneity of Corporate Governance Configurations 
It is generally assumed that national models will tilt towards one of the two ideal type 
systems described above. This section presents a stream of literature that argues that more 
than one model can cohabitate within a single jurisdiction and that recognizing domestic 
heterogeneity requires the conceptualization of corporate governance forms as open systems 
in which practices interact with institutional contingencies. Indeed, recent developments in 
research stress the need to endogenize a broader range of factors when explaining the 
emergence and persistence of different forms of corporate governance. In this regard, China 
poses a challenge to conventional economic theory. Despite weak legal institutions, a thin 
financial market and environmental uncertainty, private businesses have been growing 
steadily. In other words, “despite the absence of formal private property rights, Chinese 
entrepreneurs have felt sufficiently secure to make large investments, making that country 
by far the world's fastest growing economy over the last two decades.” (Rodrik, 
Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004: 157) Yet, while China has defied predictions of classical 
economic theory, nothing suggests that standard economic concepts don’t apply in China. 
John Child (1994: 301) explains that “the conceptual tools for analyzing organizational 
fundamentals such as authority, control, structures of governance, normative systems, 
property rights, [...] supply the bricks from which a reasonably adequate representation of 
the Chinese case can be constructed”. The Chinese experience might just call for more subtle 
adaptation to the local context. A contextualized approach conceives of institutions as 
influencing the interests and identities of actors (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010). Aguilera and 
Jackson (2003) propose that the specific roles played by capital, management and labor and 
the interactions among them are shaped by institutional configurations. Their idea rely on 
the assumptions that different types of investors (banks, families, funds, state, etc.) and 
different managerial cultures result in different interests and that relations among actors are 
socially embedded rather than isolated from the institutional context (Dacin, Ventresca, & 
Beal, 1999). 
Firstly, the institutional context is itself shaped by relations among actors. Since the meaning 
of law is often negotiated in the marketplace (Dobbin & Sutton, 1998; Edelman & Suchman, 
1997), the implementation of new norms and practices is often the theatre for power 
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confrontations between interest groups. While the rule of law has long been conceived as a 
prerequisite for the rise of functioning markets, new insights suggest that effective legal 
frameworks only rise in “response to a failing self-enforcement mechanism” (Krug, 2012: 
357; see also Dixit, 2007). However, the proper implementation and enforcement of laws, 
even when they are desired by market players to palliate failing informal institutions, can be 
hampered by political embeddedness. For instance, the usage of the enterprise bankruptcy 
law in China is limited by a lack of cohesion in the state administration regarding its 
implementation, which leads to ambiguity in its application and a general preference to settle 
disputes outside courts in processes that are subject to political agents' interference and 
discretion (Krug, 2012). Political embeddedness can thus be a force for path dependence by 
limiting the usage of law. 
Secondly, the economic actors and the relations among them are shaped by the institutional 
context. Shareholders across jurisdictions might not fit the same ideal type (Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2010). While the need for any investing party to gain sufficient assurances that the 
terms agreed upon regarding decision making rights, income rights and exit options is 
present in all contexts, the mechanisms used to achieve a sufficient level of protection might 
differ in an environment characterized by weak legal institutions and high uncertainty. In 
other words, distinct mechanisms can be functional equivalents, or substitutes. The concept 
of substitution is expressed clearly in Ahlering and Deakin’s (2007: 872) comparative study 
of international systems: “by virtue of functional continuity, in addition to observing 
complementarities within national systems, we are likely to observe functional substitutes 
or equivalents -institutions that substitute for one another in the sense of performing a similar 
function in different ways- across systems”. Actors in different systems therefore have 
different legal and institutional tools at their disposal to structure their relations. 
This is also the case at the national level, where a diversity of equally successful practices 
and organizational forms can emerge. Scholars are increasingly aware of the richness of the 
variety of effective institutions in local marketplaces (Krug & Hendrischke, 2012; Meyer et 
al., 2009; Peng et al., 2008). Whitley (2006: 192) stresses that “not all states can be expected 
to establish a single kind of business system throughout all regions and sectors of an 
economy” and that “the nature of firms, their strategies, and capabilities frequently vary 
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between sectors, technological regimes, and regions within countries”. Consistent with 
Whitley’s view of organizational heterogeneity, and following a tradition that recognizes the 
decentralized nature of property transformation in transition economies (Stark, 1996), 
organizational level analyzes promises to best explain the nature of market institutions that 
are effectively used in the realm of corporate governance.  
The typical approach of corporate governance studies to examine practices in silo is ill-fitted 
to the analysis of functional equivalents. While some elements can be individually 
beneficial, another stream of literature conceives corporate governance rather as a 
configuration of multiple interdependent practices that maintain internal coherence as a 
system (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Davis & Useem, 2002). New insights from the comparative 
corporate governance literature emphasize the need for an open systems perspective, taking 
environmental contingencies into account in addition to internal complementarities. For 
long, research on the effectiveness of corporate governance has mostly paid attention to 
internal factors, such as practices and structures that allocate decision making rights within 
the firm and among key stakeholders. Aguilera et al. (2008) propose that a richer 
understanding of corporate governance should incorporate an open system approach, in 
which organizational practices and structures are inherently interdependent with the 
environmental context. Such an approach allows, as opposed to closed system approaches 
such as agency or stakeholder theories, to “uncover the diversity of arrangements and to 
understand how the effectiveness of governance practices is mediated by their fit or 
alignment with situational variables (context) arising in diverse organizational 
environments.” (Aguilera et al., 2008: 476). 
The open systems approach provides an insightful framework to analyze the patterned 
variation of outcomes emerging from interdependencies between the external context and 
internal practices in different types of firms. Aguilera et al. (2008) characterize this fit of 
practices with the institutional and competitive environment as the contingencies. These 
should be analyzed simultaneously with internal complementarities, which assume that some 
governance practices cannot be implemented in silo but rather become effective only in 
conjunction with other practices or structures. Finally, the opportunity costs of 
implementation and the benefits of a given practice will vary across environments. Taking 
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into account different configurations of practices within organizations and the subtle 
environmental contingencies surrounding them is necessary to flesh out the domestic 
diversity of forms of corporate governance. For the purpose of the present study, to bring 
context to the analysis as suggested in the literature asks for the identification of China-
specific factors and how those factors might complement or supplement features of the ideal 
type systems of corporate governance.  
 
3.3 Corporate Governance Models “With Chinese Characteristics” 
This section explores how ideal type systems of corporate governance may apply in 
conjunction with China specific factors primarily embodied in the presence of inherited 
features of strict political governance. To this end, a discussion of how the Chinese market 
structure differs from western contexts offers a relevant starting point. Roe (1994) has argued 
that the US equity market is particularly healthy in terms of liquidity and dispersed 
ownership because banks were heavily regulated for the large part of the industrial 
revolution, and therefore unable to develop the tight relationships with non-financial 
corporations that their European peers enjoyed (see also Aguilera & Jackson, 2010). This 
national-level governance dimension of bank-based and market-based systems cannot be 
easily applied to China. In China, the equity market is under-developed and the banking 
resources are steered predominantly towards firms in the state-sector or those that are 
politically connected. Capital at early stages is provided by the individual networks of 
entrepreneurs who channel by themselves the savings of their family, colleagues or friends 
(Nee & Opper, 2012). More mature firms rely in large part on organic capital generation for 
reinvestment. Without accounting for heavy hybridization, none of the two ideal-type 
systems are observable in China. Of course, internal capital generation is also the most 
important source in market- and bank-based systems (Corbett & Jenkinson, 1996). Still, the 
marginal capital obtained either from loans or external shareholders are often critical in 
growth management. Also, it is important to note that no system produces uniformity at the 
firm level. Many American firms have large banking liabilities while many German firms 
don't (Rajan & Zingales, 1995), which suggests that firms leverage all the sources of funding 
at their disposal. Aguilera and Jackson (2010: 499) contend that “the more robust differences 
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lie in the forms of monitoring associated with these financial systems and their impact on 
the distribution of rewards in corporate governance”. In a transition economy like China, the 
discussion about income and decision making rights allocation that is crucial to monitoring 
must take into account the enduring role of the state. This section offers insights from the 
literature on how political embeddedness and state control may affect the prevalence and 
efficiency of corporate governance models. 
In countries where CEOs are subject to more political pressures, concentrated ownership 
prevails as a mechanism to control for this added agency problem (Roe, 2000). For instance, 
in social democratic European countries more pressures are exerted by governments on 
business managers than in Anglo-Saxon countries for community purposes such as 
employment stabilization and investment promotion. In such countries, to control the 
additional agency costs incurred because of state pressures, concentrated ownership persists 
as an effective governance mechanism instead of typical internal and external corporate 
governance practices put forward in markets with low government intervention (Roe, 2000). 
Indeed, low public pressures allow for dispersed ownership, accompanied by a norm of 
shareholder wealth maximization as the duty of managers as well as internal (incentive 
compensation, accounting transparency, board independence) and external (market for 
hostile takeovers) corporate governance mechanisms to solve principal agent problems. In 
markets with high ownership concentration, the CEOs have been found to enjoy much less 
managerial discretion and less influence on business outcomes than in markets with 
dispersed ownership (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007). At a systemic level, these insights 
suggest that political embeddedness has inherent complementarities with ownership 
concentration rather than dispersion. 
Firm level studies in China seem to support the fact that ownership dispersion is not 
complementary with political embeddedness. While Roe (2000) suggests that political 
pressure is a determinant of the ownership structure, Wong et al. (2004) find the reversed 
relation: shareholder structure of Chinese listed firms influences the level of politicization. 
Firstly, the proportion of individual shareholders is negatively related with the Party's 
decision making power in the firm. They interpret this result as an indication that the 
presence of individual investors that can exercise their exit option leads to direct 
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depoliticization. Secondly, the presence of large institutional investors attenuates the 
negative relationship between political influence and firm performance, which shows that 
external shareholders with a strong voice are a force for indirect depoliticization. This kind 
of study is difficult to reproduce with data from recent years because the split share reform 
has made it difficult to track shareholder identity in aggregate numbers. In sum, while they 
disagree on the direction of causality, both Roe (2000) and Wong et al.’s (2004) concur that 
political embeddedness is complementary with concentrated ownership.  
In turn, this confirms that political embeddedness is expected to be complementary with an 
insider-control system rather than an outsider-control system. For Hansmann and Kraakman 
(2012: 34), China today is a perfect example of “state-oriented model”, much like Japan in 
the 1960s or South Korea in the 1970s. This type of governance has elsewhere been labelled 
“administrative governance” (Pistor & Xu, 2005: 185). In this respect, strong political 
connections negatively affect the effectiveness of Western-style board-level corporate 
governance practices (Yang et al., 2011). For instance, Goyer (2003) finds that information 
disclosure is complementary with dispersed ownership, foreign and institutional investors 
and the absence of family or political control. Similarly, the contamination of performance 
evaluation of managers in Chinese SOEs by political objectives is expected to reduce the 
effect of compensation packages on incentive alignment (Yang et al., 2011). Even if one 
accepts the agency theory assumption that managers are primarily driven by self-interest and 
extrinsic reward, incentive compensation may still only have a marginal effect on the 
motivation of managers. Their potential career improvements are tied to performance 
assessments that also rely on criteria foreign to the agency theory framework and embedded 
in the political priorities of state agencies. These priorities and career advancement 
mechanisms are known by Chinese investors. Incentive compensation in state firms should 
therefore not be expected to have a strong effect on incentive alignment, or to reduce the 
cost of capital. This may also be true with political connections. Aoki (2001) suggests that 
the effectiveness of incentive compensation to align managers’ interests to those of the 
shareholders is lower when other powerful stakeholders have close-knit long term 
relationships with the firm. This has been observed in countries such as Germany and Japan 
that rely on a bank-based financial system and where employees participate more actively 
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in corporate decision making. In China, the monitoring role of the Party as a stakeholder is 
expected to produce a similar outcome. 
Yet, while political connections hinder the effectiveness of Western-style corporate 
governance practices, these same political ties have sometimes been found to be effective 
functional equivalents. For instance, political appointment of CEOs in China may reduce 
principal-agent problems. Li and Tang (2010) indeed show that the impact of CEO hubris, 
defined as exaggerated pride or optimistic overconfidence (Kahneman & Tversky, 1995), 
on firm risk taking in Chinese manufacturing firms is increased by managerial discretion, 
while it is decreased if positions of BOD Chairman and CEO are held by different people or 
if the CEO is politically appointed. This suggests that the shadow of political governance 
can be a substitute to effective board monitoring to reduce the salience of mismanagement 
in the form of miscalculated risk taking. La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(2000) had also found that poor investor protection can be offset by social embeddedness. 
In countries with poor investment protection, firms are often held by the founding family. 
This social embeddedness in family ties can provide sufficiently strong ex-ante 
commitments to compensate for weak formal institutions. As exposed earlier, tight political 
networks can provide similar embeddedness to align the interests of insiders. Still, while 
concentrated ownership allows the controlling owner to monitor managerial agency and 
political pressures (Roe, 2000), minority shareholders are left defenseless against 
expropriation of their rightful cash flow by controlling shareholders. In short, features of 
political embeddedness salient in China are naturally more complementary with an insider-
control system than an outsider control system. Political connections may even act as an 
effective surrogate to the functions of practices associated with outsider-control. Given these 
subtle interactions and following on the expectation of heterogeneity discussed in the 
previous section, one model or the other will not uniformly and integrally prevail among 
firms. The following section explores the theoretical underpinnings of the process 
recombination that result in the firms adopting innovative sets of practices that fit their 
context and that may diverge from ideal type models. 
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3.4 Hybridization: Corporate Governance Configurations  
The aforementioned analysis suggests three forms of corporate governance. On one side is 
a form that, in the Chinese case, adheres to the new laws formulated according to Western 
standards and aiming at outside control by shareholders and investors. On the other side are 
two forms (politically embedded or private insider control) that both revolve around strong 
insider control with a predominant shareholder that, given the political control inherited from 
the past, may or may not have strong ties to the political apparatus (party members or state 
administration). The benefits of politically embedded firms and the informal political 
networks, empowered by local autonomy, allow firms playing with different forms of 
corporate governance. These in-between forms often called hybrids ask for a more nuanced 
analysis as the term hybrid suggests an inferior form and/or a transitory phenomenon. 
Instead, the term configuration is adopted to allow for the inclusion of components of each 
or any of the theoretically defined forms. 
Firstly, it should be noted that the models presented above are not immutable. In fact, the 
observed reality often departs from theorized ideal types. For instance, in theory, dispersed 
ownership is contingent upon strong shareholder's rights. Weak shareholder rights lead to a 
concentration of ownership because investors need larger stakes to exert internal control on 
managers (La Porta et al., 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). 
Minority shareholders face higher risks and are more reluctant to buy shares unless at a 
discount, which provides lower incentives for firms to conduct share emissions in the first 
place. However, La Porta et al.’s (2000) main claim that shareholder rights are a potent 
predictors of patterns in ownership concentration across countries has been criticized. 
Aguilera and Jackson (2010) explain that strong protection of minority investors is not a 
necessary condition for ownership dispersion, as confirmed by the cases of Switzerland and 
Ireland where relatively weaker shareholder rights are not accompanied by significantly 
higher ownership concentration. Similarly, they are not sufficient conditions, since countries 
with strong protections like Spain and Portugal still exhibit large block holders. So in 
practice, strong shareholder's rights do not appear to constitute a necessary or a sufficient 
condition for ownership dispersion. Also, Coffee (2005: 207) challenges the claimed 
superiority of dispersed ownership, as advanced by the legal origin literature, showing that 
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while concentrated ownership leads to a lack of transparency regarding the appropriation of 
private benefits, “dispersed ownership is vulnerable to gatekeepers not detecting inflated 
earnings”. The complementarities that conceptually bind the various elements of each model 
do not constitute universal laws. 
Secondly, it is important to note that fully fledged governance models do not appear in a 
vacuum. Streeck’s (2001) work is helpful to understand the subtlety and spontaneity of the 
emergence of coherent systems. Complementarity is discovered rather than planned, 
emerging through experimentation and hybridization out of a pool of elements that were not 
necessarily compatible from the onset. As stated earlier, coherent systems involve internal 
complementarities that must fit the firm’s environmental contingencies (Aguilera et al., 
2008). Bottom-up organizational change and top-down institutional reforms both matter. It 
is unlikely that the elements at all levels can transition simultaneously from one coherent 
model, say politically embedded insider-control system, to another coherent system, such as 
a market-based outsider control system. On the one hand, the costs of giving up on the 
complementarities with the surrounding consistent system and the isomorphic pressures 
from the environment can deter firms from radical change. On the other hand, the state is 
also experimenting with institutional reforms in a way that minimizes system wide 
disruptions. Such a process of fuzzy institution building, often steered by the elite, typically 
happens during exceptional political moments. Yet, the resulting coherent systems must “be 
continuously established, restored, redefined and defended against all sorts of disorganizing 
forces” (Streeck, 2001: 30).  
The corporatization of the state sector in China certainly represents one of those exceptional 
political moments. Victor Nee (1992: 2) had already found in the 1990s that transition 
economies have “given birth to a new diversity in organizational forms and a plurality of 
property rights.” The rapid evolution of the market environment gave rise to hybrid forms 
of firms whereas, for instance, the management of small public enterprises is leased to 
private operators. Nee claims that hybrid forms of enterprises persist where property rights 
are less defined (messy). According to Boisot and Child (1996), such hybrid forms include 
marketized state enterprises. Krug (2012: 348) remarks that “if political embeddedness 
results in functioning markets then we cannot expect political embeddedness to be only of a 
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transitory nature”. In other words, where the state has a helping rather than a grabbing hand, 
political interference and state control would remain a lasting institutional feature, possibly 
as one element of new hybrid configurations of corporate governance. 
Such hybridization has been observed in other countries. A good example to illustrate the 
dynamics of hybridization in corporate governance and the role of complementarities is the 
German case (Höpner, 2005). Two external pressures resulting from internationalization 
were instrumental to the rise of the shareholder value orientation in large German 
corporations: the increased competition in export-oriented industries following European 
integration, and the rise of domestic and foreign institutional investors that accompanied the 
appearance of hostile takeovers (ex: Mannesmann/Vodafone). The institutions of co-
determination (employee participation) and two-tier board were not dismantled as a result 
of the new shareholder value orientation, but instead reinforced through an unlikely alliance 
between labor and capital to pressure management for more information disclosure. 
Dominant in Chile and Malaysia as well, this kind of alliance has been labelled the 
transparency coalition and has been found to fuel the dispersion of share ownership 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Gourevitch & Shinn, 2005). These case may not apply to China, 
but they demonstrate that elements pertaining to theoretically competing models can be 
recombined and display unexpected complementarities. 
The previous section has presented how the concept of political embeddedness applies to 
China and how features of political governance have persisted during a wave of market 
reforms and standardization of corporate governance structures. The present section has 
provided the conceptual building blocks necessary to distinguish competing models of 
corporate governance, namely the outsider-control system and the insider-control system, as 
well as a discussion about the potential interactions between political connections and 
elements of these two ideal type models. It also explored the dynamics that can produce 
domestic heterogeneity of corporate governance forms and instances of hybridization 
involving the recombination of seemingly incompatible practices. The remainder of this 
chapter endeavors to devise and implement an inductive exploratory empirical study that 
aims to identify and characterize the main corporate governance configurations that have 
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allowed listed firms to achieve performance in a context of institutional tensions between 
inherited institutions of political governance and a recent wave of market oriented reforms. 
 
4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 Data and Sample 
This section describes the design of the empirical study of large samples of listed firms in 
China used to analyze the heterogeneity of forms of corporate governance and the effects of 
political embeddedness on firm performance. Given their distinct institutional background, 
private firms and state-owned enterprises are separated into two distinct samples. Besides 
the multiplicity of objectives in decision making of SOEs discussed in section two of the 
present chapter, SOEs and private firms are subject to distinct institutional constraints in 
many areas, for instance regarding their treatment during internationalization both in the 
home country (Liang, Ren, & Sun, 2015) and host country (Meyer, Ding, Li, & Zhang, 
2014), concerning issues and perceptions of corruption (Nguyen & van Dijk, 2012) or 
patterns of earnings management (Ding et al., 2007). Using separate samples also allows 
understanding the distinct role of political embeddedness in each institutional setting. In 
addition, corporate governance in SOEs being under-studied in the literature, the production 
of dedicated results provides an opportunity to single out findings that specifically concern 
SOEs. Indeed, compared to the large body of literature on corporate governance in private 
firms, there is little research on corporate governance in SOEs and its differences with 
private firms apart from the general and largely unhelpful claim that corporate governance 
in SOEs is relatively inefficient (Dilova-Kirkowa, 1999; Mahadeo & Soobaroyen, 2012; 
Sokol, 2010). This is even more relevant for the case of China since the listed SOEs included 
in this study have been marketized. Most studies of SOEs concern firms that are wholly 
owned by the state, while many SOEs especially in transition economies have been 
corporatized by floating shares on stock markets and allowing minority block holdings by 
private investors, which can enhance firm performance (Aivazian, Ge, & Qiu, 2005; 
Berkman, Cole, & Fu, 2014), but also weaken the legal regime of investor protection 
(Pargendler, 2012). The corporate governance structure of corporatized SOEs can differ 
substantially from the internal government-led monitoring mechanisms observed in 
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traditional SOEs as they are subject to market forces and outsider scrutiny. Finally, in terms 
of research design, although 8 out of 9 explanatory conditions used in the empirical analysis 
are the same across the two samples, separating in two samples allows the inclusion of a 9th 
condition that is specific to each sample and that could not apply to the other sample (these 
specific conditions are discussed below: type of state ownership in the SOE sample and 
participation measures during the shareholders meeting in the sample of private firms).  
The working definition of state-owned enterprises employed in this study is exhaustive, 
going beyond the immediate owner and coding as SOE any firm that is ultimately owned by 
a state agency at any level, or owned by an entity managed by a state organ, or any firm for 
which the largest shareholder corresponds to these criteria. To do this, ownership data is 
cross-checked from three databases (Orbis, GTA information and Sinofin) and triangulated 
using company websites and annual reports in cases of inconsistent information. The 
samples exclude cases with incomplete data, such as firms that had their IPO over the course 
of the year. To ensure the comparability of the two samples, the dataset also excludes 
industries in which SOEs represented less than 30% of firms or more than 70% of firms. 
This reduces the potential comparative distortion to measures of performance stemming 
from the over- or under-representation of state firms. Five industries were thus excluded: 
timber and furnishing, finance and insurance, mining, utilities and transportation. The final 
samples included 810 SOEs and 942 private firms. All the data is collected for the year 2010, 
which is selected to adequately balance recency and completeness of the dataset. 
 
4.2 Method 
To decipher interconnected elements that have complex causal relationships with an 
outcome, configuration analysis seemed the most suited method. Fiss (2007) retains Meyer, 
Tsui and Hinings' (1993: 1175) definition of organizational configurations as “any 
multidimensional constellation of conceptually distinct characteristics that commonly occur 
together”. This view assumes that organizational structures and practices cannot be analyzed 
in silo but rather as a coherent set of complementary and interconnected elements. As 
explained below, configurational analysis allows for ingrained study of complex causal 
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relationships that involve non-linearity, multivariate interaction effects, or asymmetry. A 
powerful application of this method is the examination of equifinality, which refers to the 
possibility that "a system can reach the same final state, from different initial conditions and 
by a variety of different paths" (Katz & Kahn, 1978: 30). In essence, distinct sets of practices 
and structures can lead to the same outcome. Within the concept of equifinality lies the idea 
of asymmetry, whereby a condition might lead to a particular outcome when combined with 
a given set of complementary conditions while the absence or the opposite of the same 
condition may also lead to the same outcome when combined with a different set of 
conditions (Ragin, 2008a). By extension, this means that configurational methods are useful 
to analyze non-linear causal relations since the results do not attribute an overall sign to the 
effect but rather identifies the absence and presence of the conditions in each configuration 
separately (Fiss, 2011). This is especially suited to study the heterogeneity of an 
organizational landscape.  
Fiss (2007: 1181) explains that set theoretic methods are particularly suited to study the 
multivariate interaction effects of organizational configurations since they “do not 
disaggregate cases into independent, analytically separate aspects but, instead, treat 
configurations as different types of cases”. Econometric approaches are more powerful to 
analyze additive effects ceteris paribus, while set theoretic methods make use of Boolean 
algebra to attribute an effect to both the presence and absence of complementary factors. 
Traditional interaction effects in statistics can capture some synergies, but are ambiguous to 
interpret beyond typical bi-variate interactions. Another alternative method to study 
configurations is cluster analysis (Lim, Acito, & Rusetski, 2006). However, while this 
method is useful to discover the co-occurrence of characteristics across similar cases, it does 
not emphasize the causal factors that are central to configurations. Because of this, cases that 
share few but important causal factors while differing on many other characteristics would 
be attributed to different clusters, while still pertaining to the same causal sets (Fiss, 2007). 
The configuration analysis is operationalized using the fsQCA software (Ragin et al., 2006), 
which relies on set theories and Boolean algebra. While Boolean algebra is initially built on 
binary variables (presence or absence of attributes) in what is called crisp sets, the use of 
fuzzy sets allows for ordinal and interval scale variables (Ragin, 2000, 2008a). The variables 
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are calibrated between zero and one, thus attributing a meaningful floor and ceiling (Ragin, 
2008b). The method invites the researcher to use substantive knowledge about the cases and 
the causal relationships to calibrate the scales appropriately, instead of simply 
proportionately rescaling the continuous variable. In the present study, some conditions have 
custom scales while others (non-skewed interval scale variables) use the fsQCA calibration 
function. This form of data-driven calibration is commonly used in large-N QCA studies 
(Fiss, 2011; Greckhamer et al., 2008; Whittington et al., 2013). Also, in order to rely on 
scales that are not sample specific to calibrate the conditions and the outcome variable, the 
scales are anchored on the entire population of listed firms in China.  
 
4.3 Outcome Measure: Firm Performance 
When choosing a measure for performance, Chen, Li and Shapiro (2011) argue that 
accounting measures of operational performance such as the return on assets (ROA) are 
more informative and reliable than financial performance measures in China. Stock returns 
are less informative than in mature capital markets because the underdevelopment of 
Chinese stock exchanges, with a high proportion of shares that are not traded, high volatility 
(Lin & Swanson, 2008) and low transparency, hinders the price setting efficiency on the 
market (Peng, 2004). The ROA (ratio of net profits to total assets) is therefore adopted as 
the measure of performance for the outcome variable. Accordingly, the empirical analysis 
aims to identify the configurations of corporate governance that contribute to firm 
profitability (ROA). The measure is adjusted to the industry average to avoid noise from 
sector-specific factors. It is simply calculated by subtracting the average ROA in the industry 
from the firms ROA. The industry classification used is that of the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission. Finally, the calibration from 0 to 1 is done through the calibration 
function in the fsQCA software, which requires to set the thresholds for full-membership, 
full non-membership and the cut-off point, also known as the point of “maximum ambiguity” 
(Ragin, 2008b: 186). These thresholds are set at the 5th, 50th and 95th percentile of the 
industry-adjusted ROA from the entire population: -6.8%, -0.2% and 8.8%.  
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4.4 Explanatory Conditions 
Nine explanatory conditions are used in each of the two analyses. To achieve maximum 
comparability, eight conditions are identical in the two samples. The ultimate condition 
differs because it was not applicable to the other sample. The selection of conditions was 
made with an aim to cover the most important factors identified in the literature, while also 
maintaining a parsimonious model to facilitate the interpretation of results. A model of nine 
conditions is below the maximum of 12 proposed by Greckhamer, Misangyi and Fiss (2013) 
for large-N fsQCA studies. The presentation of the conditions is followed a table (table 13) 
that provides descriptive statistics on the variables used for the calibration of each condition 
for the two samples separately.  
Board independence. This is a typical component of Western systems of corporate 
governance, by which outsiders use voice within the board to protect the interests of minority 
investors. A custom scale for this item is established based on international standards. A 
score of 1 is attributed to firms with at least 50% independent directors, which was 
recommended in the Cadbury report in the UK and mandated by the New York stock 
exchange. A score of 0.75 is attributed to a score of more than 40%. A score of 0.51 (above 
the cut-off point) is attributed to firms going above the minimum requirements in China of 
one third. Firms meeting exactly the minimum are given 0.25. Firms under the legal 
threshold receive 0. 
Proactive disclosure. Disclosure is an essential enabler of outsider influence 
mechanisms in the firm, in the forms of both internal control (voice) and external pressure 
(exit option). Two separate elements combine to produce an index of proactive disclosure, 
each worth 0.5. Firstly, firms are given a score on 0.5 depending on the delay of the release 
of their annual report. The number of days between year-end and release has been identified 
in past studies as an important feature of disclosure generally and in China specifically (Haw 
et al., 2006, 2000; McGee & Yuan, 2012; Park et al., 2013). In the US, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) requires that the 10-k form (annual report handed to the SEC, 
not to the shareholders) be filed at different deadlines depending on the size of the company. 
The three thresholds used are 60 days, 75 days and 90 days. Despite the fact that deadlines 
differ per firm size, the thresholds are used for indicative purposes for the "proactive" 
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disclosure measure. Therefore, less than 60 days is worth 0.5. Less than 75 days is worth 
0.35. Less than 90 days is worth 0.2. More than 90 days scores 0. Secondly, firms releasing 
quarterly profit forecasts, which is not mandatory but has been identified as crucial 
information by individual investors during exploratory interviews in Shanghai, are given an 
additional 0.5. 
Management incentive. This is an important measure in the principal-agent model 
to discipline management and align interests with shareholders, especially under conditions 
of dispersed ownership. Tying manager’s compensation to stock returns helps aligning their 
incentives on the interests of shareholders. Because information about incentive 
compensation is often incomplete and opaque in China, many authors have resorted to the 
basic share ownership of managers as a proxy for incentive alignment (Chen, 2001; Conyon 
& He, 2011; Gao & Kling, 2008; Li, Moshirian, Nguyen, & Tan, 2007). The measure 
adopted here uses a similar proxy, but takes the total market value of the shares at year-end 
instead of taking the simple quantity of shares. This translates more effectively the actual 
material incentives of managers. Because the distribution is highly skewed, the calibration 
follows a custom scale based on generic thresholds. More than 1 billion Yuan receives a 
score of 1. More than 100 million Yuan receives a score of 0.75. More than 1 million Yuan 
receives a score of 0.51. Less than 1 million Yuan receives a score of 0.25. 0 receives a score 
of 0. 
Large minority. This condition is measured as the combined proportion of shares 
held by the second to the 10th largest shareholders. This measure has often been used in the 
Chinese context as a proxy for the market for corporate control (Liu, 2006b), which is an 
integral component of outsider external control. It has also been used as a proxy for internal 
checks and balances to prevent controlling owners from expropriating the cash-flow of 
minority investors through related party transactions or other means (Huyghebaert & Wang, 
2012). The calibration employs the fsQCA calibration function based on thresholds set to 
the 5th, 50th and 95th percentile of the entire population: 3%, 20% and 48%. 
Large controlling shareholder (SH). Where the law and internal governance 
mechanisms do not enable small investors to discipline management, concentrated 
ownership tends to persist. In insider-controlled firms, a large controlling shareholder can 
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discipline management through direct internal monitoring. However, while a large 
controlling owner can prevent principal-agent problems, it can expose minority investors to 
principal-principal problems (Claessens et al., 2002; Jiang et al., 2010). Following many 
other studies, the measure is calculated as the proportion of shares held by the largest 
shareholder. The fsQCA function is used to calibrate the condition according to the 
thresholds set at the 5th, 50th and 95th percentile of the entire population: 13.5%, 33.5% and 
63.5%. 
Supervisory board. An active supervisory board is emblematic of insider-control 
systems, where such a board serves to reconcile the interests of multiple stakeholders. While 
the presence of the board is mandatory in China, the frequency of meetings is used as a 
measure of the relative level of activity and a proxy of vigilance. The significance of meeting 
frequency as an important measure of board vigilance and good governance has primarily 
been demonstrated for boards of directors. Meeting frequency has been associated with 
lower levels of discretionary earnings management (Xie et al., 2003) and better board 
operations leading to higher performance (Vafeas, 1999; for the supervisory board see Jia, 
Ding, Li, & Wu, 2009). The condition is calibrated as follows. Holding 8 meetings or more 
per year gives a firm a score of 1. 7 meetings provide a score of 0.8. 6 meetings (at least bi-
monthly) convert to a score of 0.6. 5 meetings convert to 0.4. 4 meetings convert to 0.2. 3 or 
less meetings convert to 0. 
Political leadership. This is a binary condition that takes the value 1 if either the 
CEO or the board Chairman holds an official position for the CCP outside the firm. This is 
a strong feature of China’s inherited system of central planning. Such measures of political 
connections firms’ CEOs and presidents have been used in multiple studies (Faccio, 2006; 
Fan et al., 2007). The data was coded using the GTA corporate governance database on 
individuals in Chinese listed firms, which provides information on concurrent positions held 
outside the firm by directors, supervisors and top executives. An individual is coded as 
politically embedded if he held a political position within any organization (i.e. CCP 
committee member) or any position in a political organization (i.e. National People’s 
Congress). 
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Political connections. This item is a second measure of political embeddedness. As 
opposed to the previous one which focuses on the leadership (CEO and board chairperson), 
this condition takes into account political involvement among all the top individuals. Top 
individuals here include every members of the board of directors, members of the board of 
supervisors and any other top executive whose profile is disclosed in the annual report. As 
stated in the previous sections, political embeddedness is expected to reduce the 
effectiveness of mechanisms based on the primacy of shareholders. In the literature reviewed 
for this article, no other study was found that measured the impact of political connections 
with such width including all top individuals in large samples of firms. For the calibration, 
a score of 1 is given for 4 or more connections, 0.75 is given for 2 or 3 connections, 0.51 is 
given for 1 connection, and 0 converts to 0. 
Enabling shareholders’ (SH) meeting. This condition is only used in the sample 
of private firms because it is widely acknowledged that, especially in SOEs, shareholder’s 
meetings are nothing more than a ceremonial manifestation with no decision making power 
(Berkman et al., 2010). It measures the openness to outsider effective participation during 
shareholder’s meetings to allow minority investors to voice their concerns and preferences 
and to monitor the board of directors. A firm obtains a score of 1 if it implements any or 
both of the following enabling measures during the official annual shareholder meeting: 
distance voting through electronic means, or cumulative voting. A score of 0.51 is given if 
any or both of these measures are implemented during an extraordinary shareholder meeting 
over the course of the year. Otherwise, the score is 0. 
SASAC. The final condition only applies to the SOEs sample. It is a binary variable 
if the SOE is ultimately controlled by the central State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) of the State Council or by an entity managed by it. 
Presumably, such firms would be more curtailed from political objectives and adopt a more 
rigorous shareholder value orientation. 
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Table 13. Descriptive statistics of variables used in the models for private firms 
and SOEs 
 
 
4.5 Analysis 
In the set theoretic approach, the first step involves the creation of a truth table that lists all 
the theoretically possible combinations of conditions. For a model involving nine conditions, 
there are 512 possible combinations. It should be noted that, while all combinations of 
characteristics can be studied conceptually, not all configurations are observed empirically. 
Some combinations might simply be impossible, and others just absent from the field. The 
absence of empirical observations for a configuration is called limited diversity (Ragin, 
1987, 2000). Analyzing such absence of paths is relevant to explicit the incompatibility of 
attributes. Fiss (2007) also argues that identifying configurations that are close to the 
outcome set, but absent empirically, can provide ground for exploring new possible 
organizational designs. For each combination, the truth table displays the observed 
frequency, which is the number of cases that display this particular combination. It also 
provides the consistency, which generally represents the proportion of cases that are part of 
the outcome set. 
Mean Std.Dev Min Max Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Performance (ROA) 0.05 0.07 -0.54 0.71 0.04 0.07 -0.21 0.79
Proportion of independents on BOD 0.37 0.05 0.20 0.60 0.37 0.06 0.25 0.80
Disclosure
     Days to release of annual report 89 22 20 120 88 21 19 120
     Release of quarterly profit forecast 0.55 0.40
Management shareholding (mn RMB) 603 1366 0 27145 44 264 0 4087
Supervisory board meetings 5.24 1.79 1 15 4.87 1.52 1 13
Share of the largest shareholder 0.34 0.15 0.04 0.96 0.38 0.16 0.04 0.84
Share of the 2nd to 10th shareholder 0.26 0.14 0.01 0.66 0.17 0.12 0.01 0.61
Political leadership 0.13 0.29
Political ties 0.53 0.85 0 5 1.54 1.85 0 12
Shareholder meeting* 0.53
Controlled by SASAC 0.27
* Takes  va lue 1 i f onl ine voting and/or cumulative voting was  used in any shareholder meeting.
b  i  n  a  r  y
b  i  n  a  r  y
Private SOE
b  i  n  a  r  y
b  i  n  a  r  y
b  i  n  a  r  y
b  i  n  a  r  y
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The second step involves the selection of a minimum frequency threshold to eliminate 
combinations with too few cases and a minimum consistency cut-off to identify which 
configurations belong in the solution set. The frequency threshold must balance the need to 
avoid that cases become their own configuration in order to keep the solution to a 
manageable size, but to still allow a large proportion of cases in the analysis. While in small-
N studies the frequency threshold is often set at 1 to include every case (ex: Meuer, 2014), 
in large-N studies, the rule of thumb is to set the threshold at a minimum of 3, while aiming 
to leave about 80% of the sample in the analysis (Greckhamer et al., 2013). For the 
consistency cut-off, a minimum of .75 (Ragin, 2008a, 2008b) or .8 (Fiss, 2011) is suggested, 
but studies have used cut-offs as high as .95 (Epstein et al., 2008). The consistency and 
frequency thresholds influence the overall coverage of a solution and its overall consistency. 
The coverage of a path (a combination of characteristics that produces the outcome) is the 
proportion of all cases that display this configuration among the membership set of the 
outcome variable (Ragin, 2006). Coverage therefore provides a measure of the relative 
importance of a particular path, interpreted in a comparable way as the explained R2 in 
statistics. In order to remove bias, a process of iteration helped choosing the frequency and 
consistency thresholds. A table documents the product of the overall coverage and overall 
consistency of the solution for every possible combination of frequency and consistency 
thresholds, changing the frequency by 1 and the consistency by 1%. In order to facilitate 
interpretation, solutions that contained 10 or more solutions were excluded. Given the large 
sample size, solutions that displayed an overall consistency of less than 85% were also 
excluded. The solution that maximized the product of the overall solution coverage and 
consistency indicated the frequency and consistency thresholds.  
During the third and last step in the analysis, the truth table algorithm uses Boolean algebra 
to achieve logical reduction of statements according to their commonalities. The fsQCA 
software provides three separate outputs: the complex, the parsimonious and the 
intermediate solutions. Like in most other studies, the results presented below are based on 
the intermediate solution, which only uses plausible reduction assumptions drawn from the 
theory and inputted by the researcher. The resulting solution strikes a balance between 
interpretability and complexity, thus allowing analyzing core and peripheral causal 
conditions. Fiss (2011) introduces the use of fuzzy set analysis to uncover the core and 
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peripheral causal conditions within organizational configurations, identifying the 
characteristics that display strong and weak causal relationships with the outcome. His study 
refers to typologies of organizational design that can involve more than one marginally 
different, yet mostly similar, configurations. Fiss (2011) also introduces the concept of 
neutral permutations to describe peripheral causal conditions that are supplementary to each 
other. For instance, a configuration typology would include a few stable conditions that are 
densely connected to and reinforced by peripheral conditions that can be mutually 
interchangeable. Neutral permutations can be used for the “exploration of viable strategic 
alternatives, particularly with a focus on understanding intratype similarities and 
dissimilarities” (Fiss, 2011: 398; Reger & Huff, 1993). Distinct typologies defined primarily 
by their core attributes are deemed to be of first order equifinality while interchangeable 
peripheral conditions refer to second order equifinality. In the present study, the 
identification of core and peripheral conditions was based on an analysis of commonalities 
between configurations in the solution. 
The notation for results suggested by Ragin and Fiss (2008) takes the form of a table with 
the causal conditions in the lines and the resulting configurations in the columns. The cells 
contain black dots to indicate the presence of the corresponding causal condition in a 
configuration, while a crossed circle signals its absence. Also, large black dots and crossed 
circles indicate core conditions while small ones are peripheral (Fiss, 2011). It should be 
noted that absence in this context means that the absence of the corresponding characteristic 
is required in the configuration. Empty cells mean that the absence or presence of the 
corresponding condition has no impact in a configuration. In the interpretation, empty cells 
are interesting to understand the robustness of certain configurations in the face of change. 
For instance, if the condition munificence has no impact, a particular configuration can be 
expected to remain conducive to the outcome even if market growth slows down. 
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5 RESULTS 
5.1 Sample of Private Firms 
The first part of the analysis uses the fsQCA software to analyze the configurations that lead 
to above average performance in a sample of 942 private firms. The intermediate solution 
used here relies on theoretically-driven assumptions about some conditions. Assumptions 
were only included in the cases that were strongly supported by the literature: executive 
incentives, shareholders’ rights and large minority investors are expected to be “present” in 
configurations leading to performance. The truth table constructed by the software contains 
512 theoretically possible combinations of conditions. To determine which combinations 
would be part of the model, the thresholds that maximized the product of overall coverage 
and overall consistency in the solution were a minimum frequency of 4 and a consistency 
threshold of 0.93. The minimum frequency of 4 leaves 69% of cases in the analysis, which 
is slightly below the ideal of 80% suggested in the literature but still keeps a reasonable 
number of cases given the size of the sample. Table 14 presents the configurations that 
resulted from the analysis. The final solution contains nine causal paths to performance and 
covers 49.6% of the outcome subset. The overall consistency of the solution of 90.4% is 
very high. This means that there are indeed dominant models of successful private firms in 
the Chinese landscape. The nine causal paths were grouped in the table according to their 
commonalities. This produces four categories of configurations to which labels were 
attributed based on interpretation. Many configurations come in two distinct versions 
(marked a and b) that differ according to the peripheral conditions. These versions result in 
second-order equifinality involving functional equivalents. For example, this can be 
observed in the neutral permutations between supervisory board (1a) and board 
independence (1b) in the Market pressure model or between management incentives (3a) 
and proactive disclosure (3b) in the Insider-control model. Each configuration is discussed 
in detail below. 
142_Erim BW Tremblay_Stand.job
142 
 
Table 14. Configurations leading to performance in private firms 
 
Table 15 exhibits a number of descriptive statistics specific to the four configurations and 
the whole sample. They include the number of firms covered, geographic location, industry 
groupings and selected statistics. For the location, provinces are grouped in regions as 
follow: East (Anhui, Fujian, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Shandong, Shanghai and Zhejiang), North 
(Beijing, Hebei, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi and Tianjin), Northeast (Heilongjiang, Jilin and 
Liaoning), Northwest (Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi and Xinjiang), South Central 
(Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Henan, Hubei and Hunan) and Southwest (Chongqing, 
Guizhou, Sichuan, Tibet and Yunnan). Industries are aggregated into three categories: low 
value production (agriculture, food, textile, paper and metals), high value manufacturing 
(petrochemical transformation, electronics, machinery, pharmaceuticals and other 
manufacturing) and services (construction, IT, retail, real estate, social services, media and 
conglomerates). The other descriptive statistics included in the table are the average firm 
size (total assets), average firm age, average size of the board of directors, average number 
Causal conditions 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4 5a 5b
Board independence ø • ● ● •
Enabling SH meetings ● ● ø ● ●
Proactive disclosure ● ● ● ● • ø ● ●
Management incentives ● ● • • ● ● ●
Large minority shareholders ● ● • ● ● ● ● ●
Large controlling shareholder ● ● ● ● ø •
Supervisory board • ø • ø ø ● ø
Political leadership ø ø ø ø ø ø ø ● ●
Political connections ø ø ø ø ø ø ø ● ●
Raw coverage 0,23 0,2 0,1 0,14 0,23 0,22 0,19 0,04 0,02
Unique coverage 0,04 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,02 0
Consistency 0,93 0,93 0,93 0,92 0,93 0,93 0,92 0,94 0,94
Overall coverage: 0.496 Overall consistency: 0.904
●= core (present), ø= core (absent), •= peripheral (present), ø= peripheral (absent)
Market 
pressure
Outsiders' 
voice
Insider-control
Politically 
embedded
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of meetings of the board per year and the proportion of firms that display CEO duality (board 
chairman and CEO is the same person). Other statistics were gathered and are used 
selectively in the detailed description of configurations below. 
Table 15. Descriptive statistics: Configurations in sample of private firms 
 
Configuration 1: market pressure. This configuration covers 97 firms, with paths 
1a and 1b covering respectively 59 and 38 firms. Like nearly all causal paths in the table, 
this configuration excludes any form of political connections. Apart from the absence of 
political leadership and political connections generally, the core conditions of this 
configuration consist of the presence of large minority shareholders, the presence of 
proactive disclosure and the presence of management incentives. These three conditions 
Market 
pressure
Outsiders' 
voice
Insider-
control
Politically 
embedded
Number of firms 942 97 34 76 23
Location
East 44,6% 47,4% 47,1% 55,3% 60,9%
North 10,5% 8,2% 8,8% 10,5% 8,7%
Northeast 4,0% 3,1% 5,9% 1,3% 4,3%
Northwest 3,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Southcentral 30,1% 37,1% 38,2% 31,6% 21,7%
Southwest 7,2% 4,1% 0,0% 1,3% 4,3%
Industry
Low value 21,3% 13,4% 29,4% 21,1% 34,8%
high value 49,3% 61,9% 41,2% 59,2% 52,2%
Services 29,4% 24,7% 29,4% 19,7% 13,0%
Other average stats
Size (assets, mn RMB) 2728 2239 3100 2230 2913
Firm age (years) 10,08 6,11 6,32 5,04 6,96
Board size (members) 8,55 8,43 7,82 8,37 8,61
Board meetings (yearly) 8,94 9,09 10,74 7,89 9,96
CEO duality 33,7% 43,3% 32,4% 43,4% 34,8%
Sample
Configurations
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together resonate with the typical corporate governance bundle found in outsider control 
systems that discipline the firm through market pressure, providing informed shareholders 
with an effective exit option and aligning the interests of managers with those of any other 
small investors. Specifically, the presence of large minority investors complemented by 
proactive disclosure ensures effective pressure from market forces, much like the discipline 
instilled by a healthy market for corporate control. Also, the fact that this configuration leads 
to performance regardless of the proportion of shares of the largest shareholder suggests that 
a high level of management shareholding is an effective mechanism to reduce potential 
principal-agent problems. The core conditions are complemented by peripheral and mutually 
exclusive elements involving either an independent board (1b) or an active supervisory 
board (1a). The presence of these peripheral conditions suggests that this configuration needs 
a minimal level of internal oversight. Following insights from the literature on the outsider 
control system, the predicted compatible condition would be the presence of independent 
directors to increase the level of board vigilance. Yet, there is a possible neutral permutation 
between board independence and an active supervisory board, suggesting that these two 
conditions can act as functional equivalents. A possible interpretation for this finding is that 
the professionalization of corporate governance in recent years has enabled the supervisory 
board under certain circumstances to perform the monitoring role typically expected from 
an independent board of directors. However, the fact that these two conditions are mutually 
exclusive suggests that, in the context of the market pressure model, this monitoring role 
must be carried out by either of the two boards but not both.  
The reliance on market forces is coherent with the fact that firms with this configuration are 
disproportionately present in the two industries with the highest stock turnover ratio 
(electronics and other manufacturing) while they are nearly absent from the two industries 
with the lowest stock turnover ratio (retail and food production). Similarly, it is not 
surprising that this configuration has the highest average shareholding by investment funds 
(15.6% compared to an average of 13.2% in the rest of the solution set), which are known 
for short term orientation. Generally, firms in configuration 1 are found predominantly in 
high value manufacturing industries and are scarcely present in low value production. In the 
services, it is interesting to note that configuration 1b covers 40% of firms in IT services in 
the solution set (10 out of 25). In terms of location, there is a slight overrepresentation in the 
145_Erim BW Tremblay_Stand.job
145 
 
South Central region. Configuration 1a covers 4 out of 6 firms in the Southwest in the 
solution set. Overall, configuration 1 is the closest to the outsider control ideal type model 
with features of proactive disclosure, management incentives and a relatively dispersed 
ownership structure that provides a disciplining effect from market forces. 
Configuration 2: outsiders’ voice. Paths 2a and 2b respectively cover 22 and 27 
firms. Like the previous one, this configuration is also devoid of political connections. Its 
core features include the dominance of the largest shareholder and the presence of 
participation mechanisms available to external investors within the governance structure. 
Minority shareholders have enabling instruments at their disposal to participate during 
annual meetings, have access to timely information and are represented by a critical mass of 
independent directors on the board. This suggests that the large controlling shareholder faces 
enough scrutiny to forego potential excesses of appropriation of private benefits of control. 
While ownership concentration in the hands of the largest shareholder is associated with an 
insider-control system, the three elements described above (shareholder meeting, disclosure 
and board independence) are typical of an outsider-control system, which results in a hybrid 
form of internal discipline by a dominant owner and external discipline through outsiders’ 
voice. Apart from these core conditions, there is a neutral permutation, this time not mutually 
exclusive, between large minority shareholders in path 2b and management incentives with 
an active supervisory board in path 2a. It is worth pointing out that every single causal path 
in the solution exhibits either management incentives or the combination of a large 
controlling shareholder, large minority shareholders and proactive disclosure. This suggests 
that containing agency costs requires either highly concentrated ownership among the top 
10 shareholders with informed minority holders or significant management shareholding. 
This explains the observed permutation between management incentives and large minority 
shareholders in configuration 2. 
Further supporting the reliance on voice mechanism is the fact that the operations of the 
board of directors in this configuration increase the level of board vigilance. Configuration 
2 has the highest average number of board meetings and the smallest average board size, 
which has been found to contribute to effective monitoring (Cheng, Evans, & Nagarajan, 
2008; Jensen, 1993; Jia et al., 2009; Yermack, 1996). This is especially salient in 
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configuration 2a, which has the smallest board of directors on average (7.4 members) 
holding the most meetings (11.4). Similarly, it shows the lowest rate of CEO duality, which 
further supports the level of board vigilance. Also, firms in this configuration present the 
highest average foreign shareholding in the form of strategic investments (5.2% compared 
to 3.1% in the rest of the solution set). In the Chinese context, the foreign parties involved 
in such investments typically adopt a long term orientation and are usually more used to 
participating in a firm’s governance than domestic ones. In terms of location, firms in 
configuration 2 are disproportionately present in South Central China, especially in the 
province of Guangdong where 40% of firms covered by configuration 2b are based. 
Configuration 2 is overrepresented in the low value production industries and 37% of firms 
covered by path 2b are in services. To sum up, configuration 2 presents a hybrid form 
between the outsider-control system with its concentrated ownership and the outsider-
control systems with effective participation mechanisms for shareholders, including an 
enabling shareholder meeting, proactive disclosure and an independent board. 
Configurations 3 and 4: insider-control. Three paths are covered in this category 
grouped in two separate configurations: 3a, 3b and 4, respectively covering 56, 41 and 9 
firms. As with the previous ones, the configurations in this category require the absence of 
political connections. The first configuration (3a & 3b) involves highly concentrated 
ownership (large minority shareholders and large controlling shareholder) and an inactive 
supervisory board. Path 3a presents an insiders’ alliance between large minority 
shareholders, a dominant controlling owner and managers owning stocks. In path 3b, in the 
absence of management incentive like in configuration 2, proactive disclosure represents a 
functional equivalent enabling large minority shareholders to be effective watchdogs. 
Configuration 4 also falls under the heading of insider-control configurations, with the 
difference that it exhibits more ownership dispersion because of the absence of a dominant 
shareholder. This suggests an alliance of multiple large minority shareholders that are 
probably directly involved in management. In this sense, management incentives are 
effective to contain principal-agent problems. This seems to loosely follow the model of a 
family business with scarce disclosure, closed governance, and the presence of an active two 
tier board to solve the collective action problems among multiple stakeholders with long 
term interests. 
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Successful insider-control configurations appear predominantly in Eastern provinces, 
especially in Jiangsu and Zhejiang where 40% of firms in configuration 3 are located. The 
firms covered are disproportionately present in the high value manufacturing industries. Path 
3a covers nearly half of the firms in petrochemical manufacturing in the solution set (15 out 
of 33). Still, it also covers half of the firms in agriculture (3 out of 6). On average, firms in 
this path are by far the youngest (4.5 years). 5 out of 9 firms covered by configuration 4 are 
in IT services. Overall, configurations 3 and 4 are the closest forms among private 
enterprises to the insider-control ideal type system with a concentrated ownership and very 
few OECD-prescribed corporate governance practices. 
Configuration 5: Politically embedded. This configuration offers the only model 
involving political connections in the solution set for private firms. Paths 5a and 5b 
respectively cover 17 and 10 firms. The first striking feature is that despite the fact that at 
least twice more firms have political connections than political leadership, political 
leadership is necessary in the only two paths involving political embeddedness in the 
solution set for private firms. Also, nearly all best practices from the outsider-control system 
must be present for this model of politically connected private firms to achieve performance, 
including proactive disclosure, management incentives and enabling shareholders meetings. 
The combination of multiple elements of the outsider-control system with political 
connections akin to the multiplex relationships typically found in insider-control systems 
represents a creative hybrid form that balances the OECD-like best practices of corporate 
governance with features of political governance inherited from the Chinese past. Apart from 
these core conditions, path 5b includes a large controlling owner. As discussed in the 
literature review, a large controlling shareholder can be necessary to contain undue political 
influence. Interestingly, there is a neutral permutation between a large controlling 
shareholder and board independence (path 5a). This offers the possibility that a critical mass 
of independent directors may act as a functional equivalent to a large controlling shareholder 
regarding the task of maintaining adverse political pressures in check.  
Although 60% of firms covered by configuration 5 are in Eastern provinces, none is based 
in Shanghai. 30% of paths 5a and 5b are located in Zhejiang province. While this 
configuration is disproportionately present in low value production, 65% of firms covered 
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by path 5a operate in high value manufacturing industries. Overall, configuration 5 
represents a hybrid form between political governance and the outsider-control ideal type 
system, featuring both political connections and corporate governance best practices such as 
proactive disclosure, management incentives and enabling shareholder meetings. 
 
5.2 Sample of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
The second section of the empirical analysis concerns the sample of 810 state-owned 
enterprises. As in the previous section, set theoretic analysis operationalized through fsQCA 
is used to identify configurations that lead to above average firm performance. To produce 
the intermediate solution reported below, theoretically driven assumptions were set in the 
model. For purposes of comparability, the same assumptions used in the first section were 
kept in the model for SOEs: executive incentives and large minority shareholders were both 
marked as present. The third assumption in the first section concerned shareholders meeting 
procedures. As explained earlier, this is the only condition that is not included in the present 
section. It is replaced by the condition SASAC, which signals that the firm is ultimately 
controlled by the central SASAC. Based on the extent literature, this condition was also 
marked as present. The six remaining conditions were left as present or absent. To select 
the combinations to be used in the analysis out of the 512 theoretically possible combinations 
appearing in the truth table, the minimum frequency and the consistency threshold were 
selected through a process of iteration aimed at maximizing the overall coverage and overall 
consistency of the solution. The resulting frequency cut-off of 3 left 74% of all cases in the 
model. A consistency threshold of .9 was used. 
Table 16 below presents the resulting solution set containing five configurations grouped 
into three categories. Three configurations contain two separate versions for a total of eight 
causal paths. The overall consistency of 90.4% is coincidentally exactly equal to that of the 
sample of private firms. However, the overall coverage of the solution is much lower at 
29.5%. This remains within an acceptable range. With a comparable sample, Fiss (2011) 
reported solutions with overall coverages of 27% and 36%. Still, this lower coverage 
indicates that there is more dispersion among successful SOEs in a multitude of 
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configurations. The causal paths identified here are the dominant ones, but this does not 
disqualify other potential combinations leading to performance. Still, while the causal paths 
presented in the previous section covered a number of firms ranging from 9 to 59, the 
coverage here ranges from 3 to 20 firms. While analyzing these configurations provide valid 
insights about the bundles of practices used by successful firms, the reader should keep in 
mind that these causal paths are observed in a more limited number of cases. 
Table 16. Configurations leading to performance in SOEs 
 
Table 17 provides descriptive statistics specific to the three groups of configurations and the 
comparison with the sample of SOEs. The statistics reported here are the same as in the 
previous section, including the number of firms covered, the geographic location, the 
aggregate industrial sector, and selected other data points (firm size, firm age, BOD size, 
number of BOD meetings and CEO duality). It is worth noting that the sample of SOEs is 
more evenly distributed across all Chinese regions than the sample of private firms, which 
was more concentrated in the Eastern and South Central regions. The industrial sector is also 
Causal conditions 1 2a 2b 3a 3b 4 5a 5b
Board independence ø ø • ø ø ø ø •
Proactive disclosure ● ø ● ● ● ø •
Management incentives ● • •
Large minority shareholders ● ● ● • • ● ●
Large controlling shareholder ø ø ø ● ● ● ● ●
Supervisory board • • ø • ø ø •
Political leadership ø ø ø ø ø ø ø •
Political connections • • ø • • ● ●
SASAC ø ø ø ● ●
Raw coverage 0,108 0,084 0,1 0,135 0,117 0,082 0,044 0,021
Unique coverage 0,018 0,004 0,011 0,013 0,002 0,023 0,014 0,021
Consistency 0,914 0,902 0,905 0,907 0,914 0,909 0,893 0,927
●= core (present), ø= core (absent), •= peripheral (present), ø= peripheral (absent)
External pressure Insider-control
National 
champions
Overall coverage: 0.295 Overall consistency: 0.904
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slightly less concentrated in the high value manufacturing. Finally, SOEs generally exhibit 
a much larger average size (10 806 million RMB compared to 2 728). SOEs are also older, 
with an average age of 13.7 years compared to 10.1 years in the private sector. The difference 
is much larger when considering the average age of firms that appear in the solution sets of 
profitable firms: 11.7 years for SOEs VS 5.9 years for private firms.  
Table 17. Descriptive statistics: Configurations in sample of SOEs 
 
Configurations 1 and 2: external pressure. This category covers three causal paths 
present in two configurations: 1, 2a and 2b, which respectively cover 20, 11 and 4 firms. 
These configurations are primarily characterized by the fact that the largest shareholder 
holds a relatively small proportion of shares and by the presence of large minority 
External 
pressure
Insider-
control
National 
champions
Number of firms 810 28 18 6
Location
East 36,8% 46,4% 44,4% 33,3%
North 17,5% 10,7% 16,7% 16,7%
Northeast 7,2% 3,6% 5,6% 16,7%
Northwest 8,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Southcentral 21,6% 28,6% 16,7% 16,7%
Southwest 8,9% 10,7% 16,7% 16,7%
Industry
Low value 24,2% 17,9% 11,1% 0,0%
high value 42,5% 50,0% 50,0% 83,3%
Services 33,3% 32,1% 38,9% 16,7%
Other average stats
Size (assets, mn RMB) 10806 5826 6761 11929
Firm age (years) 13,68 12,64 10,44 11,33
Board size (members) 9,30 9,75 9,33 10,67
Board meetings 8,72 9,46 8,50 7,67
CEO duality 9,5% 14,3% 16,7% 0,0%
Sample
Configurations
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shareholders. In other words, the state agency controlling the firm is not overly dominant in 
terms of shareholding compared to other investors. Yet, configurations 1 and 2 differ on the 
mechanisms used to discipline the firm to achieve performance. Although both are subject 
to a form of external pressure, configuration 1 relies on market forces while configuration 2 
relies on political steering. Configuration 1 is very similar to the first configuration observed 
in the solution set of private firms, involving market pressure. Indeed, large minority 
shareholders enjoy timely information disclosure that enable more efficient monitoring. This 
is coupled with management incentives to align the interests of decision makers with those 
of external investors. The fact that configuration 1 does not involve political connections 
while relying on market pressure makes it the closest to the outsider-control model. 
Configuration 2, on the other hand, does not rely on disclosure but rather on political 
connections and an active supervisory board. As predicted by theory, a supervisory board 
can play an important role to balance the interests of powerful stakeholders such as 
politically connected agents. As already observed in configuration 5 in the solution set for 
private firms, configuration 2 provides evidence that political connections are not 
necessarily complementary with a large controlling shareholder. However, like in most paths 
in the solution set, configurations 1 and 2 exclude a politically connected leadership. 
In the absence of a large controlling shareholder, management incentives in paths 1 and 2a 
help mitigating principal-agent problems. Path 2b is the only one across both solution sets 
of private firms and SOEs that does not involve either management incentives or very 
concentrated ownership. It is worth reiterating the fact that the presence of politically 
involved individuals can discipline managers and pressure them to conform to guidelines. 
Also, as observed in politically embedded private firms earlier, the presence of an 
independent board in this diverging path (2b) may play an important role to curtail undue 
political influence in the absence of a large controlling shareholder. While firms covered by 
path 2a do not involve board independence, they hold the highest average number of board 
meetings (10.5 compared to 8.5 in the rest of the solution set). External pressure 
configurations are disproportionately present in Eastern China and in the South Central 
region, which resembles the location of successful private firms. Overall, configuration 1 is 
the closest among SOEs to the outsider-control ideal type system with a dispersed ownership 
structure and best corporate governance practices including proactive disclosure and 
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management incentives. Configuration 2 conforms to the heritage of political governance, 
with political connections and an active supervisory board. Its dispersed ownership structure 
shows that politically embedded forms of governance do not necessarily require ownership 
concentration. 
Configurations 3 and 4: insider-control. Insider-control configurations concern 
paths 3a, 3b and 4, which respectively cover 6, 5 and 7 firms. The defining feature of 
configurations 3 and 4 is that they rely on a large proportion of shares held by the controlling 
owner. The use of proactive disclosure as a core condition suggests a need for a form of 
external oversight. This however does not translate into effective participation by outsiders 
like in the outsiders’ voice model for private firms since they all rely on an insider-dominated 
board of directors. Configurations 3 and 4 differ in the previously identified mechanisms 
used to curtail principal-agent problems. Indeed, paths 3a and 3b rely on very concentrated 
ownership involving the additional presence of large minority shareholders, while path 4 
uses management incentives. The combination of management incentives and political 
connections in configuration 4, which was also observed in path 2a, falsifies the theoretical 
prediction that these two elements are incompatible. Finally, the two causal paths observed 
in configuration 3 display a neutral permutation involving wither the presence of two 
conditions together, or their absence: political connections and an active board of 
supervisors. Specifically, while both of these conditions are present in path 3b, they are both 
absent in path 3a. This mirrors the complementarities already observed between these two 
elements in configuration 2, supporting the idea that the supervisory board can play a role 
to coordinate the interests of diverse stakeholders.  
On average, firms covered by insider-control configurations are quite evenly distributed 
across geographic regions, with a slight overrepresentation in Eastern provinces. They are 
underrepresented in low value production industries. Four out of five firms covered by path 
3b operate in high value manufacturing industries. Also, five out of seven firms covered by 
configuration 4 are in services. Surprisingly, firms in configuration 3 that involve political 
connections (3b) are much younger on average (8.5 years VS 14.5 years) than firms without 
political connections (3a). This shows that features of political governance inherited from 
the past are not necessarily concentrated in older firms. To sum up, configurations 3 and 4 
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are the closest forms to the insider-control ideal type system with very concentrated 
ownership and few best practices of corporate governance, with the exception of proactive 
disclosure. 
Configuration 5: national champions. Configuration 5 concerns paths 5a and 5b, 
which both only cover 3 firms. The defining feature of this configuration is that it applies to 
firms ultimately controlled by the central asset management agency, the SASAC. They 
display strong features from the insider-control system, including political connections and 
very concentrated ownership by both the controlling owner and large minority shareholders. 
However, paths 5a and 5b rely on peripheral conditions that offer wildly different 
combinations of conditions that both involve some form of hybridization.  
Path 5b involves the presence of features from both the insider- and the outsider-control 
systems. On the one hand, they rely on board independence and proactive disclosure, which 
strengthens the formal mechanisms of external oversight. On the other hand, they rely on an 
active supervisory board and are the only firms in the solution set that have a politically 
connected leadership. It should be noted that the only other path in the solution set of SEOs 
that involves board independence (2b) also relies on an active supervisory board and political 
connections. Apart from these two, every other path in the solution displays insider-
dominated boards. This suggests that independent directors in state-owned firms might not 
play a typical role of monitoring in the name of small investors. Path 5a exhibits the exact 
opposite peripheral conditions of path 5b, relying on the absence of both external oversight 
(board independence and proactive disclosure) and the insider-control elements (political 
leadership and an active supervisory board). While these firms did let go the heritage of 
political governance, they do not buy into OECD-inspired best practices of corporate 
governance.  
On top of relying on an insider-dominated board, path 5a displays the highest average board 
size (11 directors VS 9.6 in the rest of the solution set) and the fewest board meetings (6 VS 
9.1), which is predicted to reduce board vigilance. Also, firms in path 5a are much older than 
firms in 5b (15 VS 7 years). The six firms in the national champions configuration present 
by far the largest average size across both sections of the empirical analysis. They are not 
geographically concentrated but nearly all operated in high value manufacturing industries. 
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All three firms covered by path 5a are in petrochemical manufacturing. Overall, 
configuration 5 leans more towards the insider-control ideal type system relying on 
concentrated ownership, with features of political governance. Where the corporate 
leadership is also politically connected, firms adopt more practices that usually belong to 
outsider-control systems, presenting a creative hybrid between the three models discussed 
in the literature. 
 
5.3 Additional General Findings 
Apart from the detailed presentation of each configuration, a number of important general 
findings deserve additional discussion. Primarily, the results of the configuration analysis 
clearly show a healthy level of heterogeneity of forms of corporate governance in the 
Chinese domestic market. Both private firms and SOEs use models that lean towards both 
insider-control systems and insider-control systems. Several instances of hybridization 
involving elements of both archetypes in creative governance forms are observed. A 
surprising finding concerns the fact that there are more configurations in the SOEs sample 
than in the private firms sample involving the absence of a very large controlling owner. It 
was predicted that ownership dispersion was complementary with western best practices of 
corporate governance. It appears that there is a larger diversity of governance forms in state 
firms that rely to some extent on ownership dispersion. Counter to the expectation that 
ownership dispersion is to be found in outsider-control systems, two of those three 
configurations involve political connections and an active supervisory board. This 
unexpected hybrid form testifies for the fertile ground for experimentation in the Chinese 
organizational landscape. Two other examples of hybrids are found in the sample of private 
firms. The outsiders’ voice configuration involves the presence of participation mechanisms 
for external investors such as an independent board, proactive disclosure and an enabling 
shareholder meeting in firms that have a large controlling shareholder. Also, politically 
embedded private firms display nearly every best practice of corporate governance 
prescribed by the OECD. 
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Secondly, many configurations rely on functional equivalents, which are observed through 
neutral permutations of peripheral conditions across causal paths. The results show that 
principal-agent problems can be mitigated by either highly concentrated ownership or by 
management incentives. Also, undue political pressure can be mitigated by either ownership 
concentration or, in the absence of a dominant controlling owner, by an independent board. 
While different conditions can play a similar role, a condition can have different functions 
in different contexts. It appears that the supervisory board, when it is effectively active, plays 
a different role in private firms and SOEs. While many politically embedded configurations 
in SOEs rely on supervisory boards as a broker of interests among stakeholders, the boards 
are absent or insignificant in the two politically connected configurations of private firms.  
Thirdly, political connections are still playing an important role in the Chinese corporate 
elite. In particular, 5 of the 8 causal paths identified for the SOEs sample involved political 
connections. In fact, for SOEs, there is at least one politically embedded version of each 
model in the solution. Also, the only two politically embedded configurations in the first 
sample involve political leadership, whereas SOEs use multiple models in which political 
connections are core conditions while political leadership is absent. This demonstrates that 
the dominant models of successful SOEs must hire unaffiliated leadership to reliably achieve 
performance. On the other hand, political leadership in private firms seems to benefit from 
centrality in the decision making power, possibly to exert more control on the other 
politically involved individuals among the top personnel. 
Fourthly, the overall effects of three conditions deserve additional attention. Large minority 
shareholders are present and are often a core condition in nearly all the causal paths. In both 
solution sets, the presence of large minority shareholders appears to be a quasi-necessary 
condition. Their role is obviously different across distinct configurations, sometimes 
embodying the threat of the market for corporate control, sometimes monitoring controlling 
owners from the outside, and sometimes being an active part in insider-control models. Also, 
disclosure is a present condition in a majority of models in both samples, with very few 
configurations relying on the absence of proactive disclosure. Finally, management 
incentives are generally much more effective in private firms than in SOEs. Even in the 
models involving political leadership, management shareholding seems to play a critical 
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role. In SOEs, the only configuration including political leadership evidently also involves 
political appointment, which ties the overall compensation to political agencies. 
Fifthly, one further remark worth mentioning concerns some specific effects of political 
embeddedness on private firms. It has been argued that politically connected firms might 
enjoy preferential access to capital in the form of bank loans. Some further analysis was 
conducted to test this assertion. The fact that the firms covered by the politically embedded 
configuration in the sample of private firms present the highest leverage ratio of liabilities 
to total assets (.42 compared with .27 in the rest of the solution set) seems to support this 
prediction. Also, the fact that this configuration contains the only two paths that involve 
political embeddedness in the sample of private firms and covers only 11% of firms within 
the solution set raises the question whether this inherited but persistent feature can be 
expected to vanish in the future. While a longitudinal analysis falls outside the boundaries 
of the present study, two measures of growth potential were used to assess whether the 
success of these firms is likely to carry on. Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes (2003) use the 
market to book ratio as a proxy for investment opportunities. The other proxy, inspired from 
Fan et al. (2007), uses the future sales growth as another proxy (sales at t+1 / sales). Firms 
covered by configuration 5 display the highest market to book ratio (2.81 compared to 2.67 
in the rest of the solution set) and the highest future sales growth (1.41 compared with 1.26 
for the others). This suggests that politically embedded private firms can not only exhibit 
above average performance, but present thriving business prospects. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
This paper has sought to bridge the literatures on comparative corporate governance and on 
political embeddedness to study the heterogeneity of forms of corporate governance at the 
firm level that lead to economic performance in a transition economy. The elements of 
corporate governance incorporated in the model are derived from two archetypes of control 
systems (Franks & Mayer, 1997; Garcia-Castro et al., 2013; Jenkinson & Mayer, 1992): the 
insider-control system, which relies on ownership concentration and a two-tier board to 
coordinate the interests of powerful stakeholders, and the outsider-control system, which 
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defines the Anglo-American model involving typical Western best-practices including board 
independence, incentive compensation, a market for corporate control and ownership 
dispersion. The use of such models at the firm level is warranted by Whitley’s (2006) work 
showing that heterogeneity can be observed within a domestic market and the tradition of 
research on hybrid forms in transition economies (Boisot & Child, 1996; Nee, 1992). These 
creative forms may involve different practices that act as functional equivalents (Ahlering 
& Deakin, 2007), including China-specific features of political embeddedness inherited 
from the socialist past (Wong et al., 2004). 
China indeed offers a well suited institutional environment to study the relation between 
political embeddedness and corporate governance. Many reforms have been implemented to 
professionalize corporate governance since the turn of the millennium, pegging the formal 
legislation to Western best practices. These efforts were particularly aimed at reforming 
state-owned enterprises and support the development of the private sector (Qian & Wu, 
2003). Yet, the regime tolerates a gap between de jure regulation and de facto practices, 
allowing a decoupling between commitment to reforms and actual implementation and 
enforcement (Opper & Schwaag-Serger, 2008). In this context, the institutions of political 
governance show resilience and maintain influence through Party committees, political 
affiliation of top executives within the Party Nomenklatura and enduring state ownership in 
many listed firms (Allen & Shen, 2012; Brødsgaard, 2012). 
To explore the heterogeneity of corporate governance forms that lead to performance in 
China, the empirical study takes a configurational perspective operationalized through 
fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (Fiss, 2007; Ragin, 2000, 2008a). The analysis is 
conducted separately on a sample of 942 private firms and a sample of 810 SOEs. This set 
theoretic method lets emerge in an exploratory fashion the complex causal relationships 
between the many combinations of corporate governance practices and firm performance. 
The model allows to identify the complementarities among the nine conditions included in 
the models: board independence, management incentives, proactive disclosure, large 
minority investors, the proportion of shares of the largest shareholder, an active supervisory 
board, political leadership, political ties, a participation-enabling shareholders meeting (only 
in private sample) and whether the firm is controlled by the SASAC (only in SOE sample).  
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The solution set for private firms results in nine causal paths grouped into four distinct 
categories of corporate governance forms. Firstly, the market pressure configuration 
concerns firms with multiple large minority shareholders without any dominant one. 
Management incentives instill discipline to prevent principal-agent conflicts and proactive 
disclosure provides timely information to investors for monitoring purposes. Secondly, the 
outsiders’ voice configuration involves a large controlling owner, but provides effective 
mechanisms to external investors to participate in the firm’s governance, including proactive 
disclosure, an enabling shareholders meeting and an independent board. Thirdly, the insider-
control configurations involve concentrated ownership and the absence of Western best 
practices of corporate governance. Fourthly, the politically embedded configuration presents 
an interesting hybrid form whereby firms have strong political ties, including a politically 
connected leadership, but also rely on best corporate governance practices. 
The solution set for SOEs results in eight causal paths grouped into three categories of 
corporate governance forms. Firstly, the external pressure configuration is characterized by 
the relatively low proportion of shares held by the controlling state agency. In the first 
version of this form, discipline in instilled through market pressure by informed large 
minority investors and by management incentives. In the second version, a supervisory 
board helps coordinating various stakeholders, including large minority shareholders and 
political agents. Secondly, the insider-control configurations relies on ownership 
concentration and a form of external oversight provided by proactive disclosure. Thirdly, 
the national champions configuration applies to firms ultimately controlled by the central 
asset management commission, the SASAC. These firms are politically connected and rely 
on very concentrated ownership with both a large proportion of shares by the controlling 
owner and the presence of large minority investors. Two distinct versions of this 
configuration are observed. One displays an interesting hybrid form involving the presence 
of political leadership and an active supervisory board, but also an independent board of 
directors and proactive disclosure. The other relies on the absence of these four peripheral 
conditions. 
Apart from documenting in detail successful configurations of corporate governance in 
China, these results provide a number of interesting findings. A high variety of corporate 
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governance forms that lead to profitability coexist under the current Chinese regulatory 
regime. In both samples of private firms and SOEs, there are configurations that lean closer 
to each ideal type control system. Most firms implement corporate governance structures 
that do not align perfectly with any model, but selectively adopt practices from each ideal-
type system to create successful hybrid forms. This supports the idea that distinct practices 
can act as functional equivalents to either discipline management, reduce appropriation of 
private benefits by insiders or generally achieve performance. Moreover, proactive 
disclosure and large minority investors both play a positive role in most configurations 
across the two samples. Generally, management incentives play a more important role in 
private firms. Also, the coordination function of an active supervisory board as broker of 
interests between political agents and other stakeholders is more salient in SOEs. 
These findings offer important contributions to the literature13. Firstly, the analysis helps to 
reconcile the equivocal findings from the literature on political embeddedness and firm 
performance (Faccio, 2006; Fan et al., 2007), outlining the specific bundles of practices in 
which political connections contribute to performance in both SOEs and private firms. By 
the same token, these insights contribute to the debate between hypotheses of the helping 
hand the grabbing hand of the state (Frye & Shleifer, 1997; Shleifer & Vishny, 1998). In 
essence, the main proposition of this chapter is that whether the hand of the state, either in 
the form of direct equity control or through informal political networks, brings net benefits 
to firms depends on complementarities with other features of the ownership or governance 
structures. Still, while many governance configurations in SOEs can lead to performance, 
the more limited coverage of the main models of profitable SOEs compared to that of private 
firms suggests that the state sector is still experimenting. 
Secondly, the substantial heterogeneity and the presence of hybrid forms of corporate 
governance supports the idea that laws and regulations around stock-listed firms do not pre-
determine business-to-government relations, nor do they steer towards an ideal-type model 
suggested in the literature: insider control system for SOEs, as opposed to outsider control 
system for the private sector. The multitude of governance forms of profitable firms is a 
                                                          
13 See the general conclusion for an in depth discussion of the contributions. 
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clear indication that the regulatory framework leaves choices, facilitating the search for 
contextually suited bundles of corporate governance practices by recombining elements 
pertaining to distinct models. The fact that no ideal-type model tends to become dominant 
challenges the convergence hypothesis (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001) and suggests that 
there remains substantial heterogeneity not only at the international level (Khanna et al., 
2006), but also at the domestic level. 
Thirdly, the institutions of political governance inherited from the past in China are adapting 
to the new reality. The Chinese regulatory regime accommodates the coexistence of a large 
variety of successful forms, including those relying on enduring political networks. This 
suggests that the recombined forms of governance may not be symptomatic of a so-called 
transition phase, but rather prove to be persistent in time. Features of political governance 
are adapting and political embeddedness is felt beyond the typical Party Committees (Allen 
& Shen, 2012; Nee et al., 2007; Wong et al., 2004) into new decision making bodies such as 
the board of directors and the board of supervisors. Yet, while political embeddedness 
prevails in a majority of configurations that apply to SOEs, a striking finding rests in the fact 
that the three dominant categories of causal paths in the sample of private firms are devoid 
of political connections.  
An important limitation to this study stems directly from the choice of methodology. 
Focusing on configurations does not provide insight on individual practices in firms beyond 
those covered by the dominant causal paths. This limitation is more salient in the SOEs 
sample given the smaller coverage. Another limitation of the empirical study is the lack of 
longitudinal perspective. One can only speculate that if many politically embedded forms of 
corporate governance survive in 2010, it is likely that many of their complementary features 
will survive beyond the so-called state of reform. Despite the identification of hybrid forms, 
the research design lacks the perspective to qualify in better detail the dynamics at play in 
the co-evolutionary processes of legal reform towards international standards and the 
consolidation of politically embedded national champions.  
Another limitation comes from the choices of measures used in the operationalization. The 
most important construct in this study is firm performance, which is used as the outcome 
variable. For reasons explained earlier, an accounting measure was preferred to stock return 
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data because of the Chinese context where the stock pricing mechanism is not efficient 
enough to provide informative signals (Chen et al., 2011; Peng, 2004). Still, firm 
performance is one of the most common construct used in the management literature and it 
carries inherent limitations (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986). March and Sutton’s (1997) 
dissection of the construct is the most notable review of the difficulties inherent to measuring 
the overall performance of an organization. They explain that a performance advantage is 
competitively unstable and that the typical operationalization of performance analysis “tends 
to eliminate variation in both the determinants and their effects” trough imitation of best 
practices (March & Sutton, 1997: 699). While the present study is not fully exempt from it, 
this limitation is more acute in the case of statistical methods. A configuration analysis has 
more power to account for the variation in determinants across cases by inherently 
incorporating equifinality. Another problem identified by March and Sutton (1997) lies in 
the time frame employed in the analysis. The short term effects of a determinant may differ 
from its long term effects. For instance, in the present chapter this problem applies to the 
relation between an active supervisory board and performance. While an active board may 
increase performance, it is possible that a board will increase its activity following a period 
of weak performance in order to achieve better results in the next period (Vafeas, 1999). 
Another time-related limitation identified by Richard, Devinney, Yip and Johnson (2009) is 
that accounting performance focuses on past performance and may provide little indication 
of future performance. They call for longitudinal studies, as well as using various alternative 
methods and using various measures of performance to reduce error, improve construct 
validity and generally better align the research context with the measure of organizational 
performance. Indeed, combining various measures of performance may allow to better 
capture the broader concept of organizational effectiveness since financial performance 
alone is not a relevant measure for all stakeholders, but mainly for shareholders (Lin 
Fitzgerald & James E. Storbeck, 2003). Similarly, because of data limitation, the 
measurement of the concept of proactive disclosure included in this study was based on only 
two components. While some studies have used single measures (see for instance Li, Pike, 
& Haniffa, 2008 on intellectual capital disclosure), many use indices that include many 
elements of voluntary disclosure (García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010). Such indices are 
not available for China. Finally, while the two distinct measures of political embeddedness 
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used in this study (active political participation by top individuals and by firm leadership) 
encompass a much broader net of political ties than most studies, it is important to remember 
that they still represent only one facet of the interface between businesses and the Party. 
To conclude, this chapter provides insights that open interesting paths for future research. A 
fruitful area would be to explore in detail the corporate governance configurations that were 
dominant early in the reform process. It would be very insightful to conduct in depth case 
studies on firms in each configurations identified here to confirm and enrich the analysis 
about the causal mechanisms. It would also be relevant to conduct a similar analysis on other 
transition economies to validate the generalizability of the findings. The insights from this 
chapter also raise important considerations for other streams of literature. Firstly, the 
importance of the political networks documented here warrants the explicit inclusion of 
political attributes in analyses of social networks in corporations in transition economies 
such as the board interlocks studied through formal network analysis (Ren, Au, & Birtch, 
2008). Secondly, the role of informal political connections and their interactions with the 
ownership structure should be taken into account in studies analyzing business group 
formation (Carney, Gedajlovic, Heugens, Essen, & Oosterhout, 2011), especially in 
transition economies. Finally, the findings are relevant for research in international 
economic diplomacy concerning the treatment of foreign SOEs in antitrust cases and more 
generally regarding infringement of competition policy (Backer, 2010; Sappington & Sidak, 
2003; Zimmerman, 2010). While the identification of foreign state-owned enterprises is 
based on ownership by the government, the findings suggests that the state in transition 
economies may enjoy decision making rights that stem from informal networks of political 
ties.  
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CHAPTER 4 – GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
1 THE DISSERTATION’S AIM AND MOTIVATION 
The corporate governance regime in emerging countries diverges from ideal-type systems. 
In particular, transition economies are difficult to frame in normative models since their 
institutional framework is inherently evolving during the process of reforms from a 
command economy to a market economy. China is the textbook example of a transition 
economy that embodies the institutional tensions between an inherited system of political 
governance and a new legal framework transplanted from Western countries and 
empowering external shareholders on capital markets. On the one hand, the legal reforms 
adopted and implemented in China have largely followed the guidelines predicted by the 
convergence hypothesis of corporate governance emphasizing the primacy of shareholders, 
while accommodating for some features pertaining to a more stakeholder-oriented model 
such as the establishment of boards of supervisors. On the other hand, the decoupling from 
legislation to practice and the strong participation of the state both in terms of ownership 
and political connections contribute to the resilience of informal institutions of political 
governance. 
China is therefore a fantastic case of institutional tensions in corporate governance between 
new legal reforms versus inherited political institutions, between professionalization and 
standardization versus informal channels of influence. Confronted with these evolving 
institutional tensions, firms face a great challenge in designing a corporate governance 
structure that can align the interests of stakeholders, maintain internal coherence with the 
ownership structure and external consistency with the institutional environment, and 
mitigate the most salient governance problems. In this context, can effective and dominant 
forms of corporate governance emerge? If so, what forms and whose interests do they serve? 
This doctoral dissertation was designed to answer these questions and contribute to 
understanding how firms in transition economies navigate often conflicting institutional 
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tensions. The analysis offers a more nuanced view of corporate governance problems in 
transition economies, focusing on China as a business system characterized by ill-defined 
property rights and underdeveloped capital markets. At first sight these two conditions seem 
to suggest that models of corporate governance, such as the outsider or insider control 
models might render only poor explanatory values as both rely on clearly defined ownership 
rights and functioning capital markets. Yet, the analysis shows novel ideas about how 
Chinese firms found solutions by which the corporate governance structures within and 
around firms can help to cope with changes in the external environment, in particular the 
resilience of political influence on firms’ strategic behavior. Despite ill-defined property 
rights and underdeveloped capital markets, firms must conceive structures that efficiently 
allocate decision making rights and income rights to mitigate conflicts of interests between 
owners and managers, insiders and outsiders, shareholders and other stakeholders (Aguilera 
& Jackson, 2003; Daily et al., 2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). These corporate governance 
mechanisms must be compatible with the firm’s ownership structure and take into account 
the contingencies set by the institutional environment (Aguilera et al., 2008). 
The conceptual frameworks were based on existing models found in the literature but 
incorporate elements of political governance and state control to really dive into the 
complexity of the Chinese corporate governance landscape. Adapting the ideal type models 
was necessary because they were built for the Western context and because they assume that 
systems are national, with a substantial level of domestic homogeneity across firms. It was 
therefore crucial to adopt a research design that would allow dropping the premise of 
homogeneity to account for a larger spectrum of forms of corporate governance that emerges 
out of the spontaneous process of recombination observed in China. For this purpose, the 
configurational approach through set theoretic methods is especially useful to study 
complementarities, functional equivalents and equifinality (Fiss, 2007). Accordingly, the 
two empirical studies in this doctoral thesis adopted a configurational perspective on 
corporate governance in the context of a transition economy, using the fsQCA software to 
study large samples of Chinese listed firms during the last decade (Ragin, 2008a). The results 
point to important complementarities among practices and to bundles of causal conditions 
that have not received enough scholarly attention. 
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2 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS 
The second chapter of the thesis (Principal-principal relationships at the core of corporate 
governance problems in China: A set theoretic analysis) looks at the specific corporate 
governance problem that is the most salient in Chinese listed firms: the diversion of cash 
flow from the firm by the controlling shareholder. This problem arises from a misalignment 
of interests among principals when the controlling shareholder enjoys sufficient control 
rights in the context of very concentrated ownership to appropriate a disproportionate share 
of the firm’s cash flow (Claessens et al., 2002). Such diversion of assets is known as 
tunneling (Friedman et al., 2003). Most often in China this takes the form of inter-firm loans, 
whereby the firm transfers money to another corporate entity (Jiang et al., 2010). Typically, 
the controlling shareholder controls both entities, but enjoys higher income rights in the firm 
on the receiving end of the transfer. These related party transactions have received 
considerable attention in scholarly work as they represent the biggest corporate governance 
problem in Asia generally and in China specifically (OECD, 2009a). Still, most of the 
empirical literature that has attempted to identify the determinants of tunneling has produced 
mixed and equivocal results. The task of isolating the effect of variables with statistical 
models has proved elusive. 
The empirical study designed for this dissertation uses a configurational approach to analyze 
the interactions among key causal conditions, allowing for asymmetry and substitution 
effects. The results are particularly useful to identify under which conditions a given variable 
is involved in the causal path leading to the outcome. The findings distinguish three 
conditions that set in place the incentives and the mechanisms that allow tunneling: a 
relatively small proportion of shares (cash flow rights) held by the largest shareholder, a 
high financial leverage (indebtedness) and a small firm size. The presence of any two of 
these three conditions is sufficient to set the tunneling incentives and mechanisms. This 
interaction is symmetric because the opposites of these conditions are observed in firms that 
do not engage in tunneling behavior. Specifically, the presence of any two out of three of 
these opposite conditions is sufficient to avoid tunneling: a relatively large proportion of 
shares held by the largest shareholder, a low financial leverage and a large firm size.  
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In addition, the results show that a lack of monitoring plays an enabling role towards 
tunneling. Provided that tunneling incentives and mechanisms are in place, the absence of 
any two out of these three corporate governance practices is sufficient to enable tunneling: 
proactive disclosure, independent internal audit and board independence. This finding is not 
symmetric because the presence or absence of monitoring does not matter in the absence of 
tunneling incentives and mechanisms. Also, implementing good governance practices 
cannot deter tunneling if incentives are in place. Finally, board independence has an adverse 
effect in firms with large minority shareholders and in those controlled by a state agency. 
These results suggest that board independence can be used as a rent generating mechanism 
and that independent directors play an instrumental role for collusion among various insiders 
to facilitate tunneling behavior. 
The third chapter of the thesis (Political Embeddedness and Corporate Governance: 
Heterogeneity and Hybridization in China) looks beyond specific governance problems and 
adopts a broader approach to analyze the heterogeneity of the Chinese corporate governance 
landscape. This exploratory empirical study dives into the core question of how firms 
respond to the institutional tensions arising from the amalgamation of features of political 
governance inherited from the socialist past with the recent wave of legal reforms aimed at 
professionalizing corporate governance practices according to international standards (Allen 
& Shen, 2012; Opper & Schwaag-Serger, 2008). Specifically, it compares a sample of 
private firms and a sample of SOEs to identify the corporate governance forms that are 
implemented by profitable firms in these two distinct institutional contexts. The elements of 
corporate governance used in the model are derived from three competing systems reviewed 
in the literature: the outsider control system mainly observed in Anglo-Saxon countries, the 
insider-control system mainly observed in continental Europe and Japan, and the politically 
embedded system of administrative governance observed in command economies. The 
results exhibit a high level of heterogeneity of successful corporate governance forms. None 
of the dominant forms identified in the solution conforms integrally to the ideal-type systems 
identified in the literature. Although some are close relatives of these archetypes, most are 
creative hybrid forms. 
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The solution for the sample of private firms exhibits four main corporate governance forms. 
Market pressure configurations rely on proactive disclosure, executive incentives and the 
presence of large minority investors that bring a disciplining effect akin to that of a healthy 
market for corporate control. Outsiders’ voice configurations appear in firms with highly 
concentrated ownership that implement multiple monitoring mechanisms: proactive 
disclosure, board independence and participation-enhancing procedures during the 
shareholders’ meetings. These two forms are the closest relatives of the outsider control 
system, although they do not depend on dispersed ownership. Insider-control configurations 
come in two breeds. The first involves a large controlling shareholder and also large minority 
investors, thus producing a very concentrated ownership structure. The second is an alliance 
of insiders that bears a resemblance with the governance structure of family firms, 
coordinated by an active supervisory board and comprising multiple large shareholders and 
managers that own relatively large parts of the stock. As its label suggests, this form is the 
closest to the insider-control system. Politically embedded configurations are interesting 
hybrids that rely on large minority investors and on political connections, including in the 
top leadership (CEO or board chairman), while implementing most of the corporate 
governance practices prescribed in international standards: executive incentives, proactive 
disclosure and shareholder meetings that enable participation by small investors. 
The solution for the sample of SOEs shows three dominant corporate governance forms. 
There are two versions of External pressure configurations that all exhibit a relatively small 
shareholding by the controlling owner. The first resembles the market pressure configuration 
for private firms and relies on proactive disclosure, executive incentives and large minority 
shareholders to discipline the firm through market forces. The second relies on a supervisory 
board to coordinate the influence of powerful stakeholders, including political agents and 
large minority investors. Insider-control configurations rely on a large controlling 
shareholder, proactive disclosure and a mix of peripheral conditions that may include 
political connections, a supervisory board or executive incentives. National champions 
configurations concern firms that are ultimately controlled by the SASAC of the State 
Council and rely on a very concentrated ownership structure and political connections.  
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3 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The findings of the two empirical studies challenge some dominant ideas in the literature 
and have implications that raise questions for future research. The most important conclusion 
is that, even in transition economies, property rights matter for allocating decision making 
rights between large and minority shareholders and can also be found at the base of 
‘alliances’ between shareholders and stakeholders. The second most important conclusion 
is that political connections matter, but not as much as is commonly assumed. Thus for 
example a great number of private firms operate profitably without any political connection. 
Moreover, political ties are not enough. Since many firms are politically embedded, normal 
political connections do not provide a competitive advantage, but political ties among the 
corporate leaders can provide an additional edge in order to (re-)allocate decision making 
rights. In state firms, a clearer distinction between income rights and control rights shows 
that some state agencies are satisfied with an appropriate return to their investment, 
prioritizing their income rights and exercising restraint with their control rights. In other 
firms, the state appears to have a preference for strong control rights, allowing them to 
appropriate cash flow for purposes that diverge from profit maximization. The extent of 
those principal-principal problems depends on the checks and balances set forth in the 
governance structure and alliances among shareholders and stakeholders. Principal-agent 
problems, regardless of whether they concern a state or private firm, are most frequently 
solved by offering incentive contracts to top executives, in the form of share ownership by 
managers, or by tight internal controls in the case of firms with very concentrated ownership 
among the largest shareholders. In what follows, a more detailed discussion presents the 
theoretical contributions that concerns the literature on corporate governance, on political 
connections in business and on transition economies. 
Literature on corporate governance. This dissertation provides four important 
contributions to the literature on corporate governance. Firstly, it offers a thick analysis of 
principal-principal problems in the context of weak property rights and ill-functioning 
market institutions. The existing empirical literature on this problem, based mostly on 
statistical methods, has so far failed to produce conclusive results about the determinants of 
expropriation by the controlling shareholder (Chen et al., 2009; Huyghebaert & Wang, 2012; 
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Jiang et al., 2010; Wang & Xiao, 2011). The configurational analysis reported here allows 
disaggregating the problem into two main components: the drivers and the monitoring. Three 
main drivers set the incentives and mechanisms for tunneling behavior in the form of related-
party loans, which is the dominant form of cash flow expropriation in China and more 
generally in Asia. If these drivers are absent, monitoring mechanisms are mostly 
superfluous. If these drivers are present, a lack of monitoring enables tunneling, but the 
implementation of monitoring mechanisms through corporate governance practices cannot 
reliably prevent tunneling. While the three drivers are stable across configurations, the 
features involved in monitoring may vary depending on the ownership structure. 
Secondly, this thesis provides fresh support for the idea that corporate governance practices 
should be studied as bundles of interdependent elements (Aguilera et al., 2008; Garcia-
Castro et al., 2013; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014; Rediker & Seth, 1995). The results of both 
empirical studies include complements, substitutes and asymmetric effects. Studying the 
various elements involved in corporate governance structures in isolation obscures the 
complexity of their causal relationship with outcome variables. While set theoretic methods 
have quickly gained ground in the literature, the two studies are additional examples that 
such methods offer a valuable alternative to statistical methods to study causal complexity 
even in large-N samples. Previous studies on principal-agent problems have documented the 
possibility for causal conditions within a corporate governance bundle to be simultaneously 
complements and substitutes (i.e. “any two of these three conditions is sufficient for...”) 
(Garcia-Castro et al., 2013; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014). This dissertation confirms that this 
type of interaction can also apply to the analysis of principal-principal problems. 
Thirdly, while the variety of corporate governance models across countries has been 
documented exhaustively by the comparative corporate governance literature (Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2010), this thesis reports substantial diversity at the national level. While it is 
possible to categorize national regulatory frameworks in broad families and while it is useful 
to theorize ideal-type systems, the observed domestic landscape of corporate governance 
forms is wildly heterogeneous. This suggests that country labels for corporate governance 
models represent a gross over-simplification. By the same token, the debate on the global 
convergence of corporate governance obscures the fact that while firms may adopt structures 
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that are closer or farther from a given ideal-type model (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2012), 
most create forms that fit the contingencies provided by their institutional environment and 
that provide complementarities with their ownership structure and life cycle. 
Fourthly, this dissertation brings additional evidence to the growing body of empirical work 
that adopts a critical view on the role and impact of independent directors (Chen et al., 2011; 
Huyghebaert & Wang, 2012; Peng, 2004; Su et al., 2008). Independent directors can play a 
crucial role to monitor managers since they are assumed not to be in conflict of interests. 
Critics have argued that in practice, they may lack information on the firm’s operations and 
culture, and they may have little time and resources to invest in the monitoring activities 
expected from them. The results in chapter 3 of this thesis provide a mixed picture about 
their impact. For private firms, less than half of the configurations leading to performance 
relied on an independent board. The results in SOEs are striking: six successful 
configurations rely on the absence of board independence while only two rely on its 
presence. The findings in chapter 2 even show that independent directors are instrumental 
to collusion that facilitates tunneling in firms with large minority shareholders and in SOEs. 
These results clearly indicate that not only may independent directors be ill-equipped to 
properly monitor insiders, but that they actually often collaborate with them to the detriment 
of external shareholders. More in-depth intra-board case studies seem necessary to 
understand how independent directors could be empowered and incentivized to fulfil their 
duty. 
Literature on political connections in business. This dissertation also contributes 
to two important aspects of the literature on political connections in business: the shape of 
those political ties and how they interplay with other channels of business to government 
relations, and their effect on economic performance at the firm level. Firstly, the dissertation 
contributes to the literature on political ties by disentangling the many shapes of state and 
political influence in businesses, clarifying the distinct roles of regulatory reform, state 
ownership and informal political ties. There is already a large body of literature on the first 
two elements. Given its administrative monopoly, the state has an inherent but indirect 
influence through legislation and regulation. Many scholars have studied whether and how 
new legal requirements, such as those on the professionalization of corporate governance, 
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can trigger effective changes in the formal structures of listed firms (Berkowitz et al., 2003; 
Edelman & Suchman, 2007; Pistor et al., 2000) . The most direct influence of the state is 
channeled through state ownership. In the Chinese case, state agencies at various levels 
remain in control of a large share of the economy. By concentrating state assets in selected 
sectors with strategic importance, the government influences the degree of competition on 
the market for all firms (Du & Wang, 2013; Li, Liu, & Wang, 2014). While these two 
channels of influence have been documented in detail by a large body of literature, Chapter 
3 provides an empirical account of a much more subtle and opaque channel of influence that 
has received little scholarly attention (Brødsgaard, 2012): the tight networks between the 
corporate elite and the political elite. In the Chinese case, the literature on political 
connections has either focused on the Party Committees (Allen & Shen, 2012; Nee et al., 
2007; Wong et al., 2004) or on politically tied CEOs (Fan et al., 2007). This dissertation 
extends this literature by showing that political connections go far beyond these accounts 
and by offering a novel measure to assess these networks. Indeed, the results indicate that 
political agents can assume key positions in many decision making bodies, including various 
positions on the board of directors, board of supervisors and other top executive positions. 
In chapter 3, political agents are defined and measured as those individuals that, in addition 
to their corporate position, actively participate in the political apparatus by concurrently 
holding outside the firm a formal position for the Party. This provides an informal but very 
effective channel of communication between the corporate elite and the political elite and 
questions the primary allegiance of business leaders. These informal influence channels, 
coupled with the fact that weak enforcement can be a signal that the state is willing to let 
firms implement new legal tools selectively, suggest that laws do not pre-determine business 
to government relations. De facto relations endure much beyond the de jure prescriptions of 
standardization of governance. 
Secondly, while research on the influence of state ownership and of informal political 
connections on firm performance is often studied in parallel streams of literature, this 
dissertation offers an integrated account based on the configurational perspective. Part of the 
debate on the effect of state influence on economic performance has been synthesized in the 
literature through the metaphor of the helping hand versus the grabbing hand of the state 
(Cheung et al., 2010; Frye & Shleifer, 1997; Shleifer & Vishny, 1998). State actors can help 
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mitigate regulatory uncertainty and provide access to valuable resources such as capital, 
information or other resources. Yet, they are often rent seeking and pursue objectives that 
diverge from the interests of shareholders such as maximizing employment or state revenues. 
The debate on the resulting firm level effect is largely unresolved since empirical studies 
often offer contradicting findings. The same problems apply to the literature on political 
connections in which scholars have sought to analyze the impact of politically connected 
CEOs on the performance of listed firms (Faccio, 2006; Fan et al., 2007). This thesis helps 
reconciling some of the past equivocal results using a configuration perspective that allows 
to identify the conditions on which the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of state-ownership 
and political connections are contingent. The evidence reported in chapter 3 suggests that 
both state-ownership and informal political ties can play a crucial role for firms to achieve 
performance, but not under any conditions. The study identifies particular combinations of 
practices that can complement state or political influence in configurations that are 
conducive to performance. For instance, supervisory boards can help brokering between the 
influence of political agents and that of other stakeholders. Overall, most profitable private 
firms are not politically embedded. In the minority that are, political ties appear at the top 
leadership level. Among successful SOEs, many corporate governance forms rely on 
informal political connections in addition to state equity ownership, but nearly all have 
corporate leaders that are not politically embedded. Chapter 2 also clarifies the corporate 
governance configurations in which state ownership is detrimental to external shareholders 
and those where it is not. 
Literature on transition economies. Finally, this dissertation contributes to the 
literature on transition economies (Boisot & Child, 1996; Grabher & Stark, 1997a; Krug & 
Hendrischke, 2012; Nee & Opper, 2012; Peng & Luo, 2000; Pistor et al., 2000; Pistor & Xu, 
2005). Post-socialist markets are often portrayed on a simplistic linear dimension in which 
institutions are slowly evolving from central control towards market driven mechanisms. 
They are in between, in a transitory phase and have not yet fully matured. What is less clear 
is the elusive destination, the final state expected in these normative accounts. The 
exploratory empirical studies reported in this thesis reveal a much more complex and 
interesting picture. The picture is interesting because transition economies are indeed 
implementing sweeping reforms to their legal infrastructure creating a very dynamic 
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institutional environment. The picture is complex because economic actors in transition 
economies are subject to institutional tensions that follow from a clash between inherited 
but persistent features of political governance and new legal frameworks that effectively 
empower shareholders on the capital market. The fact that transition is not a simple linear 
process, but rather a dynamic one that results from complex institutional tensions, has three 
main implications: (1) markets in transition are shaped from bottom-up by firm responses, 
(2) the fact that the regime accommodates this heterogeneity challenges the convergence 
hypothesis, and (3) the explicit integration of political networks is necessary in any serious 
attempt to understand the reality of corporate governance in transition economies. 
Firstly, firms respond to institutional tensions in different ways. The Chinese market harbors 
firms that are still rooted in the system of political governance, but where old features have 
evolved to allow political agents to invest the new governance structures enabled by the 
reforms. It also harbors firms that have parted with this past and adopt corporate governance 
structures that fully rely on market forces, implementing effective monitoring mechanisms 
empowering outsiders. The former may still rely predominantly on capital channeled 
through large state owned banks, while the latter target the equity market and slowly evolve 
into more dispersed ownership structures. And in between, most firms actually implement 
creative hybrid forms tailored according to their specific context. These results strongly 
support Nee and Opper’s (2012) proposition that market transition is largely steered from 
bottom up by the economic actors themselves as opposed to the idea of a trajectory being 
imposed from top-down by the state. 
Secondly, the findings show a very diverse pool of firms that manage to achieve performance 
through distinct governance models. It appears that the Chinese regime accommodates a 
very heterogeneous field of corporate governance, where distinct institutional features 
cohabitate to allow firms to experiment with various solutions. The observed reality does 
not suggest that some forms are vanishing altogether while others are succeeding, but rather 
that all forms are simultaneously adapting to the changing environment. This heterogeneity 
of successful corporate governance forms supports the view that the present state may not 
be a transitory phase after all, or at least not in the normative sense typically advanced. The 
fact that old features of political governance remain useful to many firms suggest a resilience 
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and adaptability that challenges the convergence hypothesis (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001; 
Sachs & Woo, 2001). 
Thirdly, the contributions discussed above about corporate governance and political 
connections are relevant to the literature on transition economies since the evidence reported 
concerns a post-socialist market. The new forms of informal political influence channels are 
particularly important. China, as many transition economies, is still governed by a single 
party. The influence of the Party Nomenklatura stretches in many economic spheres where 
the state sector has effectively been withdrawing over time. In other words, while firms have 
responded creatively to the changing institutional environment, the state has also responded 
creatively to the changing business environment. Yet, such political networks in the Chinese 
corporate world have received little attention in research. This dissertation testifies for the 
importance of studying the breadth and the effects of these networks. The Chinese market 
has scarcely been studied through formal network analysis (Ren et al., 2008). Network 
analysis of top officers and politically connected directors and executives would provide 
invaluable information on many issues pertaining to corporate governance in transition 
economies, including investor-investee relationships, business-group formation and 
governance, information dissemination and the role of coordinating bodies such as the 
SASAC. 
 
4 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
This dissertation also has practical implications for managers, investors and policy makers. 
The heterogeneity of successful corporate governance forms suggests that one size does not 
fit all. In this sense, policy makers would be advised to put forward a regulatory framework 
that adopts a comply-or-explain approach rather than a rigid enforcement of prescribed 
norms to better allow firms to experiment with creative solutions to flexible problems. 
However, in the context of weak legal enforcement, the failure of the corporate governance 
practices put forward by the Chinese legislation and expected to prevent tunneling by means 
of privately enforced monitoring mechanisms set by contractual relationships has many 
shortcomings. The fact that these governance practices are ineffective to prevent cash flow 
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diversion when the interests of principals are not aligned suggests that policy makers have 
to go back to the corporate governance drawing board. Still, this dissertation points to some 
contractual arrangements in terms of firm governance that should be preferred by small 
investors. In particular, proactive disclosure is beneficial to investors in most of the reported 
solutions. Minority shareholders should forcefully advocate for better and timelier disclosure 
in listed firms. Similarly, minority investors should welcome compensation packages that 
increase management shareholding in private firms. This dissertation shows that 
management shareholding in private firms can contribute to mitigate principal-agent 
problems and, under certain conditions, help limiting the expropriation of cash flow by 
insiders. This cannot be said of independent boards. Small shareholders should be very 
cautious with their expectations regarding the duty of independent directors to act as 
watchdogs for their interests and demand accountability. The results indeed suggest that 
independent directors may collaborate with insiders to expropriation cash flow, especially 
in SOEs. 
Also, this dissertation is relevant to policy makers abroad in their negotiations of economic 
agreements with China. China is often still presented as an emerging market. It has long 
been defined by international observers according to its trade and investment flows. Now, 
China has emerged. It has an enviable position in the geographically fragmented production 
chains across East Asia and its domestic market is growing exponentially. The focus of trade 
negotiations with China has already evolved from border measures to behind-the-border 
measures pertaining to domestic national and local regulations that can hamper business 
activities by foreigners. An in depth understanding of the Chinese market structure is 
paramount to identify the potential constraints to cross-border trade and investment 
relations. The role of the state is often cited in international economic diplomacy as a very 
opaque but crucial element. Foreign governments are increasingly concerned with anti-trust 
issues regarding state firms from China and seemingly private firms that may receive covert 
support from the state. The findings reported in this dissertation contribute with a detailed 
account of the shape and impact of business to government relations in large Chinese 
corporations. More specifically, the results warrant a nuanced analysis involving factors that 
go beyond formal ownership rights to account for informal political influence when 
differentiating private firms from state owned enterprises. Such clear cut categories cannot 
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account for the subtle varieties of politically connected firms in China. As Chinese firms are 
increasingly active on the international market for mergers and acquisitions, such knowledge 
is also relevant to managers in target firms abroad to understand the effective decision 
making structure and incentives of Chinese acquirers. 
 
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The ambition of this dissertation was to document the observed heterogeneity of corporate 
governance forms in the context of imperfect market institutions. China represented a timely 
object of study since the recent wave of radical corporate governance reforms have created 
institutional tensions with the institutions of political governance and have produced various 
responses by economic actors. China is also an important object of study since it has become 
and will remain a prominent player in the world economy. The corporate governance 
problems experienced by Chinese firms are not unique to China. Yet, some of the solutions 
are certainly tainted by its particular history and context. It is the author’s hope that the 
findings will inspire further set theoretic research on corporate governance in China, in other 
transition economies and in other countries where firms face institutional tensions.  
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SUMMARY (ENGLISH) 
Corporate governance in transition economies does not fit in the dominant normative 
models. China embodies institutional tensions between an inherited system of political 
governance and new laws transplanted from Western countries that empower external 
shareholders on capital markets. Despite ill-defined property rights and underdeveloped 
capital markets, firms must conceive governance structures that mitigate conflicts of 
interests and that maintain internal coherence with their ownership structure and external 
consistency with the institutional environment.  
This dissertation takes a configuration perspective to offer a nuanced view that accounts for 
the full spectrum of forms of corporate governance that emerged out of the process of 
recombination observed in China. The two empirical studies apply set theoretic methods on 
large samples of Chinese listed firms to uncover the causal complexity involved in corporate 
governance problems, focusing on the complementarities, functional equivalence and causal 
asymmetry observed among elements of corporate governance. The first study analyses the 
configurations that facilitate and deter the most salient governance problem: the diversion 
of cash flow from the firm by controlling shareholders through tunneling. The second study 
analyses the diversity of governance forms in successful firms, including politically 
embedded firms, those that rely on outsider control systems resembling the Anglo-American 
model, as well as creative hybrid forms.  
The dissertation shows that, even in transition economies, property rights matter for 
allocating decision making rights between large and minority shareholders. Also, political 
connections matter, but not as much as is commonly assumed since many private firms 
operate profitably without any political ties. In addition, the observed domestic 
heterogeneity of forms compels (1) to move beyond traditional national-level classifications 
of governance models and (2) to drop the conception of “transition” as a linear process 
towards market institutions in favor of a finer understanding that accommodates a diversified 
landscape including resilient features of political governance. Finally, the thesis commands 
caution regarding the role of independent directors, who not only fail to provide effective 
monitoring on insiders, but often facilitate collusion easing tunneling behavior. 
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SUMMARY (DUTCH) 
Corporate Governance in een Veranderende Markt: 
Heterogene Reacties op Institutionele Spanningen in China 
 
Corporate governance in overgangseconomieën komt niet overeen met de heersende 
normatieve modellen. China belichaamt institutionele spanningen tussen een overerfd 
politiek governance systeem en nieuwe wetten, overgenomen van Westerse landen, die 
macht geven aan externe aandeelhouders op de kapitaalmarkt. In weerwil van slecht 
gedefinieerde eigendomsrechten en onderontwikkelde kapitaalmarkten moeten bedrijven 
governancestructuren bedenken die belangenverstrengeling beperken, interne coherentie 
met de eigendomsstructuur waarborgen en consistent zijn aan de externe institutionele 
omgeving. 
Dit proefschrift neemt een configurationeel perspectief om een genuanceerd beeld te bieden 
van het volledige spectrum aan vormen van corporate governance die voortgekomen zijn uit 
het spontane proces van recombinatie, waarneembaar in China. De twee empirische studies 
passen “set theoretische” methode (d.w.z. “Qualitative Comparative Analysis”) toe op grote 
steekproeven van Chinese beursgenoteerde bedrijven om de causale complexiteit van 
problemen rondom corporate governance bloot te leggen, met aandacht voor de 
complementariteit, functionele gelijkwaardigheid en causale asymmetrie die zichtbaar is 
tussen de verschillende onderdelen van corporate governance. De eerste studie analyseert de 
configuraties die het meest in het oog springende governanceprobleem faciliteren en 
verhinderen: het wegsluizen van geldstromen van de organisatie door aandeelhouders te 
controleren, een proces dat “tunneling” heet. De tweede studie analyseert de diversiteit van 
governancevormen in succesvolle organisaties, waaronder bedrijven die verankerd zijn in 
de politiek, bedrijven die afhankelijk zijn van externe controlesystemen overeenkomstig met 
het Anglo-Amerikaanse model, alsook creatieve hybride vormen. 
Het proefschrift toont aan dat zelfs in overgangseconomieën eigendomsrecht van belang is 
voor het toewijzen van besluitvormingsrechten tussen grote- en minderheidsaandeelhouders. 
Ook maken politieke banden verschil, maar niet zoveel als vaak wordt aangenomen 
aangezien veel private bedrijven winstgevend zijn zonder politieke betrekkingen te hebben. 
Daarnaast dwingt de waargenomen binnenlandse heterogeniteit in governancestructuren om 
(1) traditionele nationale classificaties van governancemodellen te overstijgen en (2) de 
opvatting van “transitie” als lineair proces richting marktinstituties te vervangen met een 
geraffineerder begrip waarin plaats is voor een gediversificeerd landschap inclusief de 
veerkrachtige eigenschappen van politieke governance. Tot slot stuurt het proefschrift aan 
op waakzaamheid met betrekking tot de rol van onafhankelijke bestuurders, die niet alleen 
tekortschieten in het bieden van effectief toezicht op insiders, maar vaak ook samenspanning 
faciliteren en tunneling vergemakkelijken.  
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SUMMARY (FRENCH) 
Gouvernance d’entreprise lors de la transition à l’économie de marché : 
Réponses hétérogènes aux tensions institutionnelles en Chine 
 
La gouvernance d’entreprise dans les économies en transition diverge des modèles 
dominants. La Chine présente des tensions institutionnelles entre un héritage de gouvernance 
politique et une vague récente de réformes calquées sur les normes occidentales s’appuyant 
sur la primauté des actionnaires. Malgré un marché des capitaux peu développé et des droits 
de propriété mal définis, les entreprises doivent concevoir des pratiques de gouvernance 
cohérentes avec leur structure actionnariale, harmonieuses avec  l'environnement 
institutionnel et permettant de limiter les conflits d'intérêts. 
Cette thèse adopte une perspective configurationnelle pour offrir une vision nuancée tenant 
compte de l'éventail complet des formes de gouvernance d'entreprise ayant émergées du 
processus d’hybridation observé en Chine. Les deux études empiriques appliquent, sur de 
larges échantillons d’entreprises chinoises, une méthode issue de la théorie des ensembles 
(fsQCA) pour documenter la complexité causale propre aux problèmes de gouvernance et 
mettant l'accent sur les effets complémentaires, substitutifs et asymétriques observés parmi 
les éléments de gouvernance. La première étude analyse les configurations qui facilitent et 
limitent le principal problème de gouvernance: le détournement de capitaux par les 
actionnaires de contrôle. La deuxième étude analyse la diversité des formes de gouvernance 
dans les entreprises performantes, incluant les entreprises bénéficiant de connections 
politiques, celles s'appuyant sur les systèmes de contrôle externe similaires au modèle anglo-
américain, ainsi que certaines ayant des formes hybrides innovantes. 
La thèse démontre que, même dans les économies en transition, les droits de propriété ont 
un effet déterminant sur l’attribution du pouvoir décisionnel entre les actionnaires 
majoritaires et minoritaires. De même, les connexions politiques importent, mais façon 
modérée puisque plusieurs entreprises privées performent sans réseau politique. En outre, la 
diversité observée des formes de gouvernance dicte (1) un développement théorique 
dépassant les classifications nationales traditionnelles de modèles de gouvernance et (2) 
l'évolution du concept de «transition» compris comme un processus linéaire de réforme à 
finalité libérale vers une compréhension plus fine d’un portrait diversifié comprenant des 
éléments résilients de gouvernance politique. Enfin, les résultats constituent une mise en 
garde concernant le rôle des administrateurs indépendants, qui non seulement échouent à 
assurer un contrôle efficace des dirigeants, mais facilitent souvent la collusion menant au 
détournement de capitaux. 
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SUMMARY (MANDARIN) 
市场转型过程中的公司治理—对中国制度性矛盾的多样化反应 
主流的公司治理规范模型并不适用于转型中的经济体。在中国，制度性矛盾体现在
由历史演变而来的政治治理体系与从西方国家引进的授权于金融市场的股东的法律
之间的对立。面对不明确的产权制度和不发达的金融市场，公司还必须找到能够缓
解利益冲突，对内能与公司所有权匹配，对外能和制度环境保持一致的治理结构。 
 
本文从配置的角度提出了一个新颖的观点，解释了在中国发现的自发性重组过程中
涌现出的所有公司治理的形式。这两个基于大量中国上市公司样本的实证研究揭示
了公司治理中的因果复杂性问题，聚焦于互补性、功能对等以及因果不对称等这些
在公司治理中出现的因素。第一个研究分析了有利于解决公司治理中最突出问题的
配置，例如控股股东通过利益输送来实现公司资金流的转移的问题。第二个研究分
析了那些成功的公司的多样化的治理模式，包括政策嵌入型公司，以及那些依赖于
外部控制系统的类似于英美模式的公司，以及一些创造型的混合治理模式。 
 
论文指出，即使在转型中的经济体，财产权关系到在大股东和散户股东之间如何分
配决定权利。同时，政治关联也有影响，尽管这种影响不像通常认为的那么显著因
为许多私人企业在毫无政治关联的情况下也能经营并盈利。另外，那些观察到的国
内多样化的治理形式迫使超越传统管制模型国家等级分类，将“转型”的概念作为转
向市场经济的线性过程，支持一种更好的理解来适用于包括政府管制弹性特征在内
的多种所有制经济。最后，本文提出必须关注独立董事的职责，因为许多独立董事
不仅不能对内部交易进行有效的内部监管，还经常促使共谋，使得利益输送行为变
得容易。 
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l)CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DURING MARKET TRANSITION
HETEROGENEOUS RESPONSES TO INSTITUTIONAL TENSIONS IN CHINA
Corporate governance in transition economies does not fit in the dominant normative
models. China embodies institutional tensions between an inherited system of political
governance and new laws transplanted from Western countries that empower external
shareholders on capital markets. 
The two empirical studies in this dissertation apply set theoretic methods on large
samples of Chinese listed firms to uncover the causal complexity involved in corporate
governance problems, focusing on the complementarities, functional equivalence and
causal asymmetry. The first study analyses the configurations that facilitate and deter the
most salient governance problem: the diversion of cash flow from the firm by controlling
shareholders through tunneling. The second study analyses the diversity of governance
forms in successful firms, including politically embedded firms, those that rely on outsider
control systems resembling the Anglo-American model, as well as creative hybrid forms. 
The dissertation shows that, even in transition economies, property rights matter for
allocating decision making rights between large and minority shareholders. Also, political
connections matter, but not as much as is commonly assumed since many private firms
operate profitably without any political ties. In addition, the observed domestic hetero -
geneity of forms compels to drop the conception of “transition” as a linear process
towards market institutions in favor of a finer understanding that accommodates a
diversified landscape including resilient features of political governance. Finally, the thesis
commands caution regarding the role of independent directors, who not only fail to
provide effective monitoring on insiders, but often facilitate collusion easing tunneling
behavior.
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